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3 On  14  January  1999 the European Parliament adopted its  resolution on improving the financial 
management of the Commission,  callinguer alia 'for  a committee of independent experts  to  be 
convened  under  the  auspices  of the  Parliament  and  the  Commission'  (B4-0065,  0109  and 
0110/99). 
On  27  January  1999  the  Conference  of Presidents  of the  European  Parliament  considered  and 
approved a "Note  on the  Committee of Independent Experts",  fixing  the  composition and terms 
of reference of the  Committee of Independent Experts. 
At the same meeting, the President of the Commission gave his  agreement to  the composition and 
terms  of reference of the Committee of Independent Experts. 
In  a letter to  the President of the  European Parliament dated  1 February 1999,  the President of the 
Commission  confirmed  the  agreement  of the  Commission  to  the  composition  and  terms  of 
reference of the Committee of Independent Experts. 
On 2 February 1999 the  Committee of Independent Experts held its  initial meeting and  appointed 
Mr Andre MIDDELHOEK as  its chairman. 
On  15  March  1999 the  Committee submitted its first report to  the President of the  European 
Parliament and the President of the European Commission. 
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7 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. The Mandate 
1.1.1.  At its  plenary sitting of 14  January  1999,  the European Parliament adoptmesmlution 
on improving the financial  management of the European Commission. 
Paragraph  1 of this  resolution reads: 
'Calls  for a committee of independent experts to be convened under the auspices 
of the  Parliament  and  the  Commission  with  a  mandate  to  examine  the  way  in 
which  the  Commission  detects  and  deals  with  fraud,  mismanagement  and 
nepotism  including  a  fundamental  review  of  Commission  practices  in  the 
awarding  of  all  financial  contracts,  to  report  by  15  March  [1999]  on  their 
assessment in  the  first instance on the College of Commissioners;'. 
1.1.2.  The request in  the  European Parliament resolution that the Committee 'examine the way 
in  which the Commission detects and deals  with fraud,  mismanagement and nepotism,  including 
a fundamental  review of Gmmission  practices  in  the awarding of all  financial  contracts' refers 
obviously to  an  examination of Commission procedures and practices in  relation to specific cases 
rather than  to an  in-depth investigation of the  merits of each case.  Such an  investigation would 
indeed  imply  a  repetition  of the  examination  of many  of the  Commission's  activities  already 
undertaken by the competent bodies such as  Parliament's tilmittee on Budgetary Control,  the 
Commission's Financial Control departments  (DG XX) and UCLAF. 
1.1.3.  Moreover,  such  an  approach  would  have  run  the  risk  of  interfering  in  ongoing 
investigations carried out by the competent authorities  within  the framework of disciplinary or 
penal proceedings against Community officials or third parties. This Committee is not entitled, 
nor does  it  intend, to  intervene in such proceedings.  With this  in  mind,  it  refrained from  hearing 
private  parties,  even  on  a  voluntary  basis,  since  that  could  jeopardise  pending  or  future 
proceedings before the courts and  would have obliged the Committee to  follow  procedural rules 
which are beyond  its  remit. 
1.1.4.  The European Parliament's Conference of Presidents at its meeting of 27 January 1999 
adopted a note on the Committee of Independent Experts which stipulates under point 6 (Terms 
of reference), paras.!  and 2: 
There  is  only  very  limited  time  available for the  drawing  up  of a first  report 
(March  15 deadline,  according  to  the  resolution). 
The first report could seek to  establish  to  what extent the  Commission,  as a body, 
or  Commissioners  individually,  bear  specific  responsibility  for  the  recent 
examples  of fraud,  mismanagement  or  nepotism  raised  in  Parliamentary 
discussions,  or in  the  allegations which  have  arisen  in  those discussions.' 
1.1.5.  The Conference of Presidents' stated aim for the first report  - 'to establish to what extent 
the Commission, as a body, or Commissioners individually, bear specific responsibility'- focuses 
attention  on  the  Commission as  a body and  on  individual  Commissioners rather than  on  the 
9 Commission's  administrative  services.  That  said,  the  close  interrelationship  between  the 
Administration and the Commissioners themselves was taken into account by the Committee 
where necessary. However, since it falls within the Committee's mandate to examine the way in 
which  the  Commission  detects  and  deals  with  fraud,  mismanagement  and  nepotism  which, 
clearly, also includes reprehensible acts committed by the Commission's administrative services, 
the Committee will have to take account of the conduct of the Administration and its officials in 
the cases under review. 
1.1.6.  In accordance with the resolution and detailed mandate outlined above, the Committee's 
first  report  will  limit  itself to  giving  its  considered  view  on  the  question  of the  'specific 
responsibility' of the Commission as  a body and of Commissioners individually in  a range of 
specific cases.  It will do so on the basis of the criteria and methodology set out below. 
1.1.7.  For  its  second  report,  the  Committee  envisages  a  more  wide-ranging  review  of the 
Commission's culture, practices and procedures within the context of the issues arising in  its 
first.report. 
1.2.  Independence  and  status  of  the  Committee 
1.2.1.  According to point 6 of the Conference of Presidents' note, para. 3, referred to above, the 
Committee shall be free  to  decide  on  the  organisation of their work and the  internal distribution 
of their tasks.' This freedom is  understood not only to denote independence in  organisational 
matters but also to give a free hand in the definition of approach to be taken, the questions to raise 
and the nature of the conclusions to be drawn. 
1.2.2.  The Committee is not constituted under the Treaties or any other regulation governing the 
European institutions and is thus neither a Community institution nor a Community agency. It is 
certainly not a Community court and has no formal investigative power. Further, its  authority is 
vested in it by virtue solely of an agreement between the Commission and Parliament that (i) all 
relevant documentation the Committee wished to look at would be made available and (ii) that 
the staff of the institutions would be exempted from all secrecy obligations imposed on them by 
Staff Regulations. 
1.2.3.  The Committee therefore regards itself as  a temporary advisory committee operating by 
consent and drawing its authority from the resolution of Parliament and the commitment of both 
Parliament and the Commission to support its work and to recognise its findings.• 
1.2.4.  The Committee therefore seeks neither to  'judge' in the judicial sense of the word nor to 
give  'instructions', but rather to offer a  (legally or politically)  non-binding evaluation  of the 
Commission's, and Commissioners', conduct in the cases under consideration. 
1.2.5.  Throughout  its  mandate  the  Committee  has  been  completely  independent.  Though 
established 'under the auspices' of the European Parliament and the Commission,  it was guided 
by the principle of impartiality vis-a-vis these two institutions and sees itself as  answerable only 
for the exercise of its mandate and accountable to no party other than the general public. 
Sec letter from the President of the Commission to the President of the European Parliament dated 
1 February 1999. 
10 1.2.6.  In practical terms,  the Committee applied conditions of confidentiality to  its  work in order 
to  avoid any interference from  outside. 
1.3.  Scope of the inquiries 
1.3.1.  Given the extremely limited time  available for  its  first report,  the  Committee restricted 
its  task to  the consideration and evaluation of a  limited number of cases. 
1.3.2.  Though  such  selectivity  arguably  bears  the  risk  of leading  to  partial  (i.e.  incomplete) 
conclusions,  the  Committee  took  the  view  that  each  case  selected  at  this  stage  for  close 
consideration  was  in  itself sufficient  to  produce  meaningful  conclusions  in  the  context of the 
mandate assigned to  the  Committee,  which is  to  comment on the  Commission's procedures and 
practices for the detection of and for dealing with fraud,  mismanagement and nepotism. The cases 
have  been  selected  on  the  basis  of recent  parliamentary discussions,  as  was  suggested  in  the 
Conference of  Presidents' note  concerning  the  mandate of the  Committee.  The fact  that other 
areas  of activity have  not  been examined  should  not,  however,  be  taken  to  mean that they  are 
necessarily clear of justified allegations. 
1.3.3.  As  regards  the  cases  it  selected  for  scrutiny,  the  Committee  did  its  utmost  to  obtain 
information which was  as  sound and  as  substantiated as  possible. It emphasises,  however,  that 
it  did  not  seek  'proof' in  the  judicial  sense  of the  word.  On  the  basis  of available  reports  and 
documentation as  provided by the relevant authorities and confirmed through interviews and other 
sources, it based its judgment on credible information,  which  was  either not contested or could 
be verified by the Committee itself within its  limited powers. 
1.4.  Nature of reprehensible acts 
1.4.1.  The European Parliament's resolution refers  to  'fraud,  mismanagement and nepotism' as 
the  reprehensible  acts  in  respect  of  which  the  Committee  is  asked  to  examine  how  the 
Commission detects  and  deals  with them. 
1.4.2.  Fraud refers  to  intentional acts  or omissions  tending to  harm the financial  interests of the 
Communities.  It encompasses irregularities  in  establishing documents  committed ntentionally, 
non-communication of information,and misappropriation of funds  which are  designed to  obtain 
illegal financial  or other benefits  at  the expense of the  Community's financial  interests  . 
1.4.3.  Mismanagement is  a broader concept.  In  the  view of the  Committee, it refers  in  general 
to  serious  or persistent infringements of the principles of sound administration and,  in particular, 
to  acts  or  omissions  allowing  or encouraging  fraud  or irregularities  to  occur  or persist.  Such 
2 
Compare Article 1 of the Convention based on Article K.3 of the TEU relating to the protection of the 
financial interests of the European Communities, adopted by the Council Act of 26 July 1995 (OJ C 316, 
27.11.95 p. 48). 
11 infringements  may be committed  intentionally  but  will  consist,  more  frequently,  in  negligent 
behaviour, or lack of care,  in  the  exercise of public management functions.
3 
1.4.4.  Nepotism is  a different (and non-legal) concept.  In common usage it refers  to  favouritism 
shown  to  relatives  or friends,  especially in  appointments  to  desirable  positions  which  are  not 
based on merit or justi~e . 
1.4.5.  In  the  Conmittee's  view,  it follows  from  the  above  that,  taken  together,  the  notions  of 
fraud,  mismanagement  and  nepotism  point  to  various  categories  of reprehensible  conduct, 
namely: 
(i)  irregularities, i.e.  infringements of Community or applicable national rules if committed 
intentionally,  in  which  case  they  will  often  involve  fraud  or  result  from  serious 
negligence; 
(ii)  fraudulent,  i.e.  intentional behaviour by act or omission (including corruption) intended 
to  obtain an illegal benefit at the expense of the Community's financial  interests; 
(iii)  ethically  reprehensible  behaviour,  such  as  making  public  appointments,  awarding 
contracts, or recommending individuals  for  rewards and benefits  (even where  no fraud  or 
irregularity is  committed) on the  basis  not of merit but of favouritism  shown to  family, 
friends  or other relations; 
(iv)  serious or persistent infringements of the principles of sound administration. 
1.5.  Standards of proper behaviour 
1.5.1.  It is  obvious  that  the  categories  mentioned  above  overlap,  and  that  it  is  not  easy  (nor 
necessary for the  Committee) to  distinguish between them in  any given case.  The distinction is 
made here only to  serve as  an  indication of the standards which the  Committee wishes to apply. 
These  standards  are  based  on  the  Committee's  understanding  of the  requirements  of proper 
behaviour in the exercise of public office and the need for compliance with the  highest standards 
of  conduct  in  European  public  administration.  These  standards  apply  above  all  to  the 
Commissioners and  the  members of their private offices.  As  custodians of the respect in which 
the  European  institutions  as  a  whole  must be held  by the  public  at  large,  such  high  standards 
3 
4 
For the purpose of comparison, the European Ombudsman defines 'maladministration' (the term used 
in Article 138e of the EC Treaty, establishing the office of Ombudsman) as follows: 
(source: http://www.europarl.ep.ec/ombudsman) 
'Maladministration means poor or failed administration. This occurs if an institution fails  to  do 
something it should have done, if it does it in the wrong way or if it does something that ought not 
to be done. Some examples are: 
administrative irregularities 
unfairness 
discrimination 
abuse of power 
lack or refusal of information 
unnecessary delay.' 
Compare Oxford English Dictionary and Petit Robert 
12 imply that no  opportunities  for,  or appearances of,  possible conflicts of interest must be created 
which would jeopardise the  public image of the Commission or the Community as  a whole. 
1.5.2.  The Committee is  conscious of the fact  that - in the absence of specific rules  or codes of 
conduct - the  very concept of standards of proper behaviour entails grey areas  of assessment.  The 
Committee  believes  nonetheless  that  there  exists  a  common  core  of 'minimum  standards',  in 
addition  to  rules laid down  in black and  white,  which binds  holders  of high public  office,  such 
as  the Commissioners and  the  members of their private offices.  The higher the office,  the more 
demanding  those  standards  are  in  requiring  the  holders  to  conduct  themselves  properly  in 
appearance and behaviour. 
1.5.3.  Article  157  of the  EC Treaty states,  in  paragraph 2,  that 'the  Members of the  Commission 
shall,  in the general interest of the Community, be completely independent in the  performance 
of their duties...  In  the performance of their duties,  they shall neither seek nor take instructions 
from  any government or from  any other body.  They shall refrain from any action  incompatible 
with  their  duties...  [T]hey  will  respect...  their  duty  to  behave  with  integrity  and  discretion  as 
regards  the  acceptance, after they have ceased to hold office,  of certain appointments or benefits.' 
This  latter duty of integrity and  discretion is  one which undoubtedly also  applies,  even more  so, 
while Commissioners are  in  office. 
1.5.4.  The rules  of conduct which are part of the common core of 'minimum standards' referred 
to  above  may be defined as  follows: 
acting  in  the  general  interest of the  Community and  in compliltdependence,  which 
requires  that  decisions  are  taken  solely  in  terms  of the  public  interest,  on  the  basis  of 
objective criteria and  not under the influence of their own or of others' private interests; 
behaving  with integrity  and discretion  and  - the  Committee  would  like  to  add  - in 
accordance  with  the  principles  oflccozmtability  and openness  to  the  public,  which 
implies  that,  when  decisions  are  taken,  the  reasons  for  them  are  made  known,  the 
processes by which  they were taken  are  transparent and  any personal conflicting interests 
are honestly and publicly acknowledged. 
Only  by respecting  those  standards  will  it  be  possible  for  holders  of high  office  to  have  the 
authority  and  the  credibility enabling  them  to  offer  thrndership  which  they  are  required  to 
give.5 
1  .6.  The issue of responsibility 
1.6.1.  The stipulation  in  the  European  Parliament's  resolution  that  it  is  for  the  Committee  'to 
examine the  way in which  the Commission detects  and  deals  with  fraud,  mismanagement and 
nepotism' is  to  be seen in  connection with  the  stipulation in the  Conference of Presidents' note 
that  the  Committee  shall  'seek  to  establish  to  what  extent  the  Commission,  as  a  body,  or 
Commissioners individually,  bear specific responsibility'.  The reference in  the resolution to  the 
way  in  which  the  Commission  detects  and  deals  with  fraud,  mismanagement  and  nepotism 
indicates  that the emphasis of the Committee's examination is  to  be placed on mismanagement 
5  Compare with the 'Seven principles of public life' as set out in the first report on Standards in Public 
Life of the UK Nolan (now Neill) Committee, 1995, p.l4. 
13 on the part of the  Commission, as  a body,  or of thmtmssioners individually,  as  stated in the 
note of the Conference of Presidents.  It is  therefore the essence of this  Committee's task to  look 
into  the practices of the Commission aimed  at detecting and dealing with fraud,  mismanagement 
and nepotism committed (possibly) by Members of the Commission itself as  well as  (more often) 
by  officials  working  in  the  Commission,  or  by  third  parties  working  on  behalf of,  or under 
contract to,  the Commission.  And indeed,  as  the individual cases examined below demonstrate, 
poor or failed administratiorby the Commission,  as  a body,  or by individual Commissioners and 
members of their private offices in detecting and dealing with fraud,  mismanagement or nepotism, 
covers the bulk of the allegations made and  examined by the Committee. That does  not mean that 
the  Committee did not also  have  to  deal  with a few  allegations  of nepotism by Members of the 
Commission itself,  although there  were no  allegations of fraud  or corruption. 
1.6.2.  Reprehensible conduct of the Commission as  a body,  or ofmmissioners individually, 
and  more  particularly  (as  we  have  seen)  mismanagement  in  detecting  or dealing  with  fraud, 
mismanagement or nepotism perpetrated by the  administrative services of the Commission and 
by  third  parties  working  for  the  Commission,  obviously  involves  the  responsibility  of the 
Commission as  a whole,  or of individual Commissioners. The responsibility that this  Committee 
is  dealing  with  concerns  ethical  responsibility,  that  is  responsibility  for  not  behaving  in 
accordance  with  proper  standards  in  public  life,  as  discussed  above  (para.l.5.1.).  Such 
responsibility must be distinguished  from  the  political responsibility of the  Commission dealt 
with  in Article  144 of the  EC Treaty,  which is  to  be determined by the European Parliament,  and 
from  the disciplinary responsibility of individual Commissioners dealt with in  Article  160 of the 
EC Treaty, which is  to be determined by the Court of Justice,  on application of the  Council or the 
Commission
6
•  That does  not,  however,  prevent  the  institution  concerned,  when  determioning 
political or disciplinary responsibility,  from  basing its  assessment in part on the  findings  of the 
Committee  concerning  the  collective  or  individual  behaviour  of  the  Commission  or  of 
Commissioners. 
6  It must be distinguished from  the  non-contractual  liability provided for in  Article  215,  second 
paragraph, of the EC Treaty, which the Community may incur as a result of damage caused by its 
institutions or its servants in the performance of their duties. 
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INTRODUCTION 
2.0.1.  The  tourism  file  is  the  oldest  of the  files  which  calls  the  Commission's  actions  into 
question. It began in  1989 with the launch of the European Year of Tourism (EYT).  In  1999, 76 
bodies  or  individuals  were  the  subject  of criminal  proceedings  in  the  Member  States  or of 
additional  inquiries  within  the  Commission.  This  file  gave  rise  to  severe  criticisms  of the 
Commission's management by the  European Parliament and the Court of Auditors  as  well in a 
number of press reports. 
2.0.2. Because of the number of proceedings involved, the Committee of Independent Experts has 
given detailed consideration to  three specific matters  which have not been dealt with in sufficient 
depth or with the appropriate care:  disciplinary measures and  the  contracts with Euroconseil and 
IPK. 
2.1.  Le~.:al framework and hud~.:et allocations 
2.1.1. In the wake of the resolutions adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in  1983 
and  1984  on  a  Community  tourism  policy,  then  of the  European  Parliament resolution  of 22 
January  1988  on  the  promotion  and  financing  of tourism,  the  Commission  proposed  to  the 
Council an  action programme designed  to  highlight the economic significance of tourism in the 
Community and to  integrate tourism policy more closely into other Community policies. 
2.1.2. On 21  December 1988, the Council designated 1990 as European Year of Tourism (Council 
Decision  89/46/EEC).  That  decision  laid  down  that  the  Commission,  in  consultation  with  a 
Steering  Committee,  would  take  the  measures  required  for  the  implementation  of the  action 
programme, with particular regard to  the coordination of private and public tourism organisations 
in  the Member States. For their part, the  Member States would be responsible for pre-selecting 
the  projects  and  monitoring  their  implementation.  They  were  also  required  to  report  to  the 
Commission. 
2.1.3.  Article  3  of the  Council  Decision  provided  for  a  budget  of ECU  5  million  for  the 
organisation of the European Year of Tourism.  To that amount was  added ECU 0.8  million to 
cover administrative costs.  At the same time,  ECU 7.5  million was  entered in the budget to fund 
activities, especially studies,  in the  tourism sector. Those activities began in  1990 and continued 
in  1991  and  1992. 
2.1.4.  On 13  July 1992, the Council adopted a three-year action plan to  assist tourism (covering 
the period from  1 January  1993  to  31  December 1995)  (Council Decision 92/421/EEC) which 
entrusted the Commission with the implementation thereof and its  coordination with the various 
Community policies  through  the  directorates-general  concerned.  The  Commission  was  to  be 
assisted  by a  committee  consisting of representatives  of the  Member States  and  chaired by a 
representative of the  Commission. In  the light of the opinion of that committee, it  would adopt 
measures  which would apply immediately. 
2.1.5. The volume of Community funds required for the implementation of the plan was estimated 
at ECU 18  million. 
17 2.1.6.  This action plan constituted the  final  decision adopted in this field. 
2.1.  7.  Other  Community  policies,  covering,  for  example,  the  social  sector,  the  environment, 
transport,  the trans-European networks, research,  training and education, cooperation and cultural 
activities,  were endowed with budgets  designed  to  finance projects having an  impact on tourism. 
2.1.8.  In  all, according  to  the  Court  of  Auditors'  Special  Report  No  3/96,  apart  from  the 
appropriations  allocated to  EYT,  the budgetary authority granted: 
ECU 15.9 million for  actions  to  assist tourism from  1989 to  1992 
ECU 1.750 million to  promote Europe as  a holiday destination in  third countries 
ECU 21.7  million from  1993  to  1995  for  the  plan of action to  assist tourism 
i.e.  a total of ECU 39.350 million. 
2.2. Orcanisational structure 
2.2.1.  From 1988  to  1995,  the Commissioners  with special responsibility for tourism were: 
from  1989  to  January  1993:  Mr Cardoso e Cunha 
from  January  1993  to  January 1995:  Mr Vanni d'Archirafi 
since January  1995:  Mr Papoutsis. 
2.2.2.  With regard to  both direct actions  and  the coordination of indirect actions,  responsibility 
for  implementation  of tourism  policy  lay  with  DG  XXill  - Directorate  A:  Action  to  assist 
enterprises and improve the  business environment. 
2.2.3.  Within Directorate A,  a unit was  set up  with specific responsibility for the  implementation 
of Community tourism policy.  According to  the  Establishment Plan in force  in June  1990,  that 
unit had the following  staff:  1 A3,  2 A  7  -A4,  1 B and  1 C,  i.e.  five  officials,  five  auxiliary staff 
members (three A  category and  2 C category),  three detached national experts and  one member 
of staff recruited from  an  employment agency.  In  order to  offset the  impact of a lack of staff in 
the unit,  the firm  Euroconseil was  selected after a call for  tenders  to  take responsibility for  the 
technical management of European Year of Tourism from May 1989 to  October 1990. 
2.2.4.  The authorising officers responsible for  the commitment of expenditure were the  Director-
General and the  Director of Directorate A,  the  other directors and  the  assistant  to  the  Director-
General being authorised to  sign payment orders.  Day-to-day management of the  appropriations, 
i.e.  the preparation of commitments of expenditure and payment orders,  the  checking of invoices, 
etc.,  was  carried out by a B  category official from  the  Tourism Unit and by a  unit headed by an 
official in the  same category under the direct responsibility of the  Director-General.  In  practice, 
the  assistants  to  the  Director  and  to  the  Director-General  were  closely  involved  in  the 
management of the  appropriations  allocated  to  tourism policy. 
2.2.5.  The Steering Committee provided for in the Council's resolution was  set up  and  met from 
March  1989 to  February  1991.  Local  committees,  which  were  not  provided for but were deemed 
to  be  essential  to  the  success  of EYT,  were  also  set  up  in  each  Member State.  In  actual  fact, 
decisions were taken bilaterally,  with the  Steering Committee being simply informed thereof. 
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2.3. Chronology of events and detection of irregularities 
2.3.1.  In  order  to  carry  out  the  tasks  entrusted  to  the  Commission  by the  Council,  DG XXill 
issued: 
calls  for  tenders  which,  except  for  the  consultancy  contracts  with  Euroconseil, 
generally related to  contracts  for  studies,  with particular regard to  statistics.  Like 
all calls for tender,  they were  subject to  the financial provisions applicable, i.e.  the 
Financial Regulation, its  implementing provisions  and the  Commission's internal 
rules,  the contracts being subject,  in  accordance with their nature  and  amount,  to 
strict  rules  for  tendering  with  a  view  to  ensuring  the  transparency  of  the 
operations,  equal  treatment  for  bidders  and  sound  financial  management. 
Selections were made by the  authorising officer and  the  managing services,  after 
consultation of the  ACPC  and  subject to  the approval of the Financial Controller. 
However,  the  Court of Auditors' report  submitted  in  September  1992  refers  to 
serious  irregularities  and  unjustified  payments,  not  least  in  connection  with 
actions  subject to  strict procedures (see the  Euroconseil file); 
calls  for  proposals  for  specific  actions  subsidised from  the  Community budget. 
This  procedure  is  not  covered  by any  rules  and  concerns  subsidies..  It enables 
interested  associations  and  individuals  to  apply  for  a  subsidy  and  obliges  the 
authorising officer's  staff to  compare requests  with each other. 
2.3.2.  In fact,  DG XHI above all granted ad  hoc subsidies to  projects put forward,  unsolicited, 
by  the  recipients  of the  subsidies  and  which  were  not  covered  by  a  call  for  proposals.  This 
instrument was  used  on  a  massive  scale  for  EYT and  involved  half the  projects  for  the  period 
1991-1992,  then  a quarter for  the  action plan. 
2.3.3.  However,  according  to  the  Court of Auditors' Special Report No 3/96, in the  context of the 
action plan the  selection  procedure carried out on  the  basis  of a  call  for  tenders  and  a  call  for 
proposals  opened  in  1994  suffered  from  technical  problems,  with  particular  regard  to  the 
registration  of bids,  while  the  procedure  introduced  in  1995,  although  an  improvement on its 
predecessors,  was  not able  to  guarantee equal treatment of bidders on a regular basis. 
2.3.4.  At the samaime, the  Head of the Tourism Unit,  as  the  Court of First Instance confirmed 
in  the judgment it handed down  on  19  March  1998  in  Case T-74/94,  knowingly and persistently 
engaged  in  unauthorised  outside  activities  which  completely  negated  guarantees  of  his 
independence and were  such  as  to  give rise to  serious conflicts of interest in the performance of 
his  duties  ...  seriously neglected his  duty,  as  senior official called upon,  within the  institution,  to 
perform  important  managerial  duties  in  a  specific,  sensitive,  sector,  to  act  responsibly, 
independently and  with  integrity and  ...  by deliberately and  continuously failing  to  inform  the 
Commission of the real nature of his  activities and  the links which he had formed  with companies 
operating in the sector covered by his  own duties  within the Commission, committed a serious 
breach of his  duty of loyalty to  the fustion and  furthermore,  in so  doing,  infringed Article  12 
19 of the  Staff  Regulations  of Officials.  Those  breaches  caused  serious  damage  to  the  image, 
reputation and interests of the Commission (paragraph  178  of the judgment). 
2.3.5.  In  other  words,  the  Head  of the  Tourism  Unit  was  engaging  in  unauthorised  external 
activities in his  sphere of responsibility, giving rise to  embezzlement, corruption and  favouritism. 
2.3.6.  Another grade A4  temporary staff member in  the Tourism Unit,  a former detached national 
expert,  was  involved  in  one  of the  national  committees  responsible  for  identifying  projects 
eligible  to  receive  Community  funding,  a  process  for  which  he  himself  was  responsible  at 
Community level.  Furthermore,  according  to  the  audit  carried  out by the  Commission in  July 
1998,  another detached national  expert was  also  involved in a conflict of interests  of the  same 
type  during the  EYT programme. 
The  warning  signals 
2.3.7.  Since  1989.  three  written  questio.ossubsequently  withdrawn,  have  been  tabled  by  a 
Member of the European Parliament on the  management of EYT and the  selection of Euroconseil 
and certain aspects  of the contract. 
2.3.8.  On  9  April  199,0the  European Parliament expressed its  concern at the  management of the 
project and  possible irregularities relating to  activities  undertaken under EYT and called on  the 
Court of Auditors  to  deliver an  opinion. 
2.3.9.  In  June  1992,  the  Chairman  of  the  European  Committee  on  Tourism  wrote  to  the 
Commission to  complain about the Head of the Tourism Unit,  who was  alleged  to  have favoured 
the selection of an extremely dubious  firm  called Demeter. After consulting the Head of the  Unit, 
the Director-General  and  the  Director concerned in DG XXIII  took the  view  that the  approach 
was  designed to  discredit a competitor and  decided to  disregard the  letter. 
2.3.10.  On  30  September  1992 the  Court  of Auditors'  report  requested  by  the  European 
Parliament identified irregularities in the procedures followed  for the award of contracts and their 
implementation, the granting of subsidies and the  use thereof, failure  to  respect the  budgetary and 
accounting rules and,  in  general  terms,  criticised the financial  management of the European Year 
of Tourism as  a whole.  Furthermore, the report noted the  inadequacy of the Financial Controller's 
checks  from the point of view  of both the  commitment of expenditure and the disbursement of 
payments. 
2.3.11. Those signals should have  alerted  not only the  Commissioner and  the  Director-General 
responsible,  but also,  where  appropriate,  the  Commission  as  a  body  as  to  the  management of 
tourism policy.  Nothing of the  sort.  It was  not  until  the  second half of 1993  that DG IX revealed 
the existence of serious problems  in  the Tourism Unit. 
Internal  inquiries  within  the  institution  and referral  to  the  courts 
2.3.12.  In  March and April  199DG XXIII  carried out an  internalqiuiry and,  in July,  asked for 
assistance from  DG XX  - Financial Control.  From mid-1993  onwards,  the internal inquiry was 
extended to  cover all  of DG  XXIIll  resulted in  the  identification  of irregularities  which  had 
occurred since  1989 that were  likely to  give  rise  to  recovery orders and to  the  risk of  fraud.  After 
discussion  with  the  Secretariat-General  and  DG  IX  - Personnel  and  Administration)  the 
20 appointing authority decided  to  transfer the  Head of Unit in the interests of the service with effect 
from  15  March  1994. 
2.3.13.  The file  was  forwarded  on  8  July  19~M the  Commission's  coordination  unit  for  the 
prevention of fraud  (UCLAF) which,  given the  nature of the presumed irregularities  (fraud and 
corruption),  immediately  started  investigating  the  matter  with  a  view  to  possible  legal 
proceedings. UCLAF joined some of the audit missions carried out in the Member States by DG 
XX. 
2.3.14.  In  December  199~on the  basis of that  information, the Commission referred the  matter 
to  the  French  and  Belgian  courts  in  order to  have  a  preliminary  inquiry started  in France  and 
judicial  investigations opened in Belgium,  where  appropriate.  In February  1995,  a Member of 
the European Parliament lodged a complaint with the  Belgian judicial authorities,  and in March 
1995,  the  Greek judicial authorities  were  asked  to  start preliminary inquiries. 
Sanctions 
2.3 .15.  On  22  June  199,5 the  Director-General  of DG  IX,  acting  in  his  capacity as  appointing 
authority,  dismissed  the  Head  of Unit  without  reduction  or  abolition  of pension  rights  in 
accordance with the opinion of the Disciplinary Board adopted unanimously on  23  May  1.22.5.  On 
28  July 1225 he terminated the contract of the temporary staff member with effect from  1 August 
12.2.5.,  departing  from  the  unanimous  opinion  of  the  Disciplinary  Board  of  30  June  1995 
recommending  that  the  authority  entitled  to  conclude  recruitment contracts  punish  the  person 
involved by ordering a relegation in  step. 
Further  inquiries  at  an  internal  level  and  in  tlze  Member  States,  and  information  from  tlze 
audit  bodies 
2.3.16.  In  February and  November  1295with  a  view  to  furthering  their inquiries,  the  Belgian 
judicial authorities requested  waiver of immunity in respect of certain officials  and Commission 
authorisation  to  interrogate  others.  After  carrying  out the  standard  verification  procedure,  the 
Commission granted  their request for  waiver of immunity and lifting of the professional security 
requirement. 
2.3.17.  In  April  1996, pursuant to  Article  6 of Council Decision 92/421/EEC, the Commission 
submitted to Parliament a report drawn up by an outside firm on the evaluation of the Community 
action  plan to  assist  tourism  (1993-1995).  That report  gave  a  critical  analysis  of the  decisions 
taken  and  the  guidelines  followed,  but noted,  nevertheless,  that a  number of projects  had been 
successfully implemented. 
2.3.18.  In  June  1996 the  Belgian judicial authorities requested waiver of immunity in respect of 
the  Director-General of DG  XXill, the  Director responsible for  tourism policy and  a member of 
their staff.  DG IX requested additional justification, and the Commission as  a body replied on  12 
September that it was not in  a position to  approve that request.  According to  the Commission, the 
reasons  put forward  by the  Belgian Public Prosecutor were insufficient,  and  the  internal inquiries 
had not revealed any reasons  why waiver of immunity should be granted.  On  16  October, 1996 
the  Commission,  acting  in  its  capacity as  appointing  authority,  applied  Article  50 of the  Staff 
Regulations  of Officials  (retirement in  the  interests  of the  service)  to  the  Director-General of DG 
XXill. That decision took effect on  1 December 1996 
21 2.3.19. In  November 199()the Court of Auditors submitted its Special Report No  3/96 on tourism 
policy and the  promotion of tourism.  In  December 199.die  new  Director-General of DG XXIII 
set up  a task force  involving DG XX,  DG  XXIII and UCLAF with the aim of reviewing all  the 
issues relating to  tourism. 
2.3.20.  In  June  1997 the Commission acted  as  private party supporting the Public Prosecutor in 
legal  proceedings  against  the  Head  of Unit,  and  in  November  1997,  the  Belgian  authorities 
renewed their request for  waiver of immunity in respect of the  Director-General,  the  Director and 
a member of their staff.  The Commission approved their request on  13  November 
2.3.21.  In  199S DG  XX resumed the  inquiries it had begun in  1993;  on the basis of the De Luca 
and Wemheuer reports,  the  European Parliament adopted two  critical resolutions  (A4-0040/98 
and  A4-0049/98) on the  follow-up  measures taken by the Commission in  the tourism sector and 
on its  attitude to  the presumed cases of fraud  and  irregularities. 
2.3.22.  On  14  July  1998,  the  task  force  set  up  by DG  X:fliiHlished  an  audit  of the  past 
management of tourism policy,  addressed to  the  European Parliament and  the Court of Auditors, 
which  showed  that  236  cases  of undue  payment  had  been  identified  and  193  recovery  orders 
issued for a total of ECU 3.1  million.  Another 24  recovery orders representing a total of ECU  1.3 
million were being drawn up;  the remainder - amounting to  ECU 0.4 million - constituted various 
cases requiring further investigation or relating to  a situation where the recipient no  longer existed 
(associations,  etc.).  Finally,  61  recipient  had  repaid  ECU 0.56  million.  As  regards  the  period 
1990-1995, the  task force  audit estimated excess payments at ECU rhiilion  out of ECU 31.4 
million concerning 718  actions entered on the expenditure side.  In most cases,  excess payments 
resulted from  fraudulent  activities.  In  1998,  the actions  concerned 76 bodies or individuals who, 
in some cases,  were facing  legal proceedings in  the  Member States,  the  others requiring further 
investigation. 
2.3.23.  The  number  of cases  being  queried  demonstrates,  after  the  event,  the  extent  of the 
irregularities and the  risks  of fraud. 
2.3.24.  Investigations are  still  being conducted by the judicial authim  of the  Member States. 
2.3.25.  At the end of this  chronology of events,  reference should  be  made to  the  passivity of the 
committees  set  up  by  the  Council  Decisions  of 21  December  1988  and  13  July  1991.  Those 
committees, consisting of representatives of the  Member States and chaired by the representative 
of the  Commission,  were  supposed to  be consulted by the  Commission on the implementation 
of the action programmes in  the  tourism sector.  Within the context of  EYT,  the committee was 
informed of the decisions  taken by DG  XXIII in  conjunction with  the local committees. It was 
not consulted in  advance.  As  for the committee set up  under the  1993-1995  action plan,  its role 
is  never referred to. 
2.3.26. The same comment applies to  the Member States which,  as  part of EYT,  were responsible 
for identifying the  projects  and monitoring their implementation,  with  the requirement that they 
should  report to  the Commission.  However,  the  Member States failed  to  identify a large number 
of irregularities and instances of fraud  subsequently brought to light by the Commission. 
2.4. Disciplinary measures 
22 2.4.1.  The irregularities noted in the  management of the tourism-related projects concerned errors 
of administrative, budgetary and financial  management as  well  as  instances of fraud  and misuse 
of Community funds.  The  investigations  concluded  that,  within  the  Commission,  the  Head of 
Unit  and  his  temporary  staff member  were  largely  responsible  for  the  instances  of fraud  and 
misuse of Community funds. 
The  case  against  the  Head  of Unit 
2.4.2.  Unbeknownst to  the  appointing authority,  and while he was in  charge of the  Tourism Unit, 
the  Head  of Unit retained  an  interest in  several  companies,  either directly  as  a  manager or by 
transferring  his  shares  to  close  relatives  (his  partner  or  her  mother)  or  by  accommodating 
companies at his place of residence.  The companies involved were Immoflo,  Lex  Grouppptr 
Dynamique (Greece) and Groupe Dynamique (Belgium), two of which participated in Community 
programmes and received subsidies  as  a result. 
2.4.3.  The  Head  of Unit  also  made  significant  ineligible  payments  to  01-Pliroforiki,  granted 
subsidies exceeding the Commission's obligations in extremely dubious - not to  say extraordinary 
- conditions  of legal  and  financial  certainty  to  Demeter  and  Etoa,  granted  unsubstantiated 
subsidies,  artificially inflated the  subsidy budget for  WES  with a view to  funding  a subcontractor 
that  he had appointed himself,  without any services  being provided in return,  granted subsidies 
to  contractors  claiming false  status  or using  false  identities,  and  amended  the  budget for  the 
subsidy granted despite the  failure  of Wainfield Consultants  to  complete the project,  etc. 
2.4.4. It was during the second half of 1993  that DG  XX  uncovered problems in the  management 
of the Tourism Unit.  Early in  1994,  a press report pointing the finger of suspicion at  the  Head of 
Unit,  which had appeared in  Greece in July  1993, was brought to  the attention of his  superiors. 
2.4.5.  On  15  March  1994,  the Head of Unit was  transferred in the interests of the  service. 
2.4.6.  Subsequently,  disciplinary proceedings  were instituted against him.  The timetable of those 
proceedings  was  as  follows: 
12  July  1994: 
20 July 1994: 
3 August  1994: 
4 December 1994: 
8 December 1994: 
22 December 1994: 
9 March  1995: 
14  March  1995: 
5  April  1995: 
23  May 1995: 
Notification to  the official concerned that disciplinary qm:rlings 
were being instituted against him 
Hearing 
Suspension from  duty on half-pay 
Restoration of full  salary but maintenance of the suspension,  since 
no  decision had  been taken  in his  case 
Further hearing 
Referral  to  the  Disciplinary Board 
Disciplinary Board suspended its proceedings so  that light could 
be shed  on the workings of the  tourism sector 
Official heard for  a  third  time with  a view  to  clarifying his  links 
with  a  number  of  companies,  links  of  which  the  appointing 
authority became  aware  only at  the  end of February 
Forwarding by the appointing authority to  the Disciplinary Board 
of an  additional  report 
Opinion  of  the  Disciplinary  Board  delivered  unanimously 
recommending dismissal without forfeiture  of pension rights. 
23 1 June  1995: 
12  June  1995: 
22 June  1995: 
Opinion notified to the official concerned 
Final hearing by the  appointing authority 
Decision  of  the  appointing  authority  to  deem  proven  all  the 
accusations  it  had  referred  to  the  Disciplinary  Board  and  to 
dismiss  the person concerned without withdrawal in  whole or part 
of entitlement  to  retirement  pension The  official  concerned  was 
notified of that decision  on  23  June  1995 
1 August  1995:  Date on which  the  decision to  dismiss  the official  took effect. 
2.4.7.  This case gives  rise  to  two  problems: 
the time-lapse between the  discovery of the  instances of fraud  and  the decision to 
dismiss  the  official  concerned,  which  was  applied  in  respect  of facts  that  had 
occurred from  1989  onwards 
the leniency of the penalty imposed. 
2.4.8.  Roughly two  years  elapsed between the  discovery of the instances of fraud  by  DG XX and 
the  date when the official concerned was  dismissed.  Four months  elapsed between the  official's 
transfer  and  the  appointing  authority's  decision  to  institute  disciplinary  proceedings,  and  five 
months  between the  first  hearing and  the referral of the  case to  the  Disciplinary Board. 
2.4.9.  As  regards  the  Disciplinary Board,  it  failed  to  comply with  the  time-limits  laid  down  in 
Article 7 of Annex  IX  to  the  Staff Regulations  of Officials:  it delivered its  opinion not at the  end 
of March  1995,  as  it should have done,  but only two  months later,  on 23  May  1995. 
2.4.10.  The  Director-General  of Personnel,  as  the  appointing  authority,  did  comply  with  the 
time-limits  laid down in  the  Staff Regulations of Officials, but the  disciplinary procedure proper 
lasted  one  year.  Finally,  it  would  have  been  possible  for  the  decision  to  dismiss  the  official, 
notified on 23  June  1995,  to  take  effect  on  that date,  or at the  latest on  1 July  1995,  instead of 
being deferred to  1 August  1995,  although  the  official concerned had been suspended from his 
duties  for a year. 
2.4.11. The tardiness of the procedure may be explained,  firstly,  by the  complexity of the matter 
and  the  need to  undertake  an  investigation  and,  secondly,  by the  cautious  approach  which  the 
Community institutions  are  required to  take in  disciplinary matters  in  order to  avoid the  Court of 
First  Instance  overturning  their  decisions.  Nevertheless,  the  Disciplinary  Board  should  have 
stepped up  the  pace of its activities,  and tlppointing authority need  not have waited for  more 
than a month before imposing the  penalty. 
2.4.12. Given the seriousness of the accusations made against the official concerned,  the Director-
General of DG IV,  as  the  appointing authority,  could have: 
ignored  the  opinion  of  the  Disciplinary  Board  and  dismissed  the  Head  of  Unit, 
withdrawing his  pension rights  in  full,  or 
brought  into  play  his  liability  under  Article  22  of the  Staff Regulations  of Officials, 
pursuant  to  which  an  official  may  be  required  to  make  good,  in  whole  or in  part,  any 
24 damage suffered by the Communities as  a result of serious misconduct on his part in the 
course of or in connection with the performance of his  duties. 
2.4.13. During his  hearing by the  Committee of Experts the Secretary-General of the Commission 
explained that 
the  Commissioner with special responsibility for  personnel,  and  the  Commissioners  in 
charge of the DG  in  which the officials concerned were  employed,  had been consulted on 
the penalties imposed before the appointing authority had adopted  the relevant decision; 
the  need  to give very clear grounds  for any decision  to  depart from  the penalty proposed 
by the Disciplinary Board led the appointing authority to  follow  that opinion and not to 
impose a heavier penalty. 
The Committee takes the  view that that argument is  not pertinent. 
The  case  against  the  temporary  staff member 
2.4.14.  Theaccusations made  against this  member of staff are  similar to  those levelled against 
his  Head of Unit,  but narrower in  scope. 
2.4.15.  At issue  are  unauthorised  outside  activities  in  the  tourism  sector likely to  damage  the 
Community's  activities,  accepting airline tickets for  his  partner from  a body with which he was 
working and whose documentation he  was  appraising for  the Commission, thereby calling into 
question his  independence and impartiality. 
2.4.16.  The timetable of the  disciplinary proceedings  is  as  follows: 
29  June  1994: 
7 July  1994: 
8 November 1994: 
29-30 November and 
6  December 1994: 
25  January  1995: 
30 June  1995: 
28  July 1995: 
1 August  1995: 
Notification to  the person concerned that disciplinary proceedings 
were  to  be opened  against him and preliminary hearing 
Decision to  suspend the person concerned on half-pay 
Restoration of fully  salary but maintenance of the suspension 
Hearings 
Referral to  the Disciplinary Board 
Opinion  of  the  Disciplinary  Board,  notified  to  the  appointing 
authority on  12  July,  recommending relegation in step  (A4  step 4 
to  A4  step  1) 
Decision of the  appointing authority to  ignore  the  opinion of the 
Disciplinary Board and to  terminate  the  temporary contract of the 
person concerned 
Date on  which  the  decision took effect. 
2.4.17. The appointing authority took seven months,  from the date of the hearing of the temporary 
staff member,  to  refer  the  matter  to  the  Disciplinary  Board,  which  then  took  five  months  to 
deliver an  opinion.  Unlike in  the previous case,  the  appointing authority chose to  depart from  the 
opinion and increased the penalty with  immediate effect. 
25 2.4.18.  On his  departure,  the  temporary staff member received a  sum of BEF 3  833  807,  which 
breaks down  as  follows: 
amounted deducted as  his contribution to  the pension scheme plus  the  employer's 
contribution:  BEF 1 720 955; 
compensation  for  termination  of  contract  (Article  47  of  the  Conditions  of 
Employment of Other Servants):  BEF 1 964 838; 
amount in respect of leave not taken:  BEF 270 870; 
i.e.  a  total  of BEF 3  955  663,  from  which  amount  BEF  122  856  was  deducted  in  respect  of 
settlement of remuneration and  travel expenses. 
2.4.19.  The Commission paid its  former temporary staff member a total  of BEF 1 984 838  which 
was  not  due  to  him.  The  termination  of a  fixed-term  contract  without  notice  on  disciplinary 
grounds differs from that of the fixed-term  contract referred to  in Article 47  and  gives  no grounds 
for  the  payment  of  the  compensation  for  termination  of  contract.  That  interpretation  was 
confirmed by the Commission's Legal  Service in a note dated  8 July  1998. It would  appear that, 
on the departure of the temporary staff member,  DG IX  asked  for  the  Legal Service's opinion on 
this  matter and,  when it did  not receive that opinion,  decided that,  in  the  absence  of any specific 
rules precluding a derogation from the application of Article 47, the compensation for termination 
of contract was due to  the  person concerned,  even in  this  case. 
2.4.20.  The temporary  staff member  should  actually have  received  BEF 1  848  969  instead  of 
BEF  3  833  807. 
2.4.21.  Consideration  in  parallel  of these  two  cases  - relating  to  the  Head  of Unit  and  to  the 
temporary staff member - demonstrates the  slowness  of the  investigations  and of the  work of the 
Disciplinary Board and  emphasises the  concern shown by the  appointing authority towards the 
Head of Unit,  to  the extent that it did  not depart from  the opinion delivered by the  Disciplinary 
Board and delayed  the  application of the  decision,  and  towards  the  temporary staff member,  to 
whom it applied the most favourable  interpretation possible of the  Conditions of Employment of 
Other  Servants,  although  that  interpretation  was  not  compatible  with  the  spirit  of  those 
Conditions,  by paying  him a total of BEF 1 964  838  which was  not due to  him. 
2.4.22.  Finally,  during  his  hearing  by the  Committee  of Independent  Experts,  Commissioner 
Papoutsis stated that he  had  not been informed of the penalties imposed on the  Head of Unit and 
the temporary staff member and did  not deem it necessary to  give his  views on those penalties. 
As  for  the  Secretary-General, he  informed the  Committee of Experts  that a recovery order had 
been issued with a view  to  recovering the  sums paid unduly to  the  temporary staff member. 
2.4.23.  Despite the statements made by Commissioner Papoutsis,  the  Committee is  not convinced 
that sufficient reorganisation  efforts  have been made,  given the number of irregularities  detected. 
2.5. Euroconscil 
2.5.1.  In  1988,  the Commission proposed to  the Council an  action programme to  assist tourism 
and,  with a view to its participation in  the  development of the projects, especially those connected 
with EYT,  it decided to  seek assistance from  an  outside consultant which would provide it with 
26 the services of experts and qualified staff,  premises  and  all  the requisite infrastructure.  That firm 
would also keep detailed accounts of the  expenditure committed. 
2.5.2.  The predecessor of the  Head of Unit referred  to  in point 2 drew  up  the  file.  The relevant 
Director  in  DG  XXIII  submitted  the  file  to  the  Contracts  Board  and  concluded  the  contract, 
monitoring of which he entrusted to  his  assistant,  under his  authority,  frequently  in  conflict with 
the  Head of Unit. 
Calls  for  tenders 
2.5.3.  Three calls for tender were required before the  co-contractor could be selected.  The call for 
tenders,  which was  not published in  the Official Journal despite the  recommendations set out in 
the  ACPC's Vademecum in  force  during that period,  was  sent to  sixty firms.  Six  submitted bids. 
According to  the  report from the  authorising officer to  the  ACPC,  'the  tender from Euroconseil 
showed a clear understanding of the tasks  to  be undertaken and proposed a well-structured and 
imaginative approach to  the  work.  They have office space available close to  the  Commission and 
can  supply  highly  trained  staff  with  experience  in  both  tourism,  management  and  office 
equipment at very competitive rates.  The cost per day of the  ain expert is  between ECU 125  and 
ECU 200  (see Annex 4) which  is  the  lowest quote received.  The overall cost of the  tender for the 
7 months preparation phase in  1989  was  ECU 285  833  and for  the  12  months execution phase in 
1990 was  ECU 490 000.' 
2.5.4.  Because of the amount of the  contract, the tender ought to  have stipulated that a deposit be 
lodged,  in  accordance  with  Article  56  of  the  Financial  Regulation  in  force  until  1990. 
Furthermore,  the  tender  specifications  had  provided  for  the  assessment  of the  technical  and 
financial  capacity of the tenderers.  This was not done. 
Implementation  and  renewals  of the  contract 
2.5.5.  The first  contract,  covering the  seven months from May to  December 1989,  complied with 
the tender specifications.  Nevertheless,  as  from  September 1989,  the network of correspondents 
provided for in the  Member States  was  abolished with the  agreement of DG  XXIII in  order to 
increase the experts' unit rates.  ECU 50 000 was  paid for this  network to  the consultant, but the 
correspondents  were  not  remunerated.  In  1990,  a  new  network  was  set  up  on  the  basis  of a 
specific commitment for  an  amount of ECU 248  000. 
2.5.6.  Furthermore,  no  supervision of consultants was carried out  (no  records  of attendance,  for 
example), and,  according to  the  1992 report of the Court of Auditors, those consultants performed 
managerial  duties  incumbent  on  officials  and  played  an  important  role  in  the  selection  and 
monitoring of projects. 
2.5.7. The renewals of the contract for the  period from  15  January 1990 to  15  June  1990, then that 
from  16  June  1990  to  31  January  1991,  did  not  correspond  to  the  terms  of the  original  bid 
submitted by Euroconseil: 
unit  prices  increased  from  ECU  200  in  the  original  contract  to  ECU  370  in  the  first 
renewed contract and  to  ECU 440 in  the second; 
27 a  clause  was  inserted entitling the  consultant to  20%  of the  amounts  secured from  any 
sponsors.  That clause was  likely to  result in  a conflict of interests for  the  consultant. 
2.5.8.  In so far  as  they involved substantial changes,  the renewals  should have been submitted to 
the ACPC,  as  provided for in the implementing provisions of the  Financial Regulation,  all  the 
more so since the  contract had been awarded principally on the grounds of the  level of the  daily 
rates  applied to  the experts.  The ACPC's  opinion would certainly have revealed  the  conflict of 
interests  constituted by the  clause concerning sponsorship. 
2.5.9.  As  from  15  January  1990, the staff of the  consultant involved in  EYT occupied offices on 
the premises of the  Commission,  without paying rent for those offices, a breach of the  terms of 
the  tender specifications. 
2.5.10.  The unjustified payments made  to  Euroconseil under the  terms of these contracts are as 
follows: 
ECU  50  218  in  respect  of additional  days  not  provided  for  in  the  technical 
assistance contract; 
ECU 50 000 paid for  the  network of correspondents  in  accordance  with the  1989 
contract,  although  those  correspondents did not receive the  payments  due; 
ECU 125  000 in respect of the  services of a communications company which was 
not paid. 
Conflicts  of interest 
2.5.11.  Apart from  the  clause concerning sponsorship,  it appears  that the consultant proposed his 
assistance,  in  return for payment,  to  an applicant for  Community subsidies  when he  himself was 
responsible for registering applications and recommended projects to the Commission with a view 
to  their being adopted.  He  also proposed to  a  supplier of promotional material  for  EYT that he 
would pay him royalties for  the  use  of the  logo which  was  the  property of the Commission. 
2.5.12. Even if Euroconseil received an  amount lower than the one set out in the ACPC's opinion, 
it  should  be  recalled  that  that  contract  had  been  terminated  early  in  October  1990,  i.e.  three 
months  before  it  expired,  since  the  company  was  not  longer  solvent.  If we  bear  in  mind  the 
unjustified  payments,  the  clause  relating  to  sponsorship  and  the  failure  to  supervise  the 
implementation of the contract,  to  the  extent that  neither the  firm's  staff nor the  products  were 
properly monitored,  the budget devoted to  that company cannot be said to  have remained within 
the authorised limits. 
2.5.13.  DG XX's  audit report dated  18  June  1998  indicates that consideration of the possibility 
of instituting disciplinary proceedings against the Glumission  officials who  had concluded and 
implemented  the  contract  with  the  consultant  should  be  postponed  pending  receipt  of  the 
conclusions of the investigation conducted by the  Belgian judicial authorities. 
2.5.14.  Since this  matter did  not fall  within the  remit of the dismissed Head of the Tourism Unit, 
it is  regrettable that a thorough administrative inquiry was  not launched immediately with a view 
to  identifying possible instances of fraud  and  to  establishing the  responsibility of officials for  the 
irregularities, including those at the  upper level of the hierarchy (Director and  Director-General) 
in  respect of whom the  Commission as  a body acts  as  the  appointing authority. 
28 2.6. IPK-ECODA TA 
2.6.1. When the budget for  the financial year 1992  was  finally adopted,  the  European Parliament 
decided that an  amount of at  least ECU 530 000 would be used to  support the establishment of 
an  information network on ecological tourism projects in Europe. 
2.6.2.  On  26 February  199,2DG  XXIITpublished  in the  Official Journal  a call for  proposals with 
a view to  supporting projects  in  the  field  of tourism and  the environment. 
2.6.3.  On  22  April  1992,  IPK submitted  a  project for  the  creation  of a  database  on ecological 
tourism  in  Europe  (ECODA  TA).  IPK,  which  would  be responsible for  the  coordination of the 
work,  proposed  to  cooperate  with  three  partners:  a  French  company,  Innovence,  an  Italian 
company,  Topconsult,  and  a  Greek company,  01-Pliroforiki.  There  was  no  information  in  the 
proposal as  to  how the  tasks  would be allocated among the various companies 
2.6.4.  On  4  August  1992,  DG  XXill granted  ECUO  000  to  IPK  as  aid  for  the  ECODATA 
project. 
2.6.5.  On  23  September 1992,  IPK signed the  relevant declaration. 
2.6.6.  In  November 1992 the Head of the Tourism Unit invited IPK and one of its  subcontractors, 
01-Pliroforiki,  to  attend a meeting  where,  according  to  the testimony given by IPK to  the Court 
of First Instance and not challenged by the Commission,  the  Head of Unit proposed that the bulk 
of the  work and most of the  subsidy be awarded to  01-Pliroforiki  (paragraph 9  of the judgment). 
2.6.7.  At a further meeting held on  19  Febmary 1993,  IPK was  asked to  accept the  participation 
in  the project of SFT,  a German company,  which had not been referred to  in the  proposal for the 
project drawn up by IPK,  since that company was  active  in an ecological tourism project known 
as  ECOTRANS. 
2.6.8.  In  paragraph 47  of the judgment it  handed down  on  15  October  1997  the  CFI states  the 
following:  Even though the  applicant has  provided some evidence that one or more  officials of 
the Commission did  interferein the  project between November  1992  and February 1993  .. .'. 
2.6.9.  On  12  March  19Q3in  a note  to  his  Director-General,  the  Head of Unit pointed out that 
SFT  had  not  put  forward  proposals  in  connection  with  the  call  for  tenders  concerning 
ECODATA, that the Commission did  not have  the  right to  impose its  participation on an  external 
partner, that SFT had received subsidies from  the  Commission in  the  past,  that DG XXill could 
not continue to  subsidise the  same  persons indefinitely and that SFT had gone too  far  in exerting 
pressure on the Commission.  He stated that,  since he had been unable to  convince his  Director-
General,  and  in  accordance with  the latter's instructions,  he  had orally requested IPK to  include 
SFT in its  project.  According to  allegations,  SFT formed  a powerful lobby in Germany in order 
to convince DG XXII to pay over to it a majority of the Communitl}dli  or,  should it fail  in that 
aim,  to  cancel the project and the contract. 
2.6.10.  The Head of Unit included in his  file  on the  irregularities  committed by certain officials 
three  documents (71-72-73)  backing up  his  accusations. 
30 2.6.11.  IPK submitted an initial report in  April  1993,  followed  by a second in  July  199.3  and a 
final  report  in  October  1993.  IPK also  invited  the  Commission to  attend  a presentation of the 
work already completed,  which took place on  15  November  1993. 
2.6.12.  By letter of 30 November  1993  the  Commission  informed  IPK  that  the  report  on the 
ECODAT  A  project showed  that the work carried out in  the  period to  31  October  1993  did not 
properly correspond to  that envisaged in the  proposal of 22  April  1992  and  that it could therefore 
not  pay  the  remaining  40%  of the  contract.  IPK  expressed  its  disagreement  by  letter  of 28 
December 1993,  whilst continuing to  develop  the project and present it to  the public. 
2.6.13.  On  15  March  1994,  the  Head of Unit was  transferred in the interests of the service. 
2.6.14.  On 29  April 1994, a meeting was held between IPK and DOiiiX:Md  on  3 Augusl994, 
that DG informed the firm  that no  payment would be made in respect of the project.  Following 
that decision, IPK brought an  action before the Court of First Instance  (Case T  -331194 ),  an action 
which was  rejected and  is  now  the  subject of an  appeal. 
2.6.15.  Following  the  judgment handed  down  by  the  CFI  on  15  October  1997,  the  director 
responsible for  tourism policy wrote to  suggest that the financial  audit of the ECODATA project 
should  be  completed  promptly.  He  pointed  out  that  the  sums  to  be  recovered  should  be 
determined and drew attention to  the fact that,  when it carried out an  audit on 24  September 1993, 
DG XX had noted that there  were supporting documents  to  justify a Community contribution of 
only ECU 76 303,  whereas  ECU 300 018  had  been paid over at the beginning of 1993.  By letter 
of 10  November 1997  the  same director referred the  matter to  UCLAF,  asking  for  its  views  as  to 
whether fraud  had been committed in the IPK case. 
2.6.16.  The  Commission's  general  audit  of tourism  measures,  submitted  on  14  July  1998, 
mentions  the ECODATA affair only in connection with the judgment handed down by the Court 
of First Instance. 
2.6.17.  In connection with this case, the Committee regards it as  regrettable that an  administrative 
inquiry failed  to  determine the source  and  nature of any pressure exerted on IPK to  accept SFT 
as  a partner or 01-Pliroforiki  as  a virtually exclusive partner or to  establish whether IPK's refusal 
to  accept SFT prompted the  decision by DG liKto wibhold the payment of the  balance of the 
financial  assistance. 
Accordingly,  the responsibilities of each of the  officials concerned,  and  in particular those of the 
Director-General, could not  be  determined,  most notably as  regards  the pressure which may have 
been exerted on IPK. 
31 REMARKS 
2.7.  The problems encountered by the Commission 
Staff problems 
2.7.1.  The Commission proposed  to  the  Council of Ministers the implementation of projects in 
which it intended to  play an  active role (for example EYT)  without having the  human resources 
needed to organise them. 
2.7.2.  The following  staff problems were noted: 
Numerically  inadequate  staff resources and differences  in  status among staff 
2.7.3.  Responsibility for  managing  Community tourism  policy,  i.e.  firstly  EYT and  then  the 
action plans,  was  entrusted to  11  persons  subject to  the  Staff Regulations,  one person recruited 
from  an  employment agency and an  external consultancy.  Most of these staff members  could not 
be  awarded  contracts  for  periods  longer  than  one  year,  renewable  twice,  unless  they  were 
appointed to  a  temporary post.  In  principle,  the  detached national  experts  and  the  consultants 
assist the  institution in  its  work by providing expertise in a specific  area,  but responsibility for 
administrative and financial  management rests  not with them,  but rather with officials.  However, 
despite the  differences in  status  which should have  led  their superiors to  define  and  hierarchise 
the responsibilities of each category of staff,  tasks  such as  the selection or supervision of projects, 
or even the preparation of answers  to  written questions by MEPs,  were carried out by staff who 
were  not officials  or by the  external consultancy. 
Questionable appointments and postings 
2.7.4.  Persons appointed to  a post at the  level  of a head of unit (A3),  a director (A2)  or a director-
general  (A1)  must display the highest degree of competence, efficiency and  integrity.  In the  case 
in  point,  the  Head  of the Tourism Unit clearly showed that  he  did  not  meet these  critooia. 
their part,  the  Director and the Director-General failed to  exercise correctly their responsibilities 
as superiors and as authorising  officers. 
2.7.5.  The Committee of Experts  wonders  about the  institution's  ability to  appoint or promote 
the best candidates  and  to  earmark the  'right' person for  the  'right' post.  The  appointment  and 
posting of officials  in  grades  A1  and  A2  is  the  responsibility of the  College of Commissioners. 
Failure  by officials to  observe the  requirement that they should be  independent 
2.7.6.  The  obligation  to  work  completely  independently  and  solely  in  the  interests  of the 
Community, the unifying force  which should bind staff together,  failed  to  act as  a counterweight 
to  the  various  forms  of interference and  the  patronage which may result.  That patronage gives 
those  who  accept it a feeling  of impunity. 
32 Instances  of administrative  negligence 
2.7.7.  The shortage of human resources  and  inconsistencies in their management were  likely to 
produce management weaknesses and errors culminating in conflicts of interest and fraudulent 
operations. 
2.7.8.  Successive reports highlighterious administrative shortcomings incomplete files,  belated 
notifications,  inefficient registration of mail,  vague  invitations to  tender and to  submit proposals, 
inadequate and  'arranged' monitoring and  assessment of projects,  failure  to  carry out checks,  etc. 
2.7.9.  The tourism file  also  raises  the  problem of the  award of ad  hoc  subsidies falling  outside 
the scope of tendering arrangements  which entail advertising,  the  comparison of proposals with 
a view to  ensuring equal treatment of tenderers  and  checks by the  relevant control bodies.  As  the 
Court  of Auditors  has  pointed  out?d  hoc  subsidies  constitute  a  high-risk procedure  for  the 
institution, because, even if they are awarded with the requisite degree of rigour and  impartiality, 
they make mounting a defence against criticism difficult. 
2.7.10.  This also raisethe  issue of the  granting of  appro~a!n that all  the irregular operations 
were  given  the  green light  by the  internal  control  bodies,  and  even approval  after  the  event in 
some cases. Finally, attention should be drawn to  the problems DG XX - Financial Control - faces 
in  auditing a sector when it has  previously approved each of that sector's operations. 
The  role  of the  EYT Steering  Committee 
2.7 .11.  The EYT Steering  Committee,  comprising  representatives  of the  Member States  and 
chaired by the  Commission, played a passive role.  It agreed to  be informed of the decisions taken 
by DG XXill in conjunction with the  national committees, even though the rules  stipulated that 
it should be consulted in advance.  Likewise,  the  Steering Committee for the implementation of 
the  1993-1995 plan does  not  seem to  have played a significant role. 
Failings  on  the  part  of the  Member  States 
2.7.12.  All  or  some  of  the  Member  States,  which  were  responsible  for  superviSlng  and 
implementing the project,  disregarded the requirement to report to  the Commission in  the context 
of EYT. 
2.8.  The management of the crisis 
The  discovery and punishment of the  irregularities 
2.8.1.  The  Commission  waS"low  in  checking  whether  the  accusations  levelled  against  the 
Tourism Unit and  its  Head were well founded  and  in bringing the  irregularities  and  instances of 
fraud  to  light.  Thesehecks  were  not onl'}Jelated,  but alsoincomplete,  in that administrative 
inquiries were not conducted sufficiently quickly,  and  above all  exhaustively, in  connection with 
the  Euroconseil  and  IPK  cases.  Moreover,  the  tourism  file  was  only  belatedly  entrusted  to 
UCLAF,  in July  1994,  and  the IPK case was  referred to  it again in  1997. 
Not all  the  blame  for  the  slowness  of the  disciplinary proceedings  rests  with  the  Commission. 
It is  also  due  in  large  part  to  the  concern  to  protect  the  decisions  taken  against  the criticisms 
33 which would be made by the CFI should an  action be  brought.  However,  due emphasis should 
be given  to the inadequate and tardy nature of the penalty imposed on the Head of Unit and the 
failings  on the  part of the  administrative departments  (DG IX),  which led the institution to  pay 
BEF 2 000 000 too  much to  a temporary member of staff. 
2.8.2.  The  criticism  which  can  be  levelled  against  the  College  of Commissioners,  and,  in 
particular, the Commissioner responsible,  is  that of having protected the senior hierarchy by not 
ensuring that the  inquiries were taken to  their conclusion, given that members of that hierarchy 
might be involved,  and of having waited  several months before agreeing to the request from  the 
Belgian authorities  to  waive the  immunity of A2  and A1  officials.  The institution resolved the 
problem  involving  the  Tourism  Unit  by  imposing  disciplinary  penalties  on  two  persons  and 
applying  Article  50 of the  Staff Regulations  (retirement  in  the  interests  of the  service)  to  the 
Director-General concerned. 
2.8.3.  The failure  to  bring into play at  any time the financial  liability, pursuant to  the Financial 
Regulation and Article 22 of the  Staff Regulations,  of the  officials  involved in these irregularities 
can also be criticised. 
Fonvarding of the file  to  the judicial authorities and notification of the  supervisory authorities 
2.8.4.  Once the evidence of fraud  and irregularities had been gathered,  thmmO.sion  referred 
the matter to  the judicial authorities,  since problems involving those  authorities  in  the Member 
States  are  not  its  responsibility. By  that  stage,  the  Court  of Auditors  and  the  European 
Parliament had already intervened. 
2.9.  Conclusions 
2.9.1.  As  regards the responsitities of the  College of Commissioners as  a  whole or individual 
Commissioners,  whether the  current College and  the current Commissioners  are  concerned or 
those  in office when the  events took place: 
(i)  to  have  proposed  to  the  Council,  in  1988,  the  implementation  of projects  actively 
involving the  Commission's departments  without having  the requisite human  resources. 
Given  that  the  tourism  sector  has  to  deal  with  an  exceptionally  large  number  of 
undertakings  and  issues,  in  an  area  where  the  intangible  nature  of the  services  to  be 
provided  makes  the  management  of contracts  extremely  difficult,  the  feasibility  of a 
policy of distributing  Community subsidies  in  this  sector should  have  been examined 
more closely. 
(ii)  to  have failed,  between April  1990 and  July 1993, to  take any action despite the  serious 
warning signals  constituted by the European Parliament's  misgivings  and  the Court of 
Auditors' report of 30 September 1992. 
(iii)  to  have  accepted,  in  June  1995,  that the  appointing authority,  i.e.  the  Director-General 
of DG IX  - Personnel and  Administration - failed  to  increase the penalty proposed by the 
Disciplinary Board (Commissioners responsible for personnel and tourism - Mr Liikanen 
and  Mr Papoutsis respectively). 
34 (iv)  to  have been slow,  between September 1996  and  November  1997,  in agreeing  to waive 
the  immunity of the  Director-General,  the  Director and  a  member of their staff and  to 
have  applied,  in  October  1996,  Article  50  to  a  Director-General  who  had  failed  to 
exercise his responsibilities as  a superior and an authorising officer and, possibly, exerted 
pressure on a firm  in order to  advance the  claims  of another firm. 
35 3.  MED PROGRAMMES 
36 3. MED PROGRAMMES 
THE  FACTS 
3.1. Introduction 
The  context 
3 .1.1.  The  MED  programmes  for  decentralised  cooperation  with  the  countries  of  the 
Mediterranean began in  1992  after the  Gulf War with Iraq.  Their aim was  to strengthen political 
and  economic cooperation with the southern Mediterranean countries in order to  counterbalance 
the  aid  given  to  the  countries  of Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  After  a  period  of suspension, 
referred to  below,  they were resumed in April  1998. 
3.1.2.  Depending on which partners were involved,  the  MED programmes included five  different 
programmes:  MED-Urbs  (regional  authorities),  MED-Campus  (universities)  MED-Invest 
(enterprises),  MED-Avicenne (research centres)  and MED-Media (media professionals). 
3.1.3.  The partners  were  in  direct contact with  each other without,  as  a rule,  central  government 
authorities  being involved.  Accordingly,  the  Commission,  too,  was  unable  to  benefit from  the 
administrative support of the Member States.  Indeed,  the  main  idea of the  programmes  was  to 
avoid government structures  altogether and  channel the  cooperation funds  by means of subsidies 
to  non-governmental organisations. The idea was to  be  'close to  civil society'. 
3.1.4. The total multiannual budget for the MED programmes for the period 1992-1096 amounted 
to  ECU 116.6 million, of which ECU 78  million had been committed when the programmes were 
suspended (decisions taken  in  October 1995  referred to  below). 
3.1.5.  The Commissioner in  charge of the  programmes  was  Mr Matutes  until  the  end of 1992; 
since 1 January 1993, they have come within the remit of Mr Marfn. 
The  management structure 
3.1.6.  In  general,  the  system's  management  structure  was  organised  on four  levels:  1  - the 
Commission; 2 - ARTM (Agency for Trans-Mediterranean Networks), which was responsible for 
the  administrative  and  financial  management of the  five  programmes;  3  - TAOs  (Technical 
Assistance Offices), one for each programme and responsible for the technical supervision of the 
programmes; 4 - Projects (grouped in networks), of which there were 496 in all. 
3.1.7. The Comnitment Committee (management committee) -one per programme- consisted 
of representatives of the Commission, of ARTM and of the TAO concerned (which had no voting 
rights). It considered and approved payments. 
3.1.8. ARTM had its registered office in Brussels and was subject to Belgian law, whereas FERE 
has  its  registered  office  in  Paris  and  is  subject  to  French  law,  and,  finally,  JSMERI  has  its 
registered office in Rome and is  subject to  Italian law. 
3.1.9.  As  indicated  in  point  26  of the  Court  of Auditors'  Special  Report  No  1195I'he 
management  of this  new  instrument  was  organised  on  the  basis  of two  central  features  -
38 subcontracting  the  management  of the  programmes  to  private  bodies  and  the  separation  of 
administrative and financial  duties from  technical support - was  adopted (sic).  Administrative 
and financial duties  were entrusted to  the  ARTM whilst technical support duties  were  entrusted 
to  a different BAT, for each of the programmes.  ...  : 
3.1.10.  ARTM was  created on 24  September 1992 as  an  international philanthropic and scientific 
association under Belgian law. 
Two members of its  management board were also  directors of two TAOs  (FERE and ISMERI); 
they  were replaced,  at least formally,  on 6  April  1995.  In  the past,  they had acted  as  consultants 
to  the Commission on  numerous  occasions.  What is  more,  ISMERI held  15%  of FERE's capital. 
The Commission attended meetings of the  associations's Board of Directors as  an  observer. 
3.1.11.  As  indicated  in  point 27  of the  Court  of Auditors' Special  Report  No  1/96  referred  to 
above,  '  ... ,  the  ARTM's  resources  c·ome  exclusively from  the  contracts  awarded  to  it  by  the 
Commission'. 
3.1.12.  What we are  dealing  with here is  a network of firms  controlling the implementation of a 
policy,  which  was  set  up  by  external  consultants  on  the  initiative  of the  Commission.  The 
financial  and administrative management of the  programmes was  therefore entrusted to  ARTM 
in  1992 on the initiative of the  Commission (current Directorate-General IB  - External Relations: 
Southern Mediterranean,  Middle  East,  Latin  America,  South  and  South-East Asia  and  North-
South Cooperation)  - it even  paid  the  registration  costs  - with  no  competitive  tendering  at  all. 
Accordingly,  ARTM was  created and  financed  from  scratch by DG IB  on the basis of the private 
treaty  procedure  referred  to  in  Article  58  of the  Financial  Regulation.  There  is  no  evidence 
whatsoever  to  suggest  that  the  service  managing  the  appropriations  carried  out  any  market 
research before arriving at the  conclusion that  there  was  no  other organisation which possessed 
the requisite qualifications. 
3.1.13.  Although the  initial  contract between the  Commission and  ARTM was  thus  concluded 
by  private  treaty,  ARTM  submitted  a  successful  bid  in  mid-1994.  Accordingly,  ARTM  was 
awarded the contract (on  1 September  1994)  after competitive tendering and after consultation 
of the ACPC. 
3.1.14.  ARTM was  dissolved on  8 September 1997. 
3.1.15.  Technical monitoring of the networks and their projects was  then entrusted  to  technical 
assistance offices CTAOs) TAOs constitute external structures  with varying legal forms  (such as 
non-profit-making organisations,  foundations,  agencies, limited liability companies,  universities, 
etc.),  providing the Commission with ongoing support in connection with  the implementation of 
a Community programme,  as  a rule  following  an  invitation-to-tender procedure. 
3.1.16.  Until  mid-July 1994,  the  contracts  awarded  to  TAOs under the MED programmes were 
also by private treaty. 
3.1.17. ISMERI was entrusted with the MED-Campus programme and FERE with the MED-Urbs 
programme.  Those two  companies had previously prepared the MED-Urbs and  MED-Campus 
programmes. 
39 3.1.18.  As regards  the projects (of which there  were 496 in  all),  the  Court of Auditors  noted  in 
particular that ineligible expenditure was  financed  and that the award of contracts in response to 
a call for  tenders  was  the  exception rather than the  rule. 
3.2. ChronoJo~:y 
Origin:  basic acts,  establishment and appointment of the  companies involved 
3.2.1.  On 29 June  1992,  Council Regulation (EEC)  No  1763/92 concerning financial  cooperation 
in respect of all Mediterranean non-member countries was adopted. Article 6(1) thereof lays down 
that  'Measures  referred  to  in  this  Regulation  which  are  financed  from  the  budget  of the 
Communities shall be  administered by the  Commissi01In  turn,  Article 7(1)  thereof lays down 
that The  Commission  shall be  assisted by  the  MED  CommitttSet  up  by Council  Regulation 
(EEC)  No  1762/92 adopted the  same day. 
3.2.2.  On 24  September  1992,  ARTM,  an  international philanthropic  and  scientific association 
was  established  by  ISMERI-EUROPA,  FERE  CONSULTANTS,  CLES  EUROPEAN 
RESEARCH NETWORK and,  lastly,  a natural person on an  individual basis.  Those four (legal 
and  natural)  persons were  the founder members.  The legal framework  used  was  the  Law of 25 
October 1919 granting legal  personality to  international  associations.  Such associations do  not 
have registered capital. 
Ultimately,  as  we have already seen,  the  Commission funded  the founding  of the association. 
3.2.3.  On 21  October 1992,  DG m adopted a framework doculllmtrihg  out the  conditions for 
the  implementation of the  MED-Urbs  and MED-Campus programmeThat document had been 
drafted by the appropriate unit but had  not been formally  approved by the  Director-General, even 
though  it  was  attached  as  an  annex  to  certain  contracts  signed  by  that  Director-General  with 
ARTM. Nor did the Commission, as  a body,  approve the document. It states 'tlhntCommission 
must therefore  call on  an  external body for the  decentralised implementation of tlze  cooperation 
programmes,·  that  a  delegated  management  structure  must  be  set  up,·  that,  at all  events,  the 
Commission  must retain  control over the  operation;  that TAOs  will be  selected in  accordance 
with  the  procedures currently in force  at  the  Commission;  that following  the  decision  taken  by 
the  Commission  to  provide finance  since  implementation  in  1992  was a matter of urgency,  and 
in  order  to  ensure  continuity  between  the  setting  up  of the  networks  and the  launch  of their 
operations,  the  TAOs  for  the  trial  year  will  be  those  which  drew  up  the  programme for  the 
Commission;  and that ARTM is  obliged to  conclude contracts with a!Jency  designated by the 
Commission  or the  agency  which  successfully  tenderedfhe  document  includes  #[mctional 
analysis of  ARTM and the  agency's administrative  set-up<iith  provision even for  the  members 
of the  management board,  plus  the  board's Executive Bureau,  etc. 
Another framework document, dated  15  January  1993, concerns the implementation of the MED-
Urbs,  MED-Campus and  MED-Invest programmes. 
3.2.4.  On  12  November 1992,  the  head of unit responsible for  the programmes submitted to  the 
Commission's  Legal  Service,  for  an  opinion,  the  contracts  relating  to  the  MED-Urbs  and 
MED-Campus  programmes,  together  with  all  the  documents  which  set  out  the  conditions  for 
managing the activities covered by those programmes.  That documents  staWmf this  is  a new 
departure for DG I  in  respect of which  Financial  Control  would like  to  have  the  backing of a 
prior opinion from  the  Legal Service: 
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of the Director-General responsible for North-South relations, and ARTM was signed; its purpose 
(Article  1)  was'to  implement the financing  decision  taken  by the  Commission  with  respect to  the 
MED-Urbs  programme  (support  for  cooperation  between  local  authorities  in  Europe  and  in 
Mediterranean  non-member countries)'.  This  programme  had  earlier been formally  adopted by 
the  Commission by decision of 23  July 1992. 
In  Article  2  of the  contract~he  Commission,  as  the  principal  authorising  body,  entrusted 
implementation of the  decision  to finance  the  MED programme to ARTM,  whose obligations were 
covered by the  contract.  The  contractor undertook to  manage the programme  by  establishing, 
with  a view to  the  distribution of the  aid,  contractual relations with  16 financed networks,  a  list 
of which  was  attached at Annex IV,  and with  the  Technical Assistance  Office,  to  manage  the 
reserve funds  on  a proposal from  the  Commission,  and to  set up  a system for monitoring financial 
and administrative management and a management control system'. 
Article  8  of the  contract provided for  annexes,  including the  Commission's  financing  decision 
concerning  MED-Urbs,  the  terms  of reference  and  the  framework  document  setting  out  the 
conditions for  the  implementation of the  programme. 
Those terms of reference providecf  1)  that ARTM would receive and manage the  entire amount 
of Community aid and,  with  that in  mind,  it would conclude contracts with the  networks receiving 
Community aid and with a Technical Assistance Office,  and (5)  that ARTM would set up  a system 
for monitoring the financial and administrative management of the  networks taken  individually 
and of the  programme as a  whole'. 
3.2.6.  This  was  the  first  contract concluded between  the  Commission  and  ARTM,  and  it  was 
followed  by other,  similar contracts  (MED-Campus bearing the same date)  in  respect of all  the 
MED  programmes.  The contract  for  MED-Invest  was  signed  on  6  April  1993  and  the  one for 
MED-Media on  23  August  1993. 
Until1994, as  has  already been referred to,  all  the  contracts  were established by private treaty. 
3.2.7.  On 2 December  1992,  the  Commission's Legal Service took the view that  'control-related 
duties,  or those  involving the  discharge of discretionary power within  the framework of a genuine 
Community  policy,  including  the  implementation  of the  budget,  may  be  carried  out  only  by 
officials,  stating that,  as  the  provision of services was  involved,  the  contract had to  be  awarded 
after an  invitation  to  tender,  where  appropriate  by  duly  substantiated private  treaty.  In  this 
instance,  the  Legal Service  wished to  know what the  grounds  were for allowing  the  Commission 
to  award the  contract by private treaty with ARTM.  The  Legal Service  was also  very doubtful as 
to  the  involvement of the  Commission  and other institutions  in  ARTM's operations.  As regards, 
lastly,  the form  of the  contract,  the Legal Service  reserved the  right to  deliver its  opinion  when 
the final draft had been  referred to  it'.  That referral  never subsequently took place;  as  we have 
seen,  the contract had been concluded on  25  November  1992. 
On  30  September  1993,  the  Commission's  Legal  Service  noted  tlidte  procedures for  the 
implementation  of ARTM  's  operating  arrangements  had  been  laid  down  by  a  Commission 
framework  document dated 21  October 1992: 
3.2.8.  As  regards  technical  assistance,  the  MED-Urbs programme was  entrusted to  FERE - via 
ARTM - on  14  December  1992.  It was  on  that date  that the  contract was  signed between ARTM 
and FERE Consultants for  the provision of 'technical assistance  with  the  implementation of the 
MED-Urbs programme'.  Article 2 thereof laid  down  that  'ARTM  was  in  charge of the financial 
and  administrative  management  of the  programme  and  that  it  had  entrusted  the  technical 
assistance  aspect  to  FERE,  which  had been  appointed  by  the  Commission  of the  European 
41 Communities forthe experimental phase of the  programme,  thereby  ensuring  continuity with  the 
arrangements for the pilot projects making  up  MED-Urbs. 
3.2.9 In its  turn,  MED-Campus was  entrusted to  ISMERI- via ARTM - on 21  December 1992. 
As  in the case of ARTM,  and until  1994,  these contracts were awarded by private treaty. 
The  discovery of the problem by the  Court of Auditors and the  Commissions reaction 
3.2.10.  On  22  September  1995,  the  Legal  Service  of  the  Court  of Auditors  forwarded  to 
Mr  Karlsson,  a  Member  of the  Court,  a  legal  opinion  in  which  it  came  to  the  following 
conclusions:  (a)' that the  delegation  by the  Commission  of its  management powers in  respect of 
the  MED  programmes  to  the  ARTM  international  association  seemed  irregular  in  that  it 
breached Article 6(1)  of the  MED  Regulation (Regulation  (EEC)  No  1763/92  referred to  above) 
and breached certain  rules  governing  the  delegation  of  powers;  and (b)  that even  if delegation 
were possible,  it could only have  been  undertaken on  the  basis of a decision  taken  by the  College 
of Commissioners  since,  if the  Commission  wished  to  delegate  its  powers  to  a  body  such  as 
ARTM,  it could only have done  so  on  the  basis of an  express  decision  taken  by the  Commission 
as  a  body,  and  thus  the  very  decision  to  entrust  management  of a  Community  policy  to  an 
external body constituted a  'decision  of  principle'. 
3.2.11.  On 6  October  1995,  the  Court of Auditors  informed the relevant  Vice-President of the 
Commission (Mr Marin) of certain irregularities, with particular regard to the aspects concerning 
delegation and confusion of interests. 
3.2.12. On 23 October 1995, Mr Marin's Chef de Cabinet, acting on the Commissioner's behalf, 
ordered the acting Director-General of DG IB  not to extend the contract with ARTM, to make its 
management subject to certain supervisory measures, to prepare a new plan for the delegation of 
powers,  to  prepare a new  invitation to  tender and,  possibly, to refer the  issue of confusion of 
interests to the Belgian courts. 
3.2.13. At a meeting with Mr Karlsson on 7 November 1995, Mr Marin said that he had become 
aware of the situation the previous October when he read a working document forwarded by the 
Court of Auditors. 
Along the same lines, when interviewed in December 1997 as  part of the administrative inquiry 
(to which we shall return below), the Director-General responsible referred to above contended 
that 'in  the  'cabinet' the principal interest was  in  the  Middle  East peace process and that they 
were  not aware of any specific problems  until  the  interim  report of the  Court of Auditors was 
presented to  them.' 
3.2.14. On 23  November  1995, Mr Marin informed Mr Karlsson of the measures taken:  non-
renewal of the two contracts with ARTM which were to expire in January 1996, carrying out of 
an audit of ARTM by DG XX, non-renewal of the contracts with the TAOs (TVE, FERE, CUD 
and ISMERn, conducting of an inquiry in order to establish possible internal respon9lliy and 
consideration of the action that might be taken against senior officers of ARTM. 
3.2.15. On 23  February 1996, Commissioner Marin's Chef de Cabinet contacted the Director-
General and reminded him of the request made on 23 October, referred to above, that lmtablish 
whether or not it was justified to  bring legal proceedings before  the Belgian courts against senior 
officers  of ARTM and  the  TAOs  which  had  benefited from  decisions  involving  a  conflict  of 
42 interests.  The  Chef de  Cabinet went on  to  say that the  Vice-President  had undertaken,  in  a  letter 
to  Mr Karlsson  of 23  November the  previous year,  to  shed light on  this  issue  and accordingly, 
on  behalf of Mr Mar{n,  Vice-President,  the  Chef de  Cabinet  asked the  Director-General to 
contact forthwith  the  Director-General of the  Legal Service  and,  where  appropriate,  senior 
officials in  UCIAF with a view to  establishing at the earliest possible opportunity the position 
of  the Commission on the action it might take against ARTM's senior officer~The final  part of 
the  sentence was  underlined in the  original.) 
3.2.16. On 18 March 1996, Mr Marin's Private Office drew the attention of the Director-General 
to the importance of this issue and asked him to speed up and complete the work designed to put 
into effect some of the measures announced (new plan approved by the Commission and possible 
prosecution). 
The  Court of Auditors' Report 
3.2.17. On 30 May 1996, the Court of Auditors adopted Special Report No 1/96. The report felt 
that the Commission's transfer of powers  to  ARTI\tf1n  view  of the  nature  and scope  of the 
powers  conferred on  the  ARTM,  what the  Commission  had actually  done  was  to  delegate  its 
powers de facto  to  a third body,  rather than  sign  mere service contrc.httd')no legal basis, that 
the  Commission  had  not  taken  a  decision  of principle  on  this  issue,  and  that  the  relevant 
Directorate-General had not even waited for the opinion of the Legal Service before launching 
the programmes and had not informed the Financial Control Department before signing the initial 
contract with ARTM. 
3.2.18. The report also states that'Serious  confusions of interest developed in  the  implementation 
of the MED programmes which  the  Commission failed to  put an end to  in  a timely manner  . ...  The 
risks of  such situations arising were evident from  the  outset and should have  led the  Commission 
to  call the  system  itself into  question.  ...  There  was  excessive  recourse  to  private-treaty contracts, 
without proper tendering.  Private-treaty  contracts  have permeated the  whole  structure  of the 
MED programmes.  This  was  one of the  elements contributing  to  the  development of conflicts of 
interests  referred to  above ..... ' 
3.2.19. To sum up, the major ctticisms levelled by the Court of Auditors are:  the delegation of 
powers to ARTM, the confusion of interests arising from the fact that TAOs were represented on 
its management board, the private-treaty contracts, and poor management and monitoring. 
The  action  taken:  administrative  inquiries and Parliament reports 
3.2.20.  The  report  by  the  Commission's  Financial  Control  Department,  dated  8  July  1996, 
concerning an audit of ARTM concludes thafthe performance by ARTM of the management tasks 
assigned to  them  had been generally satisfactory ...  Sijjoont  irregularities had been  detected 
in  the  financial  systems  of DG  IB,  which  substantially  control  the  management  of the 
programmes by ...  selection  of beneficiaries and contractors for all types of expenditure.  Certain 
situations,  including potential conflicts of interest,  will be  brought to  the  attention of UCIAF.' 
The  report  on  the  TAOs  drawn  up  by  the  same  department  reaches  the  conclusion  that 
'consideration  should be  given,  in  the  management  system  of the  MED  programmes,  to  the 
following  matters:  - a  detailed  list  of tasks  that  can  be  delegated  and others  that  cannot  be 
delegated should be  prepared;  - reimbursement  of accommodation  and subsistence  expenses 
should be based on actual expenses  incurred ... '. 
43 Finally,  the report by the  Financial Control Department on the  'projects' takes the view that  'the 
controls performed have  identified several  matters  ...  these  relate  mainly  to:  improvement of 
contracts  currently  used  (the  advice  of the  Legal  Service  should  be  sought  in  each  case); 
improvement of financial  supervision:  in  this  respect,  the  tasks  of the  programmes financial 
agency should be formalised by DG IB  in  a manual of procedures;  the performance of control 
visits should not,  as  with ARTM,  be  neglected ... '. 
3.2.21.  On  17  July  1996,  on  a  proposal  from  Mr  Marin,  the  Commission  adopted  a 
communication on a 'general framework applicable to  the  decentralised Community programmes 
in  Latin  America,  Asia  and  the  Mediterraneanwhich  stipulates,  inter  alia,  that  only  the 
Commission may decide to call in an external management body and that there must be a clear 
separation between technical and financial  tasks and lays down the tasks which the Commission 
may  not  delegate.  A  second  communication  deals  specifically  with  the  system  for  the 
management of decentralised cooperation programmes in the Mediterranean area. 
3.2.22. When he appeared before the European Parliament's Committee on Budgetary Control on 
25 September 1996, Mr Karlsson acknowledged that the Commission had done everything in its 
power to remedy the shortcomings criticised without delay, at least as regards decision-making 
procedures. 
3.2.23.  On  16  January  1997,  on a  proposal  from  Mr Marin,  the  Commission approved four 
specimen contracts  applicable  to  the  decentralised  cooperation  programmes,  setting  out,  in 
particular, provisions on the prevention of conflicts of interest, incompatibilities, confidentiality 
and penalties. 
3.2.24. On 15 May 1997 UCLAF, the Commission's Anti-Fraud Unit, submitted a report dealing 
with  ARTM and the MED programmes which took the view that  'in  addition  to  confirming the 
comments  made  by  the  Court  with  regard  to  public  contracts  and  conflicts  of interest,  the 
auditors - DG XX -had highlighted relatively wide disparities  between  the  amounts paid by the 
Commission  and the  actual  substantiated  cost.n'nd  that it should be borne in mind that the 
conclusions of the audits carried out by the  Financial Control Department had led to the drafting 
of recovery orders (ECU 355 660 against ARTM, ECU 424 023 against FERE and ECU 1 204 
582 against ISMERO. 
The report stated that the amount in respect of ARTM 'had  resulted from  the submission  to  the 
Commission of artificially high  invoices for staff costs,  that these  disparities  had been  regarded 
as  the  result of errors,  rather than  an  attempt at deliberate  overcharging:  that, as regards the 
amount in respect of FERE, 'the  facts  brought  to  light,  with  the  exception  of the  links  with 
ISMERI:  were not particularly serious, and, lastly,  'that  with  regard to  ISMERI the  documents 
it  had  submitted  were  vague  and  seemed  to  have  been  drawn  up  in  order  to  'substantiate' 
declarations  intended as claims for the full amounts entered in  the  budget from  the  start'. 
As regards the internal investigations, the report noted that the consideration of documents and 
interviews 'had  not brought to  light facts  likely  to  call into  question  the  actionffujaJs in  the 
exercise  of their  duties,  at  any  level  of managemenA\s  regards  the external investigations, 
however, they had led to'requests for  inquiries  into  companies  by  UCI.AF's  national  liaison 
officers in  Belgium,  France  and Italy with a view to  detecting  transfers of charges and profits and 
inquiries  into  the personal situation of their senior managers' 
As regards legal proceedings,  'in  view of the full  involvement of the  Commission's  departments 
(according to  the Legal Service,the  measures  referred  to  by  the  Court  of Auditors  had been 
adopted  with  the  knowledge  and  agreement  of senior  management  at  the  Directorate  for 
44 Mediterranean  Affairs),  it  could  not  claim  damages  for  any  loss  resulting  from  a failure  to 
comply with  the  rules applicable to public contracts. 
In  conclusion,  the  report took the  view thntetting  aside  any external legal action,  which would 
be  limited  in  scope,  mention  should  be  made  of the  problems  facing  all  the  Commission's 
departments  in justifying,  in  this  context,  the  exclusion of the  companies under investigation from 
future funding  arrangements'. 
3.2.25.  The  above-mentioned  report  follows  on  from  another,  very  succinct,  report,  dated  20 
November  1996  and  entitled  'Summary  Report',  which  concludes  that  there  is  no  evidence  to 
suggest that Commission staff knowingly committed crimes  which represented  a breach of the 
Staff Regulations.  UCLAF asked  the  competent Belgium judicial authorities to  assess the scope 
for  criminal proceedings for  a conflict of interests. 
3.2.26.  On 10  June  1997,  at  Mr Marin's request,  a decision was  taken to  open a preliminary 
internal administrative inquiry. On 14 July 1997 the Secretary-General of the Commission, Mr 
Williamson, instructed the Director-General of DG XXII to carry out the inquiry. 
3.2.27.  The European Parliament's resolution  of 17  July  1997 on Court of Auditors' Special 
Report No  1/96 calls on the Commission to forward to  the judicial authorities of the Member 
States concerned all the details of the case for consideration of any possible legal implications. 
Parliament 'is  astonished that  the  delegation  by the  Commission  of its powers to  ARTM,  under 
the  conditions described above,  was done quite openly and that, for three years,  no  official found 
any  reason  to  object' and 'regrets  the  length  of time  it  has  taken for the  Commission  to  detect the 
extent of the problem  within  other Directorates-General'. 
3.2.28. The findings of the above administrative inquiry were notified on 28 July 1997.  On one 
level, it is noted thatThe explosion of  political interest and budget allocations was just too  much 
to  handle,  especially in  the  initiation  stage of the programme ...  It  should be noted that all the 
relevant procedures were followed regarding financial management of contracts ...  all insist that 
the  work was done  in  a  serious and professional fashion ...  proper procedures would appear to 
have been followed in  project evaluation,  selection and project list adoption  after the advice of 
the  MED  Committee  .. '. 
On another level, however, the view is taken in these findings tham  the  need to  get on  with  the 
job,  there  was certainly confusion of interest between project promotors,  evaluation  ci1doo 
members and final  contracting parties.  Commission  officials  were  involved in  these  exercises 
without proper guidance or control vis-a-vis their role and responsibilities.  This  'culture' is well 
reflected in their seeing nothing wrong in participating as observers in Board meeting of  ARTM 
...  In summary, a confusion o.f interest did exist against a background of  virtually no management 
control or guidance.  There was no code in terms of  differentiation between Commission officials' 
roles and responsibilities and involvement of  outside parties ...  The  'management',  rather than 
individual staff members surely bears prime responsibility ... '. 
3.2.29.  On the  same date,  the  interim report drawn up  by the  Commission's  Secretariat-General 
on  the  'management of the  decentralised MED programmes' concluded that  'there was evidence 
of poor management but not of any fraud or intentional individual negligence on  the part of 
officials'. 
3.2.30. On 30 July 1997, in a note to the Secretary-General, Mr Marin's Chef de Cabinet took the 
view that zt  was  in  the  interests of the  Commission for all the facts to  be duly  established and for 
45 light  to  be shed on  the  conduct of the  officials  involved in  this  affair.  That  was  the  line  which 
Commissioner Marin had taken as soon as he became aware of  the matter.  The  Commissioner 
took the view that the conclusions set out in  the report referred to above were provisional, and 
he was waiting,  as determined by the  Commission as a body and announced to  the  European 
Parliament, for the inquiries to be completed'. 
3.2.31.  On 18  September  1997,  Mr Marin  asked  Mr Liikanen  to  ensure  thafthe  interim 
conclusions  (of the  Director-General  in  charge  of the  inquiry)  were  supplemented by all the 
additional  investigations necessary at the  earliest possible date'. 
Accordingly, the Secretary-General entrusted an additional inquiry to a panel of three directors-
general. 
By letter of 17 October 1997, Mr Trojan, Secretary-General of the Commission, asked them 'to 
complete  the  inquiry  with  all the  additional  investigations  necessary  in  order to  obtain  a full 
picture of the  role of Commission  officials  in  the  MED  Programme  ...  conversations with  all the 
management staff operational in  this field during  the period 1991-5 will be  indispensable~ 
3.2.32. On 13 October 1997, DG IB proposed that the programmes be resumed. On 10 November 
1997, Commissioner Marin notified the conditions and procedures for the resumption of the MED 
programmes. 
3.2.33. On 12 January 1998, the panel of directors-general referred to above adopted the findings 
of  the  internal  administrative  inquiry.  They  concluded  that  errors  had  occurred  in  the 
establishment of the management structure, errors for which the Director-General and Director 
concerned were specifically responsible, and in the day-to-day management and monitoring, for 
which the Head of Unit concerned was responsible. 
They found no evidence of fraud carried out or personal profit made by officials. Accordingly, 
the facts  were not deemed to be such as  to require the taking of disciplinary measures; it was 
considered sufficient to bring them to the notice of the three officials concerned and ask them for 
their views. 
It should be noted that, in the  conclusions~he panel was  told that the  immediate  inspiration for 
this  type of cooperation  came from  the  Head of Unit  concerned,  late  in  1991  and this  was  later 
backed by his  superiors.  The  management construction  was  decided at services level  in  the  sense 
that  the framework document of October 1992  setting out the  details of the  construction  was  not 
submitted  by  the  Directorate  General  to  the  Commission  itself for  authorisation  or to  other 
horizontal services for advice.  Top  management should have  made sure  that even  though  there 
was  pressure  to  set up  the  programmes,  sufficient monitoring  and control  mechanisms  were 
established,  in  particular in  view of the fact  that the financial  management was  undertaken  by 
a service outside  the  hierarchy of DG 1.  It  is  the  opinion of the  Panel that the  responsibility for 
the  management  construction  and  related  matters  as  far  as  the  services  level  is  concerned, 
primarily  rests  with  the  Director  General  ...  the  Director  must  take  some  share  of the 
responsibility  for  mistakes  made  in  the  initial  phase.  The  Head  of Unit  who  proposed  the 
structure  and did not,  in  the  circumstances set out above,  take  the  initiative  to  obtain  the  views 
of other services on  that structure, fully participated in  the  setting  up  of the  construction'. 
On the other hand, the panel took the view that,  'contrary  to  the  impression  left by the  Court of 
Auditors' report,  powers for financial  matters  were  not  delegated  to  ARTM.  Rather,  all  the 
preparatory administrative  work  was  handed over to  the  ARTM whereas final  decisions  and 
payments were made by officials in  the  unit ...  It is  the  opinion of the  Panel that the  responsibility 
for  the  mistakes  rests  primarily  with  the  Head of Unit  ...  The  Panel feels  that  consideration 
should be  given  to  the  expression of dissatisfaction  as  to  the  level of management performance 
46 in  connection  with  the  Med programmes  to  be  addressed  to  the  above  persons  ...  The  main 
originator  of the  Med  programmes  was  the  Head  of Unit,  who  had  been  delegated  the 
responsibility for their management by the  Director General ...  it appears that the  Head of Unit 
invited  a  number  of parties  including  FERE  and  ISMERI  to  form  a  non-profit-making 
organisation  - ARTM - '. 
3.2.34. It must,  however,  be emphasised that,  in  his  letter to  the  panel dated 25  February  1998, 
the  Head of Unit took the view  th'irt was surprising that the  Institution  was turning against its 
staff,  to  which  it had not only not given  the  resources  required for them  to  carry out the  duties 
with  which  it  had  entrusted  them.  The  Commission  had  not provided  either  the  regulatory 
framework or the  procedures essential for the  marking out,  in  administrative terms,  of duties  on 
what  was  completely  new  ground.  For  their part,  the  Unit's  staff had carried out  the  duties 
required  of them  in  total  transparencyis-a-vis  their  superiors  and  all  the  departments 
concerned,  including Financial Control'. 
3.2.35.  On  6 March 1998,  the  Secretary-General sent to  the former Director-General and Director 
responsible for  the Mediterranean,  and  to  the  former  Head of Unit responsible at  that time for  the 
decentralised  programmes,  a  letter whicHexpressed dissatisfaction  with  [their]  management 
performance in relation to the MED programme'.  That letter constitutes the sole criticism levelled 
directly at the  officials  concerned.  It should be added that it was  inserted only into the personal 
file  of the last-named, i.e.  the Head of Unit (the lowest-grade official). 
3.2.36. On 3 April 1998, Mr Marin authorised the actual resumption of the MED cooperation 
programmes. 
3.2.37.  Recital  J  of the  European Parliament resolution of 17  November  1998  on  the  MED 
programmes notes that a total of 16 technical assistance contracts were awarded, in ten instances 
without invitation to tender, i.e. by private treaty, that two of the four board members of ARTM 
were also managers of the two TAOs, which created a conflict of interests, and that Commission 
officials contributed to the creation of a systerriwhich  made proper management of Community 
funds  impossible'(recital P). 1t  called on  the  Commission  'to  fonvard the  entire file  ...  on  the 
MED  affair to  the judicial authorities in  Belgium,  France and Italy and not,  as has been  the  case 
hitherto,  only parts of the file'. 
3.2.38. On 15 January 1999, the Commission forwarded to Parliament the second progress report 
on  the  follow-up  to  the  audit  carried  out  by  LUBBOCK  FINE  in  respect  of the  projects. 
Accordingly, 'Commission  audit work performed to  date  has identified 37 cases ...  in  respect of 
which  recovery orders for a  total of MECU I.9 have or will be issued.  The follow  up of the MED 
projects  review  report,  including  second  audits  and  issue  of recovery  orders  required,  will 
continue throughout the following  weeks.  An updated report on  the  situation of tlze follow-up  will 
be issued by end of February  1999'. 
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3.3 Legal considerations: the delegation of powers and the failure to issue calls for tender 
Delegation of  powers 
3.3.1.  The  facts  set  out  hitherto  demonstrate  that  ARTM  was  the  creation  solely  of  the 
Commission  (which  even  paid  the  costs  of  setting  it  up),  in  particular  via  the  framework 
document of 21  October 1992 referred  to  above.  Furthermore,  the  administrative and contractual 
'roots' of the entire management structure derive from  this  document,  which was  never formally 
approved. 
3.3.2.  However,  the  Commission's  Legal  Service  warned  the  management  service  about  the 
weaknesses  and  the  risks  of the  entity  starting  up,  with  particular regard  to  the  delegation  of 
powers  and  the  obligation  to  issue  calls  for  tender.  It should  also  be  recalled  that  the  initial 
contract between ARTM and  the  Commission was  signed before the Legal Service had delivered 
its  (very hesitant) opinion. 
3.3.3.  Given the  nature and  scope of the powers  conferred on ARTM,  what thnr6lssion had 
actually done  was  to  delegate its powers de  facto  to  a third body,  rather than  sign mere service 
contracts. 
3.3.4.  This structure seems scarcely compatible with the basic Regulation (EEC)  No  1763/92 and 
with the financial  and judicial provisions applicable.  As  the Court of Auditors  states  in  its Special 
Report No  1196,  the delegation of powers took place in the  absence of any clear legal basis and 
without the Commission's  having adopted at  least a decision of principle on this  issue. 
Failure  to  issue calls for tender 
3.3.5.  Furthermore,  both ARTM and the TAOs were appointed,  at least in  the  initial phase, under 
private treaty arrangements  controlled by the  Commission.  On 29 February 1996,  a note from 
the  Commission's  Legal  Service justifiably  took  the  view  that,  according  to  the  terms  of the 
contract  between  the  Commission  and  ARTM  signed  on  25  November  199'Qil.TM  had no 
further  contractual  obligation  to  issue  calls  for  tenders.  A  substantial  item  of expenditure 
financed from  the  Community budget therefore had not been covered by the  safeguards sought 
by the public procurement Directives'. 
3.3.6.  Although the  Commission assigned  the  administrative  and  financial  management of the 
MED  programmes  to  ARTM  by  private-treaty contracts  from  1992  until  December  1993,  the 
agency did  secure  a  new  contract following  an  invitation  to  tender.  As  the  Court of Auditors' 
report  indicates, The  Commission  issued an  invitation  to  tender only when  the  conditions of 
equality  between  the  applicants  had  definitively  ceased  to  exist,  even  though  that  meant 
squandering  the  experience  acquired over the  previous  two  years.  Furthermore,  the  'brother' 
programmes subsequently launched as part of the peace process in  the  Middle  East were also 
entrusted to  ARTM by private treaty contracts as was the  technical monitoring, for example,  of 
a Peace programme concluded by private contract with FERE Consultants on  18 January 1995.'. 
48 3.3.7.  If we apply the  rules  on competition,  we  see that this  application is  biased since the other 
candidates  were treated unequally,  given the  prior knowledge and  the  information conveyed to 
the TAOs which were already working for  the  Commission. 
3.3.8. To sum up,  the  Commission's departments failed  in their duty to  monitor the  situation with 
regard both to  the delegation of powers  and  to  the issuing of calls for tender. 
3.4. Lack of staff at the Commission: an inadequate argument 
3.4.1.  Directorate IB-A  (Mediterranean Directorate) of the Commission's DG I had decided not 
to  manage  the  programmes  directly  and  had  therefore  entrusted  'technical  management' 
(monitoring) and  'administrative and  financial  management' of the programmes to  outside firms. 
3.4.2.  The reason given was  that the Commission could not expect its  staff to  deal directly with 
the  technical  management  and/or  the  financial  management  of  the  new  programmes  for 
decentralised cooperation in  the  Mediterranean because it did not have enough staff in the  DG 
IB  referred  to  above and  in  the Commission in  general. 
3.4.3.  Although the  situation as  described does  not justify the issue of the delegation of powers, 
while it does  help  us  to  understand it better in its  context,  the  same cannot be said  of the failure 
to  issue calls  for  tender for  the  appointment of ARTM and the TAOs.  Whatever the case may be, 
the  lack of staff cannot under any circumstances justify the  conflict of interests referred to,  the 
central issue of this  file  and  one which has  no  connection with  the  lack of staff referred to. 
3.5. The issue of the conflict of interests 
3.5.1. This conflict of interests  appears in  this  file  in many forms:  firstly between Commission 
officials and ARTM, then between ARTM and  the TAOs. 
The  'explanations' given  by the  managers 
3.5.2. In an internal document dated 28  September 1993  and drawn up by the  unit concerned,  it 
is  acknowledged  that 'two  of the  founder  members  of ARTM  - ISMERI  Europa  and  FERE 
Consultants  - had given  the  Commission  technical  assistance  in  the  drawing  up  of the  MED 
decentralised woperation programmes (Urbs,  Campus  and Invest).  During the pilot year,  they 
then  provided technical assistance for the  MED  Campus and MED  Invest programmes.  Given 
the  deadlines  laid down,  the  lack of resources and staff at the  Commission,  and bearing  in  mind, 
furthermore,  their experience and the fact that no  other more appropriate form of collaboration 
was available  to  the  Commission for the  early start-up of the programmes referred to  above,  DG 
I  instructed ARTM to  provide it  with  assistance  in  carrying  out those  tasks'. 
3.5.3.  Another internal document states  thaThe  reason  why Fere  and Ismeri  were  chosen  to 
support the  Commission  in  the  t.ting  up of the Med programmes was  said to  be  that they were 
well known,  as  they  had already worked for DGV ...  Having  done  the preparatory work for the 
future Med programmes,  the  two finns were judged by DG I to  be the  best placed companies with 
the  necessary know-how ...  it was  reasonable  to  contract directly  with  the  same companies that 
had prepared the programmes for the  running  of the  technical support function'. 
49 3.5.4.  Lastly,  the  above-mentioned note of 27  September 1993  states that,  as  implementation of 
the  Med  programmes  was  sufficiently  advanced,  the  presence  of  the  above-mentioned 
consultancies  (FERE and  ISMERI)  on the  management board of ARTM was  no  longer justified, 
particularly since that could  be a factor causing ambiguity. 
3.5.5.  Such 'explanations' are on no account acceptable,  as  the  last paragraph suggests. 
The  situation created 
3.5.6.  We have  seen  that,  as  regards  management  of its  MED  programmes,  the  Commission 
delegated its management powers  to  the  association ARTM, two  of whose founding  companies 
(FERE and  ISMERI)  were at  the same time providing technical assistance for  those programmes. 
Two management board members  belonged  simultaneously to  the  association and to  the offices 
referred  to  above,  giving rise  to  a manifest conflict of interest.  Until  April  1995,  accordingly, 
those  two ARTM management board members  (out of a total of four)  were also  managers of two 
TAOs:  FERE and  ISMERI. 
3.5.7.  As  noted  in  the  Court  of Auditors' report,  two  of the  four  ARTM  management  board 
members  were,  until  April  1995,  also  managers of the  TAOs  (the firms  FERE Consultants and 
ISMERI) responsible for monitoring the  MED programmes.  In point 56, it states 'rHnte  the 
Commission  had  realised  the  danger  of this  situation,  it  asked  the  managers  of the  BATs 
responsible for monitoring  to  resign from  the  ARTM's Management Board.  The  minutes of the 
meetings of the Agency's Management Board show how vigorously those  concerned resisted the 
Commission's  requests.  Nearly a year and a half went by before they finally decided to  step down, 
in  circumstances which  are  questionable  to  say the  least.  Thus,  the minutes of the  meeting of 11 
October 1994 of the Agency's Management Board show that the  two administrators  'would resign 
if:  - FERE Consultants were chosen by the  European  Commission  to  provide technical assistance 
for  the  MED-Invest  programme,  {or  if]  ISMERI  Europa  were  reselected  as  the  Technical 
Assistance  Bureau  (TAB)  for  the  MED-Campus  programme'.  Furthermore,  both  of these 
managers asked to  be  able  to  propose a candidate of their choice  to  replace  them  in  the  event of 
their resignation.  Once  all of these  conditions  were fulfilled,  both administrators  resigned from 
the  ARTM's Management Board in  April 1995. '. 
3.5.8. Finally, point 57  of the report states that  'In  view of the  seriousness of these findings,  the 
Court immediately infonned the  Commission  of them,  so  that  it could take  appropriate measures 
and examine,  in  particular,  the  need to  take  legal action against those  responsible' 
3.5.9.  However,  the  above  historical' circumstances  cannot  justify  the  fact  that  FERE  and 
ISMERI secured more  than  60%  of the technical  assistance appropriations  made available by the 
Community budget for  the MED programmes, particularly since, because of their dual status, they 
were able  to  participate in  the  process of negotiating contracts  concluded  with  themselves.  The 
truth  is  that ARTM  awarded contracts to  TAOs by private treaty. 
The  involvement of Commission  services 
3.5.10.  What is  worse still, however,  and shows even more clearly the absurd situation which had 
emerged is  the  fact  that,  as  is  indicated in a Commission Legal Service note of 13  March  1996, 
'Commission  officials were apparently present at ARTM meetings at which  the  choice of FERE 
50 and  ISMER/  was  approved.  The  Legal  Service  simply  commented  that,  because  of the 
involvement of Commission services,  it would appear difficult to  win a court case against ARTM' 
3.5.11.  Examination of the  file  (in  particular the framework document,  the contracts between the 
Commission  and  ARTM  and  certain  contracts  concluded between  ARTM  and  the  TAOs,  to 
which  the Commission is  a  co-signatory)  reveals  that  it  is  the  Commission  which  dictated  the 
choice  of contractors  to  ARTM.  From  this  we  conclude  that  ARTM  was  obliged  by  the 
Commission to  engage FERE and  ISMERI,  at  least initially. 
3.5.12.  To sum up,  and  as  Parliament's rapporteur rightly pointed out in his  document of 4 July 
1997 in preparation for the resolution on report No  1/96 of the Court of AudliDilY,ything  was 
completely out in  the open  right from  the  start.  But it is  exactly this that almost takes one's breath 
away.  Your  rapporteur has  been  unable  to  ascertain  whether the  original idea  was conceived 
by a  Commission  official,  but there  is  no  doubt  that  Commission  officials  took an  active  and 
decisive  part in  bringing  about  the  establishment of a  system  to  administer  the  decentralised 
Mediterranean programmes  which  was almost bound to  lead to  a  confusion of interests which 
would have serious consequences.'. 
3.6.  Bad mana~:ement, irregularities or fraud? 
3.6.1.  While  the  fact  that  the  files  have  been  or may  be  forwarded  to  the  competent judicial 
authorities  (in Belgium, Italy and France) and the recovery of certain amounts  may point to  fraud, 
it must be realised that  these  moves  relate only to  the  'external' aspect,  i.e.  the  private firms  or 
entities which worked with  the Commission. 
3.6.2.  Indeed,  such  a  move,  at  least  for  the  time  being,  does  not  concern  officials  at  the 
Commission,  since  the  inquiries  conducted  within  the  Commission  found  no  proof of fraud 
involving officials. 
3.6.3.  However,  we  regard  the  conclusions  of the  administrative  inquiries  ordered  by  the 
Commission Secretary-General as  most disappointing.  As  far  as  procedure is  concerned, there 
are  question  marks  also  against  the  validity  of 'administrative  inquiries',  a  legal  device  not 
provided for in the Staff Regulations  of Officials.  Given the circumstances involved,  Article 86 
et  seq.  of the  Staff Regulations  should  have  been  applied,  at  least in  order to  impose the  least 
serious penalties (written warning' or 'reprimand).  It should be pointed out that the  letters  sent 
to  the  officials concerned do  not come under this  legal framework. 
3.6.4.  As to  the  substance of the  issue,  they do  not  appear to  shed sufficient light on the situation 
which  had  been  created  and  on  the  actual  responsibility  of the  various  officials  involved, 
particularly with regard to  the founding  of ARTM by FERE and ISMERI. 
3.6.5.  For instance,  the  UCLAF  summary report  dated  20  November  1996  on  'ARTM/MED 
programmes', containing three pages in all,  reaches  the conclusion tlinWh  one exception (case 
now resolved),  it did not appear that  Commission  staff required to  have dealings  with  the ARTM 
managers and with  the  TAOs for the  MED programmes had knowingly committed acts  (criminal 
offences) contrary to  the  Staff Regulations' 
That report,  albeit  'confidential', has  not a single observation to  make on the procedure followed, 
on  the  persons  questioned or interviewed,  or on the  evidence on  which  it was  based,  etc.  The 
51 report in fact  boils down to  a mere,  and very brief,  account of the  background to  the case, of the 
Court  of Auditors' report  and  of the  relations  between  ARTM,  FERE  and  ISMERI  already 
described in the report. 
Accordingly,  that  UCLAF  text  cannot  be  termed  complete  or  detailed,  and  it  provides  no 
additional help in  shedding light on the  machinations  within  the  Commission which led to  the 
situation we are describing  here.  The conclusions of the final  report,  dated  15  May  1997,  are not 
satisfactory in so far  as  they imply the  status quo.  Moreover, it has emerged that the requests for 
inquiries  which were announced were  no  such thing  because they were confined to  a few  items 
of information - and irrelevant information, to  boot.  At all events, should new facts  be discovered 
which were not known  when  UCLAF carried out its  investigation,  the case ought to  be reopened. 
3.6.6.  The  administrative  inquiry reports  are  also  superficial.  The  results  of the  preliminary 
inquiry of 28  July  1997  (two  pages  this  time!),  requested by the  former Secretary-General,  Mr 
Williamson,  are  entirely  unacceptable,  if  only  because  they  were  produced  without  even 
interviewing  the  former  Director-General  and  Head  of  Unit  with  responsibility  for  the 
programmes.  In terms  of tone,  this  preliminary inquiry is,  on occasion, tinged  with a degree of 
irony with regard to  the  task asked  f(fl found all the people helpful,  but curious as  to  the need 
for and the  nature of the  task I  was  undertaking!). 
Nor  do  the  results  of the  final  inquiry  of 12  January  1998,  albeit  more  detailed,  succeed  in 
shedding light on the origins  of the case and on establishing where genuine responsibility for bad 
management lay.  Furthermore,  it  is  surprising  that  the  Head  of Unit  should  be  singled out as 
bearing virtually sole responsibility:  'It  is the  opinion of the  Panel that the  responsibility for the 
mistakes rests primarily with  the  Head of Unit  ...  The  main  originator of the  Med programmes 
was  the Head of Unit,  who  had been  delegated the  responsibility for their management by  the 
Director  General  ... :  However,  such  observations  are  understandable  only  if there  is  no 
accountable chain of command.  Very much contrary to  the  conclusions,  the description of the 
circumstances in that inquiry argues  in favour of  the entire management chain bearing a heavy 
responsibility  as  a  result  of  having  entrusted  the  development  and  implementation  of  a 
programme  to  a  mere  head  of  unit.  Accordingly,  and  to  sum  up,  the  conclusions  are 
contradictory and clear-cut responsibility. 
3.6.7.  In  spite  of  this,  however,  and  unless  there  is  proof  to  the  contrary,  the  in-house 
Commission view is  that this  is  a case of bad management (and  not fraud),  however obvious the 
former  and  however  implausible  the  latter  may  appear.  That  bad  management'  stems  from 
repeated  failure  to  comply with  the  rules  of the  Financial Regulation  (Title XV)  with  regard to 
competitive tendering and,  in  general,  as  has  been seen,  the  lack of overall consultation within 
the  technical  services  concerned  (financial  and  legal)  or the  failure  to  take  their  opinions  into 
consideration  when  putting  a  new  policy  in  hand.  That  has  produced  a  powerful  tendency 
towards  negligence  and,  to  some extent,  a willingness  to  dispense with procedures  and  even to 
forget fundamental  principles concerning the  award of contracts. 
3.7.  The Commissioners' role and responsibility 
3.7.1.  It should be pointed  out that,  once the  Court of Auditors  had  drawn  the  attention of Mr 
Marin to  the irregularities discovered in the second half of 1995, he took significant remedial 
action (reports were requested, programmes and contracts were halted or suspended, and a new 
framework was established, etc.). 
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convincing,  and,  in particular,  the search for possible involvement of Commission officials,  the 
Commissioner cannot be held responsible.  However,  we  take  the  view that he  could have asked 
much earlier for a formal  inquiry into the circumstances of the case, given that 20 months elapsed 
after the first letter was forwarded by the Court of Auditors  (October 1995), containing a working 
document on  the MED programme audit,  before the preliminary administrative inquiry opened 
(June  1997). 
3.7.3.  To sum up,  it seems  that direct responsibility for  the  structure of the  policy on the part of 
the  Commissioner currently responsible for the matter (Mr Marin) has to be ruled out. The only 
responsibility borne by Commission Marin in this case is general responsibility with regard to 
monitoring and supervising the areas coming within his terms of reference. 
3.7.4.  However, the Commissioner previously in charge seems to bear much more clear-cut and 
much greater responsibility.  As we examined above, all the problems which have emerged date 
from  1991/92, when the issue arose. 
3.7.5.  The Commissioner responsible at the time is  the Commissioner responsible for the launch 
of the programmes and for signing the main contracts. 
3.7.6.  At that time, the relevant Commission services - theoretically the programme managers -
lacked clear instructions and an appropriate framework, which were all the more important in that 
a new Community policy was getting under way which opened up some civil service sectors to 
subcontracting to private companies (in spite of the opinions of the competent technical services, 
which, to say the least, were hesitant), a practice which inevitably expanded subsequently. Under 
the  circumstances,  a  minimum  degree  of superintendence  might  have  been  expected  of the 
Commissioner responsible; it was not forthcoming. 
3.8.  The responsibility of the Commission as a body 
3.8.1.  In 1992, the Commission was faced with a problem resulting from insufficient manpower. 
The Commission could perhaps have deployed its staff better. 
3.8.2.  An entirely new Community policy with a large budget, under which vital civil service 
tasks were delegated to  the private sector without the Commission retaining sufficient control 
over the process, was put in place at a time when the Commission asbmdy was not specifically 
aware of it and had not effectively discussed it. 
3.8.3.  As  is  pointed out by the Court of Auditors' Report No  1/96, everything got under way 
without  awaiting  any  decision  of principle  by the  Commission  and  without  waiting  for,  or 
following, the opinions of the relevant technical services (legal and financial), which were all the 
more important at what was assuredly a Community policy watershed. 
3.8.4.  The introduction  and  implementation  of the  MED  programmes  were  thus  marked by 
improvisation, haste and, indeed, incompetence, with grave consequences: irregular delegation 
of powers, failure to comply with competitive tendering rules and, above all, manifest conflicts 
of interest caused by the Commission services themselves. 
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4.1.  The 'ECHO Affair': case history 
ECHO:  Introduction 
4.1.1.  ECHO, the  European Community Humanitarian Office' was  set up  on  1 March  1992  t1 
give  the  European  Community  a  more  specialised  and  effective  means  for  providing  aid  ir 
emergency relief situations.  Experience  of previous  humanitarian  emergencies  had  taught  the 
Commission that its  usual administrative mechanisms were too slow to  provide assistance with 
the  necessary speed,  and,  incidentally perhaps,  they failed  to  give the Community contribution 
to  disaster relief a visible dimension commensurate with its scale.  ECHO is  a directorate withi 
the Commission under the  administrative authority of the  Secretary-General. 
4.1.2.  Initially  under  the  responsibility  of  Commissioner  Marin,  and  from  1995  under 
Commissioner Bonino, ECHO has responded to  a series of well-documented emergencies in 
places such as  Bosnia,  Rwanda,  Afghanistan and Colombia.  During the first  six  years of its 
existence, it disbursed some ECU 3 500 million in aid.  By and large, it has done so through 
partner organisations (NGOs and others). 
Summary  of the  ECHO  Affair 
4.1.3.  The ECHO case revolves  around  four  contracts awarded in  1993  and  1994  for the 
provision of humanitarian aid operations in the former Yugoslavia and in the Great Lakes region 
of Africa.  These were awarded to three companies: of those three, two were subsequently shown 
to be controlled under fiduciary arrangements by the third,  based in Luxembourg, a company 
which, moreover, directly and through associates, had a long-standing relationship with numerous 
Commission  services.  It  was  established  during  1997/8  that  these  contracts  were  entirely 
fictitious, in so far as none of the activities or purchases to be financed under the alleged contracts 
- and  indeed  subsequently  reported  to  the  Commission  - existed  in  reality.  The  total  sum 
involved, ECU 2.4 million, thus represents irregular expenditure. 
4.1.4.  It transpires that the money in question was used in part to finance a group of eleven staff 
(the intra muros 'external cell') working as  a financial unit within the administration of ECHO 
in Brussels.  These staff were legally employed by the contractors, but they were often proposed 
to them by ECHO on the basis of criteria which are not entirely clear.  No indications exist that 
any of the staff were aware of the source of the funds used to pay them. 
4.1.5.  The staff expenditure  does  not however represent  the  entire  amount  concerned and 
investigations are yet to  account for  all the missing funds.  Though some has  been traced to 
specific  bank  accounts,  the  true  purpose  of  at  least  ECU  600  000  remains  unknown. 
Documentation relating to the four doubtful contracts was subsequently found to be missing. 
4.1.6.  The  Commission  has  placed  the  matter  in  the  hands  of the  Luxembourg  judicial 
authorities for prosecution of its criminal aspects.  One official of ECHO has been suspended, 
while  disciplinary  proceedings  are  under  way  in  relation  to  two  others.  A  further  official, 
formerly of DG I,  has also been suspended pending enquiries into questionable links with Perry 
Lux which arose during the ECHO investigation. 
56 Outline  chronology  of events 
Parent company 
Subsidiary A. 
Subsidiary B 
Subsidiary A. 
2.2.94 
9.2.94 
17.2.94 
18.2.94 
24.2.94 
20.7.94 
1994-5 
28.7.95 
3.1.97 
March/  April 1997 
12.5.97 
May-Sept 1997 
24.6.97 
Oct 1997 
14-17.10.97 
1.8.93  - 31.1.94 
1.12.93- 30.11.94 
1.1.94 - 30.6.94 
1.12.94 - 30.6.95 
(ECU 540 000)  } 
(ECU 840 000)  } 
(ECU 500 000)  } 
(ECU 541  080)  } 
Dates  of the  contracts later 
investigated by UCLAF 
Sub-delegation  by  the  Commission  of  responsibility  for  financing 
decisions concerning humanitarian aid to  the  Commissioner responsible. 
(Subsequently sub-delegated to  the  Director of ECHO.) 
Note from Mr Marfn, Commissioner responsible for ECHO, to Mr Van 
Miert, Commissioner responsible for staff, requesting supplementary staff 
for ECHO. 
Note from Mr Van Miert to Mr Marfn pointing out the need to dispense 
with 'submarine' employees (i.e. staff not employed in accordance with the 
Staff Regulations financed from operating appropriations) in accordance 
with  the  instructions  of  the  budgetary  authority  and,  hence,  with 
Commission policy. 
Director  of ECHO  writes  to  deputy  Chef  de  Cabinet  of Mr  Marin 
informing him of the  current state  of ECHO  staffing,  though  with  no 
reference to the 'external cell'. 
Reply from Mr Marfn to Mr Van Miert statintflter aliathat he has given 
the Director of ECHO instructions to apply strictly the Commission policy 
on staff and to dispense with 'submarine' staff. 
Activity Report from the contractor  to the Director of ECHO (quoting the 
contract concerned and describing the activities of the 'external cell'). 
Frequent correspondence on ECHO staffing. (e.g.  Note to Mr Liikanen, 
new  Commissioner  responsible  for  staff,  from  Mrs  Bonino,  new 
Commissioner responsible for ECHO, dated 13.2.95.  Continuing presence 
of 'submarine' staff acknowledged at least until June 1995) 
Report of the 'General Inspectorate of Services' on the  'Functioning of 
ECHO' notes an excessive reliance on external staff and recommends the 
progressive reduction thereof. 
Audit  of ECHO  by  DG  XX  praises  'the  existence  of an  independent 
finance unit' though commenting on 'too heavy dependence on staff not 
employed in accordance with the Staff Regulations'. 
Information  received  by  UCLAF  from  'reliable  internal  source' 
(whistleblower) casting doubt on the four contracts referred to  above. 
Court of Auditors publishes Special Report 2/97.  No mention of 'external 
cell',  though  critical  of en excessive number of staff not employed in 
accordance  with  the  Staff  Regulations  (para.  4.4.)  and  a  'lack  of 
transparency' in their recruitment (para. 4.6.). 
Preliminary UCLAF review of documentation 
Meeting between Director of UCLAF and Director of ECHO concerning 
UCLAF inquiries. 
UCLAF inquiry formally opened 
UCLAF  control  visits  to  contracting  companies  (the  two  subsidiary 
companies) in Dublin. 
57 19.12.97 
27.1-4.2.98 
3.2.98 
4.2.98 
9.2.98 
12.2.98 
20.2.98 
25.2.98 
6.3.98 
9.3.98 
11.3.98 
11-18.3.98 
27.3.98 
24.3.98 
6.5.98 
12.5.98 
15.5.98 
18.5.98 
UCLAF  mtsston  report  on  above.  Grounds  for  susptcton  confirmed. 
Recommendation that the  former  Head of the financial  unit be removed 
from  financial  responsibilities  as  a  precautionary  measurU.his  report 
remains  internal to  UCIAF. 
UCLAF mission to  the former Yugoslavia.  Dispute between UCLAF and 
the  Commissioner's  private  office  concerning  the  appointment  of  an 
ECHO official to  accompany the  mission. 
The  former  Head  of the  financial  unit  informs  the  former  Director  of 
ECHO of an UCLAF investigation into the  dubious  contracts. 
The  former  Director  of  ECHO  informs  Mrs  Bonino  of  the 
abovementioned note received from the former Head of the  financial  unit. 
The former Head of the financial unit offers information to UCLAF on the 
fictitious  contracts. 
Mrs Bonino asks the Head of the financial  unit not to  do  anything without 
referring to  his  own superiors first. 
Mr  Liikanen  informed  of the  existence  of an  UCLAF  inquiry  by Mrs 
Grad  in's  Chef de Cabinet. 
The former Director of ECHO informs Commissioners Marin and Bonino 
about a telephone conversation with the Director of UCLAF on the subject 
of the ECHO inquiry and a forthcoming meeting between them. 
Exchange  of  letters  between  Commissioners  Marin  and  Bonino, 
President Santer and Commissioner Gradin as to whether and when the 
Commissioners responsible for specific services must be informed about 
ongoing UCLAF inquiries. 
The former Head of the financial unit requests details of expenditure under 
the four contracts from the owner of the parent contracting company with 
a view to an  'internal verification'. 
The  Director of ECHO  submits  a  note  to  Mrs  Bonino  describing  his 
contacts with UCLAF on the ECHO inquiry. 
UCLAF interviews the  former  Director of ECHO, his former  assistant 
(E259/N) and an administrator from the financial unit. 
Mrs Gradin informs Mr Santer of UCLAF inquiries. 
UCLAF  initiates  preparatory  contacts  with  the  Luxembourg  judicial 
authorities. 
UCLAF control visit to  main contractor accompanied by ECHO official 
and Luxembourg official. 
Main  contractor  notified  under  Commission  internal  'Early  Warning 
System' (to the effect that all payments by Commission services to it must 
be notified in advance to UCLAF). 
UCLAF mission report on visit to former Yugoslavia. 
UCLAF inquiry report  setting  out preliminary conclusions  concerning 
fictitious  character  of  four  contracts  and  the  involvement  of  four 
Commission  officials;  none  of the  money  paid  corresponded  to  its 
ostensible purpose (ECU 2.4 million), some of the money involved was 
used  to  finance  the  external  cell,  other  funds  were  paid  to  identified 
companies  and  individuals  for  unknown  purposes,  some  remains 
completely unaccounted  for. 
Report communicated to the Secretary-General, to Mrs Gradin's Chef  de 
Cabinet (18  May),  the  Financial Controller,  the  Head of Legal Service 
58 19  &  29.5.98 
2.6.98 
3.6.98 
18.6.98 
By 6.7.98 
Early July 
10.7.98 
16.7.98 
20.7.98 
24.7.98 
7.8.98 
26.8.98 
3.9.98 
8.9.98 
10.9.98 
11.9.98 
14.9.98 
15.9.98 
25.9.98 
30.9.98 
1.10.98 
(19  May), Mr Santer,  President of Commission (by the Secretary-General 
on 20 May),  the  Court of Auditors  (25  May),  Commissioners  Bonino and 
Marin  and  the  former  and  current  Directors  of  ECHO  (27  May). 
Document soon quoted extensively in the press. 
The  Director of UCLAF  presents  preliminary oral  information  to  the 
Committee on Budgetary Control of the European Parliament (Cocobu). 
Meetings between Mrs Bonino, Mrs Theato (Cocobu chair), Mr Bosch and 
Mr Fabra Valles (Cocobu rapporteurs). 
The Director of ECHO informs  the owner of the main contractor that a 
special task force will attempt to reconstitute the financial documentation 
relating to the four contracts identified by UCLAFThis task force  is never 
established. 
The  Commission  Secretary-General  instructs  the  present  and  former 
Directors  of ECHO  to  comment  on  contents  of UCLAF report.  (Mrs 
Gradin agrees to the procedure.) 
'Sufficient evidence' gathered to permit official forwarding of the file to 
the Luxembourg judicial authorities. 
Series of interviews by the present and former Directors of ECHO of past 
and  present  ECHO  staff  concerning  the  proceedings  leading  to  the 
UCLAF inquiry report of 18 May 1998. 
Identification of payments to  wife of former Head of the  financial  unit 
through  main  contractor  (ostensible  employment  as  translator).  File 
formally  forwarded  to  Luxembourg  authorities  (Letter from Secretary-
General). 
Suspension of the former Head of the financial unit, official responsible 
for ECHO financial unit.  Disciplinary proceedings initiated. 
The  present and  former Directors  of ECHO communicate their critical 
replies to the UCLAF inquiry report. 
Luxembourg authorities formally open judicial inquiry. 
Director of UCLAF replies  to  observations  of the present and  former 
Directors of ECHO (Note of 24.7.98 to the Secretary-General) 
Commission suspends all payments to contractor. 
Cocobu rapporteur publishes first working document on ECHO case with 
questions to the Commission. 
The Secretary-General requests inventory of all contractual obligations of 
the  Commission  to  companies  belonging  to  the  group  of  the  main 
contractor. 
Suspension of payments extended to associated companies. 
Debit note for ECU 540 000 sent to liquidator of main contractor. 
Commission replies to Fabra Valles working document of 26.8.98. 
Opening  of administrative  inquiry  into  ECHO  affair  headed  by  the 
Director- General of DG XVIII. 
UCLAF informs a former official of DG I that he  is  under investigation 
following  the  establishment  of  questionable  links  with  the  main 
contractor. 
Second Fabra Valles working document. 
UCLAF  meet  investigating  magistrate  nominated  by  Luxembourg 
authorities. 
Former official of DG I suspended. 
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6.10.98 
Luxembourg investigators visit the  premises of main contractor. 
File  concerning  former  official  of  DG  I  forwarded  to  Luxembourg 
authorities. 
23.10.98 
3.11.98 
Replies of Commission to second Fabra Valles working document. 
Cocobu rapporteur, Mr Fabra Valles, invited by the ilimission to view 
ECHO files, though without assistance (translation or secretariat). 
Report of administrative enquiry finalised.  9.11.98 
12-20.11.98  Opening of disciplinary proceedings against former Director of ECHO and 
his former assistant. 
4.2. Issues arising 
4.2.1.  The following issues arise in connection with the series of events outlined above: 
The  Commission's  reliance  on  outside  consultants  to  carry  out  ECHO's  tasks,  and 
problems arising therefrom in ECHO. 
Lateness of the Commission's response to the problems in ECHO. 
Involvement  of the  Commissioners  and  their  private  offices  in  the  course  of the 
investigation. 
Information to the European Parliament 
Possible favouritism in the course of ECHO's activities 
The  Commission's  reliance  on  outside  consultants  to  carry  out ECHO's  tasks,  and proble 
arising  therefrom  in  ECHO. 
Staffing situation  in  ECHO 
4.2.2.  ECHO was a new Directorate set up in 1992 to be responsible for the organisation and 
coordination of the Community's actions in the field of humanitarian aid.  The following years 
saw the demands on it grow exponentially, without a corresponding increase in the staff available 
to it.  Starting from scratch on the basis of a political initiative also meant that no well-established 
financial or organisational practices and procedures were in place, thus adding the usual teething 
troubles to what became a chronic lack of staff. 
'Mini-budgets':  an  opportunity for fraud 
4.2.3.  Against this background, ECHO tended to seek ad hoc solutions to the staffing problem, 
by using an unusually high number of temporary/auxiliary staff members and by resorting to the 
use of 'mini-budgets', i.e.  the  financing of outside staff for internal administrative tasks  from 
operating appropriations (part B of the budget).  This practice was permitted by the budgetary 
rules until  1993, at which Point it was abolished by the budgetary authority.  The Commission's 
services  were  then  instructed,  at  the  request  of  Commissioner  Van  Miert  to  various 
Commissioners, to desist from such operations as from  1993.  Nevertheless, in the short term, 
ECHO (and, in all  likelihood, other services) continued to  employ outside staff financed from 
60 both the administrative and,  contrary to  the  new regime,  operating parts of the budget to  meet its 
staffing needs. 
4.2.4.  In  the case of ECHO,  the  situation was  different from other similar situations however, 
in that outright fraud  was  allegedly  committed  by the  Head  of Unit.  That  resulted  in  the  four 
irregular contracts  being used for the  benefit of that official,  without the  knowledge - it may be 
assumed - of other officials.  Apart from  that aggravating circumstance,  which is  the  subject of 
criminal  and  disciplinary  proceedings,  the  central  question  is  whether  the  continuing,  and 
effectively tolerated,  practice of using operating appropriations  to  finance staff represents  a  'mere' 
administrative irregularity or something worse.  Many of the key figures  in  the  ECHO episode 
favour  the former hypothesis.  In  essence,  their argument is  onfoote majeure  in  that,  without 
such irregularity,  and given the  lack of adequate resources,  it would be  impossible to  carry out 
the  task,  which,  in the case  of ECHO,  is  of the  utmost importance.  All  things  considered,  the 
Committee would take the opposite view:  tlaiz? facto tolerance of irregular employment practices 
represents  a serious danger for  the  Commission in that it presents an  opportunity for fraud  and 
creates an institutional culture which is  unacceptable. 
4.2.5.  The truth  is  that,  if a  'system' is  in  itself inadequate,  it  invites  irregularity.  If,  as  is  the 
case in the ECHO Affair,  the  mechanism involves outright fabrication,  the practice shifts beyond 
the  realm  of the  merely  irregular,  and  the  invitation  is  swiftly  irresistible  to  the  fraudster. 
Therefore, even if all  the  money paid went to  pay for  work done by 'submarines',  the  tolerance 
of such a  system is wrong because the risk of fraud  is  too  high. 
4.2.6.  Abuse  of Commission  employment  practices  may  unfortunately  not  be  a  'one-off or 
restricted case. The contractors in  this  case showed a significant level of sophistication, one which 
does  not  suggest  an  occasional  operation.  The  links  between  the  companies  involved  were 
concealed by the use of fiduciary arrangements,  and the financial  flows  were concealed by the use 
of offshore  accounting.  More  'traditional',  but  no  less  unacceptable,  techniques  were  possibly 
deployed in establishing contacts with individuals  - more or less  willing,  more or less  aware of 
what was  happening - to  provide the  contractor with  the  necessary cooperation  'on  the  inside' of 
the Commission. 
4.2.7.  Moreover, according to  the same contractor's  own publicity material, it has  (or has had) 
contracts with  16  separate services of the Commission (not to  mention with Parliament and Court 
of Justice).  This  information,  moreover,  (broadly confirmed by the  Commission's  own inquiries) 
necessarily fails  to include contracts with companies whose link with the main contractor  is  real 
but disguised.  Inevitably, even where the contracts  concerned are  themselves  legitimate,  these 
contracts  must be considered  'at risk'. 
4.2.8.  The situation was  aggravated  in  the  case of ECHO by the questionable  use  which was 
made of the  'framework partnership agreement' ('contrat cadre de  partenariat').  This instrument 
was created specifically for ECHO on a proposal from Mr Marin in 1993.  It was designed to give 
ECHO the necessary flexibility in working with partner organisations in the humanitarian field 
in situations where urgency was the prime consideration. The model agreement of 28  April 1993 
gave ECHO a completely free hand in the choice of its partners, stipulating simply that '  ... ECHO 
joins  forces  and  works  together  with  international,  governmental  and  non-governmental 
organisations  or other bodies  involved  in  humanitarian  aid,  with  the  Member States  of the 
61 European Community and  with non-member countrie
7s.  ' The text goes on to say of the partner: 
1ts  mission  is  to  come  to  the  aid  of people  in  danger,  on  an  international  scale  and  without 
discrimination by race,  nationality, religion or political opinion,  with the  aim of saving human 
lives and relieving suffering' and 1t has  considerable experience in humanitarian aid  and offers 
services of a specialised naturt!l.' 
4.2.9.  Whether the several contractors  which provided administrative services for ECHO (not 
only in the case of the four contracts in question)  can be said to  meet these criteria is  extremely 
open to question.  The decision in the ECHO affair to  use the Framework Partnership Contract 
with commercial organisations providing services of a non-humanitarian nature is  thus  equally 
questionable,  relying  simply on  the  inclusion  of the  term  'other bodies' in  the  preamble.  The 
dubious  nature  of the practice is  emphasised by the fact  that,  when Mrs Bonino proposed revised 
rules  to  the Commission in  March 1998,  the words  'other bodies' involved in  humanitarian aid 
were dropped,  and  the  control/reporting requirements on partners  increased. 
Lateness  of tlze  Commission's  response  to  tlze  problems  in  ECHO 
Time  lapse  before  initial investigatian 
4.2.10. The first  striking feature  of the chronology above is  the length of the time lapse between 
the signature and the implementation of the contracts alleged to  be fictitious  and  the beginning 
of an  UCLAF investigation.  The first of the  contracts ran from  1 August  1993;  the  first hint of 
suspicion arose nearly four years  later,  and then only when a  whistleblower intervened.  Regular 
management and control mechanisms  thus  failed  to  identify any anomaly in  the  contracts which, 
at  the  very  least,  were  not  used  for  their  ostensible  purpose.  This  occurred,  moreover,  in  a 
situation  where  the  presence  of an  external  cell  of eleven  persons,  complete  with  offices, 
equipment, etc.,  must have been clearly apparent to  all  ECHO staff. 
Early indications 
4.2.11.  UCLAF enquiries  began  in  May  1997,  and  the  first  consultations  with  the  Director of 
ECHO relating  to  the  four  contracts  took place  on  24 June  1997.  No  preventive  management 
action is  demonstrated by the  files  at  this  stage within ECHO.  Nor does  any record exist of the 
Director of ECHO having informed the Commissioner responsible that an  inquiry was  in course. 
Early  UCI.AF conclusions 
4.2.12.  Following a control  visit to  the  two  contracting companies in Ireland,  UCLAF's internal 
mission report of 19  December 1997 recommended that the  former Head of the  financial  unit be 
removed  from  a  position  of financial  responsibility  as  a  precautionary  measure.  Even  if,  as 
UCLAF  maintains,  he  no  longer  occupied  such  a  position,  he  was  nevertheless  still  in  an 
influential  position  within  ECHO,  able  to  take  'remedial' action  in his  own interests,  and it is 
curious that as  clear a recommendation as  this  was  not communicated to anyone outside UCLAF. 
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62 The  only  credible  explanation  is  that  the  Director  of  UCLAF  preferred  to  maintain  the 
confidentiality of the inquiry even vis-a-vis very senior Commission staff and Commissioners. 
4.2.13.  The  UCLAF  control  mission  to  the  former  Yugoslavia  at  the  end  of  January 
unambiguously  confirmed  the  fictitious  nature  of the  contracts  under  investigation.  The 
management of ECHO and Mrs Bonino's private office were clearly aware of this investigation, 
thanks to the participation of an ECHO official.  Nevertheless, no management action in respect 
of the official concerned is recorded within ECHO to address the situation. 
4.2.14. Nearly two months elapsed between the completion of UCLAF's inquiry report on 18 May 
1998 and the decision to place the matter before the competent judicial authibies,  although the 
information in the UCLAF report already constituted a clear and at least partly substantiated 
allegation of fraud.  Similarly, the former Head of the financial unit remained in his position until 
10 July 1998, thereby having further time and opportunity to interfere with possible evidence. 
ECHO  internal investigation 
4.2.15. The Secretary-General instructed the current and former Directors of ECHO to verify the 
contents of the UCLAF report on 18 June 1998.  This led to a series of interviews with current 
and former ECHO staff (internal and external).  These interviews with often  junior staff, which 
largely concerned the possible involvement in, or knowledge of, the fictitious contracts on the 
part of the former ECHO Director, were conducted predominantly by the former Director himself. 
The question must arise as to (i) whether it was appropriate in principle for such an investigation 
to  be  conducted  by one  of the  persons  named  in  the  UCLAF  report  (who  thus  in  effect 
'investigates himself), and (ii) why the Secretary-General chose this course of action. 
4.2.16.  In  these  circumstances,  and  with  the  benefit  of hindsight,  the  ECHO  investigation 
therefore  did  little  more  than  delay  the  commencement  in  September  1998  of  the  full 
administrative  inquiry  (see  below),  which,  under  an  independent  Director-General,  covered 
essentially the same ground. 
Disciplinary action 
4.2.17. The former Head of the financial unit was suspended on 10 July 1998, the same day as 
the file was forwarded to the Luxembourg authorities.  However, no administrative inquiry was 
launched concerning the other persons named (rightly or wrongly) in the UCLAF report until 14 
September 1998.  The resultant report was released on 9 November 1998 and led to disciplinary 
proceedings against two further officials shortly afterwards.  Disciplinary action cannot ultimately 
be regarded as having been expeditious, even if it did follow rapidly on from the conclusion of 
the administrative report.  In the event, on the central issue of whether two key officials had been 
aware of the fictitious  nature of the four contracts, this  well-documented report reaffirms the 
findings reported by UCLAF some six months previously. 
Involvement  of the  Commissioners  and  their private  offices  in  tlze  course  of tlze  investigation 
Awareness of staffing problems and the  use of 'submarine' staff 
4.2.18. Unquestionably, the Commissioners responsible for ECHO, Mr Marfn until  1994, and 
Mrs Bonino thereafter, were aware (i) of the extremely difficult staffing situation in ECHO and 
63 (ii)  of  the  existence  of  staff  within  ECHO  financed  from  operating  appropriations.  Both 
Commissioners made repeated, formal  and  explicit requests to the Commissioner responsible for 
personnel  fcr  the  allocation of additional  staff for ECHO.  Though Mr Marfn gave explicit 
instructions that the practice of using 'submarine' staff should cease (on 24 Februad)994), there 
is  no  record  of him  having  pursued  the  matter  thereafter  or  having  checked  whether  his 
instructions had been followed; the record shows that they were not.  Indeed, the then Director 
of ECHO signed the last of the suspect contracts, which he himself acknowledges to  have been 
a  'mini-budget' operation (though he denies knowledge of any associated fraud).  after having 
received instructions to desist from using 'submarine' staff. 
4.2.19. Pressed on this point by the Committee, Mr Marin declined to say that he 'turned a blind 
eye' to the presence of 'submarines', but he did indicate that the practice was understandable in 
the very difficult staffing circumstances of ECHO  and  that experience showed that periodic 
'cleaning exercises' were (and remain) necessary in the Commission. Moreover, given that Mrs 
Bonino, the incoming Commissioner, was explicitly informed that 'submarines' were present, it 
is  fair  to  suggest  that  the  practice  of employing  such  staff - albeit  quite  possibly for  very 
'honourable' motives - was tacitly tolerated at  least until the last of the contracts financing the 
'external cell' expired on 30 June 1995. Thereafter, ECHO obtained a supplement of regular staff 
and, although (unsuccessful) efforts were made to persuade the budgetary authority to provide 
staff under what is known as the 'Liikanen facilit)P  , functioned without 'submarine' staff. 
Awareness of possible fraud 
4.2.20. There is no indication that any Member of the Commission or any member of the private 
offices was  aware of the existence of the fictitious  contracts (as opposed to  'merely' irregular 
staffing arrangements) until after the beginning of the UCLAF investigatioH.  The first hint in 
the files that Commissioner Bonino became aware of an UCLAF inquiry occurred on 4 February 
1998, at which point the former Director of ECHO informed her of contacts he had had with the 
former Head of ECHO's financial unit, when an UCLAF inquiry into certain ECHO contracts in 
Yugoslavia had been discussed. Soon afterwards, on 20 February 1998, Mrs Gradin's Chef de 
cabinet informed Mr Liikanen and the Secretary-General confidentially - in connection with a 
promotion procedure - of the inquiry.  At this point, Gnmissioners Bonino and Marin initiated 
a  series of letters in  which they referred to  'rumours' concerning fraud  in ECHO and sought 
clarification from Mrs Gradin.  Thereafter, on 25 February 1998, the information available to the 
two Commissioners became more explicit when the former Director of ECHO informed them of 
his contacts with the Director of UCLAF. 
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Hearing of Commissioner Marfn (24 February 99). 
Facility agreed by the budgetary authority allowing a set proportion of operating appropriations to be 
used for administrative expenditure, applied only to the Phare, Tacis and MEDA programmes (see 
remarks entered against the relevant budget items in 1997). 
The Committee received credible oral information suggesting that, as early as  1993, concerns had 
been notified to the private office of the Commissioner responsible at the time for personnel as to the 
activities of the official subsequently most implicated in the alleged fraud. These concerns were said 
to have been notified to the private office of the Commissioner then responsible for ECHO.  It was 
further indicated that another Commissioner's private office had earlier opposed the same official 
receiving any financial responsibilities because of doubts concerning his previous activities. It has 
proven impossible to substantiate that information. 
64 4.2.21.  In  the  view  of  the  Committee,  however,  it  stretches  credibility  to  suggest  that  the 
Commissioners  in  question remained  completely in the  dark as  to  the  existence of an  UCLAF 
inquiry (itself an indication of some suspicion of fraud)  during the eight-month period from 24 
June  1997,  when  the  Director  of ECHO  first  became  aware  of an  UCLAF  inquiry,  until  the 
February of the following  year. 
Intervention  in  investigations 
4.2.22. Two specific allegations  appear in  the file  concerning Mrs  Bonino and her private office. 
4.2.23.  Firstly,  the  Director of UCLAF stated  that Mrs  Bonino's  Chef de  cabinet attempted  to 
undermine  and  delay  the  UCLAF  control  mission  to  Yugoslavia  by  creating  difficulties 
concerning  the  participation  of  an  ECHO  official,  on  the  pretext  that  the  matters  under 
investigation were of a minor administrative nature.  This  'interference',  if it occurred,  would not 
necessarily imply a wish  to  conceal a case of fraud  but may be indicative of the  view  that (i)  the 
matter was  not of sufficient seriousness to  merit an  investigation,  or (ii) that the inquiry should 
be conducted differently.  In  either case, it is  clearly regrettable that UCLAF and  the private office 
concerned viewed each other as  antagonists in this  affair.  Moreover,  for reasons of prudence, it 
is  inappropriate for a private office to  challenge the conduct of an  UCLAF inquiry without being 
in full possession of the facts.  However, there is merit in Mr Marin's and Mrs Bonino's contention 
that the Commissioners concerned should, in one way or another, be made aware at an earlier 
stage of the nature of involvement of officials in the services for which they are responsible in 
UCLAF investigations, obviously within the limits of the confidentiality that the investigation 
requires. 
4.2.24.  Secondly, UCLAF's records note that the former Head of the financial unit claimed to 
have been contacted directly by Mrs Bonino shortly after the Yugoslavia mission, asking him to 
take  no  action  without first  consulting her.  UCLAF's  records  do  not include  the  alternative 
interpretation of this contact (which is acknowledged to have taken place) which is  that it was 
simply an instruction to an official to respect - rather than circumvent - the Commission's internal 
procedures for exchanges of internal correspondence. 
4.2.25.  It  must  be  said,  notwithstanding  the  formalised  circumstances  in  which  the 
abovementioned allegations were made, that they remain unilateral and subjective declarations 
and cannot be taken to  constitute 'evidence' of interference. 
Information  to  the  European  Parliament 
4.2.26. Under Article 206 of the Treaty (concerning Parliament's power to  file discharge), the 
mission 'shall submit any necessary information to the European Parliament at the latter's request'. 
Parliament has  interpreted this  article as  including a right to be informed as  to  the  existence 
and/or progress of inquiries into cases of fraud and corruption affecting the financial interests of 
the European Community. 
4.2.27.  At the outset, it should be said that the provision of information to  Parliament by the 
Commission has not been spontaneous but driven by outside pressures.  In the first  case, the 
pressure came as a result of the leakage of the UCLAF inquiry report of 18 May 1998 to the press 
(it was  even published  virtually in its  entirety);  secondly,  it came from  direct and persistent 
questioning by the rapporteur for the Committee on Budgetary Control, Mr Juan Manuel Fabra 
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Parliament without good reason, while perhaps regrettable, is not an irregularity. 
4.2.28. However, the rapporteur's subsequent requests to obtain the relevant UCLAF reports (even 
those already published in the press) were met with protracted refusals.  Ultimately, a heavily 
censored version of the 18 May 1998 report and its annexes was made available to Parliament's 
rapporteur, but so heavy was the censorship, on the grounds of protecting the legal procedures in 
course, that the documents in question were completely incomprehensible.  Finally, more than 
two months after the original request had been made, the Commission agreed that the rapporteur 
might visit the Commission's premises to view the documentation, without taking copies or notes. 
It  was  furthermore  stipulated that he could not be  accompanied by either an  assistant or an 
interpreter. In the circumstances, he refused to view the documents under such conditions. 
4.2.29. In contrast to this reluctance officially to provide information to the discharge authority, 
leaks of information play an important part in  the ECHO affair.  Firstly,  the  UCLAF inquiry 
report of 18  May 1998 itself was the subject of a leak to the press.  It is presumably this leak to 
which Mrs Bonino alludes in a letter to Mrs Gradin dated  15  September 1998, referring to  a 
'surprising information meeting [which] may have taken place between UCLAF officials and EP 
members  and  officials,  during  which  essential  documents  from  ECHO  file  [sic]  have  been 
disclosed'.  At the same time, other correspondence between private offices indicates that the leak 
in question came from one of the participants in a 'super-restricted' Commissioners-only meeting, 
leading  to  the  first  public  appearance  in  the  press  of the  name of the  official  most heavily 
implicated. 
4.2.30. Similarly, a small extract from the internal UCLAF mission report of 19 December 1997, 
including the recommendation to remove the former Head of the financial unit from a position 
of financial responsibility, came into the hands of the EP rapporteur though unofficial channels. 
4.2.31. The Committee has no interest in examining who leaked what to whom and when (the 
above are only examples), but it can at least conclude that the management of information and 
its provision to Parliament was not transparent. 
'Internal  transparency' 
4.2.32. Closely related to the questions outlined above is the lamentably poor state of internal 
communication within the Commission.  In the case of ECHO, the bulk of the correspondence 
between Commissioners revolves  around  the  issue  of when relevant  information  was  made 
available  to  the  Commissioners concerned  and  by whom.  In fact,  most information on the 
progress of the case was generated in the first instance (and protractedly thereafter) via various 
unofficial means: rumours, off-the-record briefings, misinformation, leaks and indiscretions, etc. 
Besides being an inefficient means of communication (preventing early remedial action), rumour 
inevitably distorts  reality,  thus  giving  rise  to  unnecessary  antagonisms  and  sometimes  wild 
accusations.  It  is to  be hoped that the Commission's new guidelines on the dissemination of 
information  on UCLAF inquiries  will  go  some  way to  towards  the  introduction  of a  more 
transparent culture. 
Possible  favouritism  in  tlze  course  of ECHO's  activities 
Scope for abuse 
66 4.2.33.  One  aspect of 'mini-budget'-type  operations  which  do  not  set  out clear criteria  for  the 
employment of staff under the  contracts  concerned is  the  opening they provide for  'patronage'. 
In  the  case  of fictitious  contracts,  such  as  those  in the  ECHO  case,  which  were  ostensibly for 
operations in third countries,  such criteria are  absent by definition. 
4.2.34. It  is  interesting to  observe in  the files  that  the correspondence in which ECHO requested 
the  provision  of staff from  the  contractors  typically  contains  two  parts:  firstly,  a  formal  letter 
requesting the  provision of persons to  fill  specified functions  at specified grades;  second a series 
of names  (with CVs if not  previously supplied) of persons  with  matching qualifications.  If,  as 
was  the case here,  the contractor is  compliant,  the scope for  abuse is  clear. 
Abuse in  the  ECHO case 
4.2.35.  In  his  declarations to  UCLAF,  the former Head of the financial  unit stated that the then 
Director of ECHO 'controlled' all  the appointments to  the  'external cell'.  He added that he himself 
made a relatively small number of recommendations.  The Director's  declarations contrast with 
this,  suggesting that he played a role in no  more than three cases,  and then simply recommended 
names,  without entering into  terms  and conditions.  Either way,  the issue of principle is  the  same. 
4.2.36.  Firstly,  it cannot be healthy for personal interventions  to  play such a powerful role in the 
appointment  of  staff,  especially  when  there  are  no  checks  against  any  objective  criteria. 
Secondly,  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  know  whether  the  acknowledged  personal  interventions 
(even  less  any which remain unacknowledged) represent  'favouritism' in the  sense used in this 
report (see  paras.J.4.4-5). 
4.2.37.  For  example,  the  former  Head  of the  financial  unit  makes  no  bones  about  having 
recommended (successfully)  friends  of his  son.  In  itself,  being a friend of an  official's  son does 
not  and  should  not  disqualify  an  individual  from  a job,  and  the  signs  are  that  the  persons  in 
question  gave  full  satisfaction  in  their  assigned  roles.  Nonetheless,  it  is  impossible  not  to  be 
uneasy about such personalised recruitment procedures which,  although  nominally in  the private 
sector,  are  in  fact  for  the  exercise of public-sector tasks.  The  unease  derives  mainly from  the 
sheer openness  to  abuse  - the  possibility it provides  to  'place' friends  and  relations  who do  not 
possess the requisite qualifications  or abilities,  these being failings  which are  ultimately at  the 
expense of the  taxpayer (and,  in  ECHO's  case,  by the  beneficiaries of humanitarian aid). 
4.2.38.  Further unease  arises  from  the  distortion  in  the  1evel playing field' that  such practices 
represent.  Qualified people who do not belong to  the  'charmed circle' find  more and  more barriers 
to  entry,  to their own detriment and  to  that of the  public at  large. 
Involvement of Commissioners 
4.2.39.  However that may be,  the Committee has  seen no convincing evidence in the ECHO file 
that the Commissioners, or their private offices approved or knew of favouritism in  their services. 
Hints in this direction occur in the files,  but these have been checked by the Committee, including 
in interviews  with the  Commissioner concerned,  and could not be substantiated. 
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4.3.1.  The various  aspects  of the  case described above raise the  question of the  responsibility 
of the Commissioners concerned and/or of the Commission as  a whole.  That responsibility arises, 
as  follows  from all  the considerations  above,  neither in  respect of the fabricated  nature of the  four 
contracts involved,  nor in respect of favouritism.  It does  arise,  however,  regarding the issue of 
tolerating staffing practices  which are known,  or should be known,  to  be irregular.  In  this  respect, 
Mr Marin allowed the presence of 'submarines' to continue throughout the period during which 
he was responsible for ECHO. Mrs Bonino, however, upon taking over responsibility, acted to 
ensure that  staff were no  longer employed by  ECHO after the  expiry of the  last outstanding 
contract in June 1995. 
4.3.2.  The issue, as the ECHO file shows better than any other file,  is whether irregular staffing 
practices can be justified because of the contribution of the EU to humanitarian actions which 
respond to cases of extreme need.  At the level of the Commissioners, the question is whether 
they followed up with sufficient rigour the general prohibition of irregular staffing practices as 
laid down,  not only by the Commission as a body but also by the budgetary authorities.  At the 
level  of the  Commission  as  a  body,  the  question  is  whether it  suffices  to  lay  down  such  a 
prohibition without at  the  same time providing enough staff to  enable the prohibition to  take 
effect.  This is a question which applies equally to  the former and to the present Commission. 
It seems to the Committee that the responsiHity of the Commissioners, and of the Commission 
as  a  whole,  is  involved  on  both  scores:  the  Commission has  not  provided  the  staff and  the 
Commissioners  have  not  made it sufficiently clear,  either to  the  Commission or to  the  other 
institutions,  that they could not take responsibility for carrying out all of the tasks assigned to 
ECHO, or that the policy objectives imposed upon them could not realistically be implemented. 
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5.1. Introduction 
5.1.1.  The Committee chose this  file  for consideratiorewmse audits of the implementation of 
the Leonardo da Vinci programme and of its Technical Assistance Office (hereinafter referred  to 
as  TAO)  have  disclosed  a  wide  range  of alleged  mismanagement,  irregularities  and  possibly 
fraud  and other breaches  of criminal law. 
5.1.2.  Even though the  various  individual  allegations  against the  Leonardo TAO would each 
have  deserved  thorough  scrutiny,  the  Committee focused  its  attention  on  the  treatment by the 
Commission and by the  Commissioner responsible for the  Leonardo da Vinci  programme of the 
problems  which arose  . During the whole  period under scrutiny, the  Leonardo da Vinci file  was 
under the responsibility of Commissioner Cresson and  the Director-General of DG  XXII. 
5.2. The Programme, the Technical Assistance Office (T  AQ) and the contract 
5.2.1.  In 1995, the  European Commission launched the  Leonardo da Vinci programme.  This 
had been formulated by Directorate-General XXII (responsible for  matters concerning education, 
training and youth).  It was  created by means of Council Decision 94/819/EC, and its  purpose was 
to  implement a  vocational  training  policy in  support of initiatives  conducted  by  the  individual 
Member States.  It was  scheduled to  cover a maximum period of five  years  (1995  - 1999)  with 
appropriations  allocated of the  order of ECU 620 million. 
5.2.2.  Normally,  such  a  programme  would  have  been  implemented  by  the  Commission's 
services themselves. However, because of a lack of staff within DG XXII, and since it appeared 
impossible to redeploy the necessary staff from other services in the Commission, it was decided 
to outsource the implementation of the project to a 'technical assistance office' following a public 
call for tender. 
5.2.3.  On the  basis of an  open tender issued at the end of 1994, Agenor SA was  awarded a 
five-year service contract to provide technical assistance, renewable annually, from  1 June 1995 
to 31  May 2000. The TAO provides the Commission with technical assistance in managing some 
of the operations carried out under the Leonardo da Vinci programme. Decentralised operations 
are managed by the Commission without the help of the TAO. The main operations which the 
TAO helps  to  manage comprise several thousands  of project proposals per year  and  involve 
complex processing procedures through a chain of operations leading to the selection of some 750 
projects per year by the Commission. 
5.2.4.  The  main  actors  for  the  implementation  of  the  European  professional  trammg 
programme Leonardo da Vinci were thus DG XXII, under Commissioner Cresson, and Agenor 
SA, which was selected as TAO for the programme and headed by the former representative of 
the  non-profit-making  association  CESI in  Brussels,  the  leading  shareholder in Agenor SA. 
Audits were undertaken both by an audit unit of DG XXII itself and by DG XX, the Directorate-
General  for  Financial  Control,  responsible  to  Commissioner  Gradin.  Mrs  Gradin  was  also 
72 responsible  for  UCLAF  which  became  involved  as  soon  as  allegations  were  raised  regarding 
possible fraudulent actions  and  violations of criminal law. 
5.2.5.  As stated above, DG  XXII entrusted the implementation of the programme to  Agenor SA 
as  Technical Assistance Office (TAO).  Agenor SA is  a French company composed of a number 
of shareholders from different Member States.  However,  its controlling shareholder is  the French 
Group CESI (Centre d'Etudes Superieures lndustrielles). 
5.2.6.  CESI (Centre d'etudes superieures industriels) is  a non-profit-making association whose 
aims is to  provide permanent training courses for senior management. Its Management Board 
consists, on the basis of equality, of Associations representing French management on the one 
hand, the two employers' organisations concerned and four major firms (Renault, Rh6ne-Poulenc, 
Banque Scalbert Dupont and IBM) on the other. CESI's Managing Director is Mr Jacques Bahry. 
5.2.7.  SISIE (Services Industrie Strategic Internationale Environnement) is a limited company 
with a capital of FRF 3 000 000, whose aim is  to provide consultancy services for businesses. Its 
major shareholders  are  the  Schneider Group  and EDF.  Its  Managing Director is  Mr Nicolas 
Lebon. 
5.2.8.  It would appear that Mr Pineau-Valencienne is  the Chairman of SISIE's  Supervising 
Board  (Mrs  Cresson  chaired  the  SISIE's  Management  Board  before  being  appointed  to  the 
Commission),  and  that  he  was  also  an  administrator  of CESI  where  he  represented  the 
Metalworkers' Union. 
5.2.9.  As  early  as  1994,  the  Commission's  DG  XXII  conducted  an  internal  audit  of the 
implementation of one of Leonardo's predecessor programmes, 'FORCE', also implemented by 
Agenor SA. The audit report  contained a number of critical remarks about the networks and the 
products that had been established. It gave indications of double invoicing and unsatisfactory 
financial management.  Another internal audit was done by DG XXII on a project managed by 
EW  A,  a  Berlin-based  subsidiary  of CESI,  which  also  revealed  serious  failings  in  financial 
management and control. 
Obviously, the findings of these reports should have been taken into consideration by DG XXII 
when a decision on the award of the Leonardo TAO was taken. 
5.2.10. The European Commission's DG XXII concluded a contract with Agenor SA on 13 June 
1995 stipulating that the organisation would set up the administrative infrastructure required for 
the provision of assistance to DG XXII with respect to the start-up and follow-up of the Leonardo 
da  Vinci  programme.  This  contract  stipulated  inter  alia  the  following  requirements  and 
obligations: 
The Organisation shall provide technical assistance to the Commission for the period referred 
to  in  Article 2 of the current contract with regard to  the implementation of  the Leonardo 
Programme. 
The Commission retains sole responsibility for the implementation of  Council decisions and, 
in particular, for the liquidation of  financial contributions committed to the execution of  such 
decisions. 
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based on the work programme and budget and personnel plan agreed by the Commission. 
The Organisation shall be responsible for the recntitment and general terms and conditions of 
employment of  the employees required for the execution of the work programme.  For this 
purpose, the Organisation shall infonn the Commission of  the general terms and conditions of 
employment and of  the names and salary conditions of  each of  the employees employed by the 
Organisation for the execution of  the work programme set out in this contract. 
The Organisation shall obtain the prior pennission of  the Commission for any change and/or 
any recruitment at managing level. 
The Organisation may make amendments to the Personnel Plan with the prior agreement of  the 
Commission ..... 
The Organisation shall obtain the prior approval of  the Commission for any item of  equipment 
of  furniture charged to heading II (running costs) of  Annex Ill to the present contract, and shall 
make an appropriate record in its accounts and inventory. 
The Organisation shall obtain prior pennission of  the Commission for the purchase of  goods 
and services relating to the execution of  the present contract, where such goods or services will 
entail costs in excess of  ECU 10.000 during the contract period. 
This contract shall be governed by the general tenns and conditions applicable to contracts 
awarded by the Commission of  the European Communities, which are contained in Annex I to 
this contract and which the Organisation declares it has read and agrees to. 
In addition to any auditing procedures required by the Organisation's own procedures, the 
Commission and the Court of  Auditors of  the European Communities shall be entitled,for the 
purpose of  carrying out audits, to have access to all books, documents, papers and records kept 
by the Organisation  ..... ' 
5.3. Audit findin~:s of DG XXII's own audit unit concerning the Leonardo/A~:enor TAO 
5.3.1.  A first internal audit of the Leonardo/Agenor TAO was carried out by DG XXII's 
audit unit from 1 June 1996 to 31  May 199'1nto  the  first  year of operation  (1995/6)  of the 
Leonardo/  Agenor TAO and was  published within DG XXIT  by October 1997.  On the basis of this 
audit report, which disclosed  a number of critical elements, UCLAF already established a list of 
items  which  might  indicate  serious  irregularities  and/or fraud.  In  a  later  not'e  ~633) from 
UCLAF  dated  17  April  1998,  a  copy  of which  was  submitted  to  DG  XX,  it  requested  the 
inclusion of these items in  the framework of DG XX's audit of the Leonardo/  Age nor TAO which 
was  conducted in  1998. 
5.3.2. 
* 
* 
The main allegations  in  this  first  audit report by DG XXIT  were the following: 
Alteration of the initial tender specifications in order to  give an  advantage to  the printing 
company Forma in  Quarto'. 
Under normal circumstances, price estimates are requested from various printers in order 
to secure the least expensive price.  In this  case,  however,  the  initial tender specifications 
were  altered  at  the  last  moment  and  revised  price  quotes  were  requested  by  fax.  It 
emerges  that  Forma in  Quarto' always  replied last,  its prices being in  each case slightly 
lower than the best prices previously received. 
Deliberate non-compliance with  the  rule that the cheapest provider must be chosen for 
paper and printed products,  again  to  the advantage of  Forma in Quarto'. 
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Although  the  proposals  for  calls  for  tenders  regarding  paper  and  printed  products  in 
April/May  1998  clearly showed  that  'Editions  Europeennes'  had  submitted  the  most 
favourable bid,  and  although DG  XXII had asked the Leonardo TAO in  a note dated 
7  May  1998  not  to  accept  the  bid  from  'Forma  in  Quarto',  the  Leonardo  TAO still 
recommended this company. As DG XX's audit report later showed, 'Forma in Quarto' 
was in any case was not able to fulfil the required printing work. 
Irregular expenses in favour of a contract employee in the Leonardo TAO, charged by 
DML Consult, a company owned by the employee's wife. The employee worked for the 
TAO on the basis of a full-time secondment from the Belgian company VDAB, but at the 
same time charged for consultancy work through his wife's company DML Consult. 
In the period from 1 June 1995 to  1 July 1997, the employee thus received, in agreement 
with the director of the Leonardo TAO, 'emoluments' for a total of BEF 4 million per year 
(BEF 2.85 million for his full-time secondment fronVDAB  and BEF 1.2 million via 
fictitious invoices from DML Consult). 
As from 1 June 1997, he received an additional amount of approximately BEF 100 000 
per month  through  a  consultancy  contract  concluded  between  the  TAO  and  DML 
Consult. 
An  allegedly  fraudulent  invoice  of ECU  8000.  The  invoice  concerned  study  work 
supposedly performed by an organisation called Cendis-Ris. A detailed review of this 
study revealed  that  the  document had been prepared by three other persons who  had 
consultancy  agreements  with  the  Leonardo  TAO  through  'Etudes  et  Formation'. 
Moreover, no agreement from the Commission to carry out this study had been secured. 
Unacceptably high daily fee rates of ECU 2677 for a professor from Exeter University. 
On 15 August 1995, the Leonardo TAO confirmed an agreement with Exeter University 
under which  the  latter would  contribute expertise  and  networking  know-how  to  the 
Leonardo da Vinci programme. The budgeted fees for this task amounted to GBP 40 000 
per year based on a daily fee to the professor of ECU  2699. The contract was renewed 
for 1996/97 and  1997/1998. 
No formal authorisation was ever given by the Commission for the services of  Exeter 
University or the professor, who apparently did not produce any  scientific services which 
could justify the considerable fee of over GBP 40 000 a year paid to the University by the 
TAO. 
An allegedly fraudulent invoice of ECU 24 000 for consultancy work by the company 
'Etudes et Formation'. 
Invoice No 30 dated 1 May 1997 for ECU 24 000, paid on 16 September 1997, referred 
to consultancy services carried out by employees of 'Etudes et Formation' for work on a 
1996 compendium during the months March, April and May 1997. For this  follow-up 
work to an already existing compendium, neither a contract, nor supporting documents 
nor a formal agreement from the Commission could be presented. 
75 5.3.3.  It  should  be  noted  thano action was taken  by  DG  XXIT  to  examine  the  alleged 
irregularities  further  and/or  to  review  the  patterns  of  control  and  of  cooperation  with  the 
Leonardo/  Agenor TAO 
5.3.4.  The internal audit unit of DG XXII undertook another brief audit visit to the 
Leonardo/Agenor TAO from 24 to 30 July 1997 covering the first two years of operation 
on a random basis. The audit report of this visit was submitted to and discussed with the 
Director-General of DG XXII in December 1997. 
5.3.5.  The report in  many respects  confirmed the earlier findings  and revealed  the  following 
examples of alleged mismanagement and fraudulent practices: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
mission orders did  not indicate the  purpose of the missions; 
mission reports  could not be presented; 
conflicts  of interest:  the  'group  of experts' established  by  the  Leonardo/  Agenor TAO 
concluded  contracts  in  1995  and  1996  and  participated  in  contracts  during  the  same 
years; 
pre-invoicing from  Forma in Quarto' for printing tasks  to the order of ECU 93  676; 
an  invoice for BEF 300 000, without a VAT number or an invoice number,  for  a study 
on a general evaluation of the Leonardo/  Age  nor TAO database by the  systems manager 
of the TAO himself; 
double invoicing of a study produced by Cenid-Ris; 
pre-invoicing or fraudulent invoice of BEF 200 DOD; 
overstated fees  and  daily payments for consultancy services from Exeter University; 
pre-invoicing or fraudulent invoices of ECU 24 000 by Etudes et Formation'. 
5.3.6.  In total,  the audit recommended a reduction of the reported amount of ECU 456 486 and 
noted  in  its  final  remarksTaking  into  consideration  the  importance  of the  remarks,  ... ,  the 
internal audit considers  it as  a standard procedure that this  report is  communicated to  DG XX 
and UCLAF.' 
5.3.7.  Given the above findings  and the recommendations, it is  inconceivable that the Director-
General of DG XXII did not inform the  Commissioner responsible,  Mrs  Cresson.  Since UCLAF 
could not be involved without giving notice to  the Commissioner concerned, Mrs Gradin must 
also have been aware of the  situation. 
5.4. Audit findings by DG XX. Directorate-General for Financial Control 
5.4.1.  Only after lengthy debates between DG XXII, DG XX and UCllMS a decision taken 
in  February  1998  by  DG  XX  and  UCLAF  to  undertake  an  official  audit  of the 
Leonardo/Agenor TAO.  The involvement of these  two  services, responsible respectively for 
financial  control and the fight  against fraud,  not only indicates that the  allegations  were finally 
taken  seriously by the  services concerned but also,  as  indicated above,  that the Commissioners 
responsible for  the  services  must have  been  informed  through  their Directors-General.  On the 
other  hand,  in  spite  of  these  findings,  no  initiative  whatsoever  was  taken  for  immediate 
precautionary or preventive action,  as  should have been the case. 
76 5.4.2.  The internal draft audit report of DG XX  was issued as early as 20 July 1998.  It 
revealed inter alia the  following  allegations  of possible fraud,  management irregularities and/or 
breaches of disciplinary rules  (the  presentation of cases  is  not complete in order to  avoid lengthy 
repetitions,  but the selection presented sheds  a significant light on the nature of the findings)  : 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
The  mimtes  of  Agenor's  Administrative  Board  suggest  that  it  had  extensive 
foreknowledge in respect of the TAO call for tender, as  a result of which Agenor was 
selected as the TAO. 
Agenor's Administrative Board never established procedures and rules delineating the 
decision-making  powers  of the  Director.  In  important  areas,  such  as  recruitment, 
remuneration and promotion, the Director could take unilateral decisions. 
Certain projects were subject to a third evaluation carried out by representatives of the 
social partners, which is  contrary to the relevant Council Regulation, and, furthermore, 
members of Agenor's Administrative Board were involved in projects. The draft report 
states in this respect: 
"In our review of  the selection process we came across a document in  the TAO 
which was a list of  projects having the direct support of  the Cresson cabinet.  We 
also saw documents advocating the use of  Professor Reiffers,  an advisor to  the 
Cresson Cabinet,  as an extra evaluator of  projects related to  a certain priority 
under  the  White  paper.  Organisations  with  links  to  Professor  Reiffers  are 
involved in Leonardo projects as either contractors or partners". 
Mission reports  were  missing  or in certain  cases  not  written.  Several  employees  were 
apparently allowed  trips  home in lieu  of salary,  the  legality of which is  questionable as 
salary increases for  Belgian companies  at the time were  restricted by law.  An invoice, to 
the  order of ECU 30 000,  under the  1996-97  contract included several  missions  of the 
Director of the  TAO that were not carried out. 
Invoices  were  submitted  for  payment  without  supporting  documents,  the  only 
requirement being the  approval of the  Director. There was  no  centralised purchase order 
system. 
Nearly all  printing assignments and  the  whole publication budget were awarded to  one 
company,  Forma  in  Quarto.  The  turnover  of the  Forma in  Quarto' company equalled 
about  100% of the  amount paid by Agenor to  Format in Quarto' for  the  years  1996 and 
1997,  which  suggests  that  Leonardo/Agenor  TAO  was  the  only client  of the  printing 
company.  The  fact  that  the  total  staff  of  Forma  in  Quarto'  was  only  three  and  the 
investment in  machinery was  only ECU 50 000 is  difficult to reconcile with the  amount 
of work billed  to  the  Leonardo/Agenor TAO,  on  average ECU 300 000  per year,  and 
leads  to  the  conclusion  that  the  printing  work  was  subcontracted  out  by  Forma  in 
Quarto'. 
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* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
The  obligation  that  at  least  three  price  estimates  be  obtained  for  expenditure  above 
ECU  10  000  was  circumvented  by  splitting  the  amount  charged  into  invoices  under 
ECU  10  000. 
For  some  contracts  the  Leonardo/  Age nor  TAO  could  give  no  proof that  reports  had 
actually been written;  in one case,  the  same report  was  invoiced a second time under a 
different contractor's name. 
A  possibly  fraudulent  payment  of  BEF  885  000  to  the  Deputy  Director  of  the 
Leonardo/Agenor TAO.  This  Deputy  Director  was  included  in  the  proposal  for  the 
Leonardo/  Agenor T  A  0  as Head of Finance and Administration and was made redundant 
by the TAO Director within two weeks of his appointment. It was stated that he and the 
Director of Leonardo/Agenor TAO did  not know  each other at all.  DG  XX  was  not 
presented with any evidence of prior approval by DG XXII for this dismissal. A further 
amount  of BEF 250 000 was  ultimately also paid  to  a lawyer of the  former  Deputy 
Director for legal advice. 
Alleged  'ghost  experts'  charged  to  the  Commission  in  respect  of  whom  the 
Leonardo/Agenor TAO did not register attendance or the time of employment. 
Payment of allegedly illegal salary increases of BEF 50 000 per month to  the Deputy 
Director of the Leonardo/  Agenor TAO and an additional fee of BEF 25 000 for missions 
allegedly never carried out. 
Irregular advances and loans given to  the Leonardo/Agenor TAO staff;  to  some staff, 
'loans' of over BEF 1 million were given, which appeared extremely high in relation to 
the salaries and the low equity of Agenor. 
Alleged fraud by the Head of Administration. From October 1996, when  she received 
the authority to  sign payments of up  to  BEF 100 000,  she started to  write cheques to 
herself for amounts between BEF 50 000 and 100 000, totalling BEF 1 500 000 by March 
1998. She was dismissed when this fraud was detected and after she had 'regularised' the 
situation. She  is quoted as saying that she had received oral approval from the Director 
and that the transfers were to be considered as  an advance payment to her. 
The Director's wife had been included in the initial proposal for the Leonardo/Agenor 
TAO as an assistant working in the Director's secretariat with a salary of BEF 89 000. 
After the dismissal of the Head of Administration in March 1998, she was appointed as 
the Head of Administration/Personnel with a salary of BEF 220 000. This salary has to 
be considered as grossly overstated for someone who not only has no appropriate degree 
but also no qualification relevant to the post occupied and who does not speak a second 
language. 
The future daughter-in-law of the Director replaced the Director's wife in her previous 
post in  March  1998  as  Head of the  selection process.  For this  promotion,  her gross 
monthly salary increased from BEF 107 000 to BEF 150 000. 
78 *  Another administrator, responsible for  the  development of administrative applications, 
started  with  a  salary  of  BEF  125  000  (June  1995)  which  was  later  increased  to 
BEF 200 000 (June  1996).  She created her own company as  of April  1997  and received 
several assignments  from  the  Leonardo/Agenor TAO. 
*  Alleged false  invoices  issued by a company for analysis  of the Leonardo/Agenor TAO 
database structure.  The analysis  report in  question was  in  fact  a simple description of the 
database structure of the Leonardo/  Agenor TAO which should have been available after 
the  acquisition  of the  database.  It appears  that  the  payment  was  more  a  present  than 
payment for  a service rendered with added value. 
*  An  alleged  false  invoice  of ECU  8800  from  a  subcontractor for  22  days  of service  in 
December  1977.  The person in charge  of staff in  the  Leonardo/  Agenor TAO claimed 
never  to  have  seen  anybody  doing  the  work.  There  were  not  22  working  days  in 
December 1997  in  the TAO. 
5.4.3.  The findings of DG XX's draft audit report,  as well as  other supporting documents, justify 
the  conclusion  that  the  implementation  of  the  Leonardo  I  programme  through  the 
Leonardo/  Agenor TAO can  be characterised by 
a lack of internal control on financial  transactions; 
a poor control environment concerning staff and  activities which allowed staff to  commit 
serious irregularities; 
a  perception  of irregularities  which  in  itself must  be  considered  as  an  incitement  to 
corruption,  as  it meant offering indemnities to  those  who  were suspected of fraud rather 
than  threatening prosecution. 
5.4.4.  The draft report thus  shows  important deficiencies  in the  Commission's  monitoring of 
the  Leonardo/  Agenor TAO by the Commission.  It states in this  context: 
The  Commission  control  could best be  described  as form  over substance.  It 
appears that the  TAO  has,  under these  circumstances,  taken  the  opportunity to 
enforce  its position  to  the  extent that it  is  not always  clear who  is  controlling 
whom,  DG XXII the  TAO  or vice versa.' 
5.4.5.  On 6 November 1998, DG XX's internal draft audit report of 20 July 1998 became the 
provisional final audit report of DG XX and was submitted for observations to DG XXII. 
5.4.6.  It has to be noted that the time lapse of four months (July to November 1998) is to be 
regarded as excessively long, given the number and nature of the findings set out in the draft audit 
report of July 1998, which would have required immediate and decisive action by the services 
responsible. 
5.4.7.  Even though the provisional final audit report was shortened as  regards to  details and 
considerations on a number of  aspects compared with the draft audit report of 20 July 1998, it 
still contained the major allegations, such as: 
79 detailed information about the requirements for  the future Leonardo TAO was  available 
to Agenor prior to  publication of the  tender; 
a  considerable  number  of  breaches  of  contract  conditions,  of  varying  degrees  of 
seriousness, 
non-compliance with  the  contract clause relating to  taxation; 
non-compliance  with  national  tax  laws  and  other  local  legislation,  including  social 
security payments; 
breaches in tendering procedures  and  staff policy; 
several areas of possible irregularities which UCLAF was advised to  examine; 
in  general,  a  poor  system  of  internal  control  combined  with  a  highly  centralised 
management style operated by the TAO Director; 
serious  weaknesses  in  the  organisational  and  control  structures  as  evidenced  by 
irregularities that had already been identified; 
misappropriation of funds; 
senior management operating with a lack of integrity; 
absence of objective recruitment policies  and procedures; 
favouritism with regardto the appointment of the Director's wife to a key management 
position; 
circumvention of DG XXII's approval in areas of project development; 
inadequate checks by DG XXII in areas such as personnel and management, informatics 
and operations (i.e. in none); 
lack of cooperation  and,  on occasions,  reluctance  of the  Leonardo/  Agenor TAO  to 
provide timely and relevant information; 
general dissatisfaction of Member States (NCUs) and promoters with the time taken by 
the  Leonardo/Agenor  TAO  and  DG  XXII  to  process  applications  and  with  the 
bureaucratic nature of the process. 
eligibility criteria appeared to have been applied in an arbitrary fashion; 
lack of transparency in the pre-selection process and interference by the Commissioner's 
private office. 
5.4.8.  DG XX concludes its above-mentioned audit report with the following remark: 
'Given  the  overall  results  of this  audit,  the  audit team  proposes  that DG XXII 
seriously  reconsider  the  continuation  of the  TAO  contract  with  Agenor.  The 
fundamental  problem  is  the  management  of the  TA@pen  where  there  are 
proper procedures these are  often  overridden  by the  Director.' 
5.4.9.  Looking  from  a  more  detached  point  of view  at  the  above  results,  which  had  all 
previously appeared in their essentials  in  the  internal draft audit report of 20 July  1998,  the 
conclusion drawn by DG XX  can only be regarded as an understatement.  The question arises 
whether internal management, control and organisation functioned in an acceptable way in any 
area of the TAO's activities. 
Above and beyond the established procedures of regular controls, standard audit procedures and 
spot checks, the question must further be asked whether it can be considered credible or probable 
that the overwhelming number of deficiencies that have become apparent, and which had been 
predicted (given the early 1994 internal audit report by DG XXII on 'Force' referred to above), 
could occur and continue over several years without - at least - having become known, through 
80 informal  channels  at  the  Commission  and/or  between  the  Leonardo/Agenor  TAO  and  the 
Commission, at the  highest levels of DG XXII. 
5.4.10.  On 10  November 1998 the then Director-General of DG XXII forwarded the 
provisional final audit report, together with his first observations, to the Commissioner 
responsible, Mrs Cresson.  From various  remarks  made  by the  Director- General  it  must  be 
concluded  that  DG  XXII  was  not  in  a  position  to  contest  the  factual  findings.  The remarks, 
moreover,  contained  references  to  further  investigations  that  might  be needed,  to  unspecified 
burdens  of be past, to statements that some of the evaluations were  'questionable', to formal 
checks undertaken by DG XXII, which was officially not eitlled to interfere, to the fact that the 
contract with the Leonardo/  Agenor TAO did not allow  further corrective measures, that - in his 
opinion - the overall functioning of the Leonardo programme was not to be questioned, that minor 
improvements had been introduced, that certain payments were not  accepted by the Commission 
and that possibly illegal payments of the Leonardo/Agenor TAO did not concern 'Community 
funds'.  It  was  further  claimed  that  DG  XXII  relied  on  information  provided  by  the 
Leonardo/Agenor TAO, that other internal DG XXTI audits had not yet been finalised, that the 
Commission was not aware of the local social legislation, that further investigations would be 
needed  and,  finally,  that  a  number  of suggestions  had  to  be  taken  on  board,  such  as  the 
information of UCLAF. 
5 .4.11. Even if it has to be conceded that the TAO contract itself provided a high level of freedom 
of action for the Leonardo/  Age  nor TAO, DG XXII certainly allowed an  extension of the scale 
of independence through tacit acceptance and/or indifference.  In this Committee's opinion, the 
remarks  of the  Director-General  of DG  XXII,  although  concealing  the  real  problems,  did 
nevertheless disclose findings that should have alerted the Commissioner who, in turn, should 
have informed the Commission. 
5.4.12.  Responsibility  for  the  facts  assessed  above,  lies  certainly  with  the  Commissioner 
concerned, either because of non-intervention in a situation known to be highly unsatisfactory, 
or because of a failure to make inquiries about the true situation in a file which, from the outset, 
(see  above  para.  3)  should  have  been followed  up  with  special care.  But,  of course,  such 
responsibility also has to be borne by the heads of DG XXII and the officials responsible for 
contacts  with  the  Leonardo/  Agenor  TAO  and  the  supervision  and  implementation  of the 
programme. All of them hid behind formal arrangements, understating established findings and/or 
showing an extraordinary degree of indifference. 
5.5. Further Proceedings in the Commission 
5.5.1.  In an internal note from UCLAF dated 18 September 1998, a summary is given of 
sixteen cases of possible breaches of criminal law,  of four cases of possible contractual and 
administrative breaches and two cases of possible internal disciplinary violations. Against the 
background  of this  record,  which  is  based  on  DG XX's  internal  draft  audit  report  on  the 
Leonardo/Agenor TAO dated 20 July 1998, it was suggested that: 
a letter should be prepared to  the  Public Prosecutor in  Brussels requesting  a 
criminal  investigation  with  reference  to  Article  209A  of the  EU Treaty.  This 
letter !lwuld contain a copy of DG XX's final audit report as well as a non-
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actions of  fraud and violations of the  Belgian criminal legislation.  However,  the 
non-exhaustive  list  should  only  contain  examples  of fraud,  which  can 
immediately be proved by evidential documentation.  The  purpose of the  list is 
to  convince  the  Belgian judicial authorities of the  necessity to  start the  police 
investigation.  It  should  therefore  ....  only  contain  the  most  obvious  cases  of 
fraud.  Administrative actions should also be conducted vis a  vis the company 
Agenor as indicated in the draft audit report.  Finally,  with regard to the internal 
personal aspect in the Commission it should be considered to involve the DG IX 
to  complete an administrative investigation which will determine any possible 
disciplinary sanctions and/or penal actions against responsible employees in the 
DGXXII. 
5.5.2.  In  a note dated  23  September 1998  from  the  Head of unit DG  XX.2's  Internal Audit Unit 
to  the  Director-General  of  DG  XX,  reference  is  made  to meeting  arranged  with 
representatives of DG XXII to  discuss  the comments  of DG XXII on the  internal draft audit 
report on the Leonardo/Agenor TAO which had been forwarded  to  them on  18  September 1998. 
The Head of DG XX.2's  unit concluded his  note  with  the following remarks: 
'I must emphasise, at this stage,  that DG XXII did not contest the findings on the 
TAO Leonardo da  Vinci,  which means that DG XXII should consider without 
further delay their approach to the TAO Leonardo and the actions to be taken 
in respect of  the contract with the TAO that expires on September 30.  It appears 
that DG XXII have not developed any contingency plans in  respect of  the future 
management of the  Leonardo programme  in  the  light of our audit findings 
(received 24 July 1998).' 
5.5.3.  It should be emphasised that this  note was  drafted  well in advance of 10  November 1998 
when the provisional final  audit report was forwarded  to  DG  XXII (as  referred to  above in para 
5.4.9.). 
5.5.4.  According  to  a note for DG XX's  files,  a  meeting  took place  on  30 September  1998 
between the Director-General of DG XX and  the  then Director-General of DG XXII concerning 
the renewal of the contract of the  Leonardo/Agenor TAO.  In  the  light of the findings  of the audit 
report,  the  option  of terminating  the  contract  with  Agenor  with  six  months' notice  and  the 
engagement of a new  TAO was  discussed.  DG XXII considered  that such a termination would 
create problems for  the continuity of the programme. It was finally  agreed that the contract would 
be extended for an  initial period of four  months - from September 1998  to  January  1999 - with 
special  conditions  for  improvement being  closely  monitored  by  DG  XXII.  With  regard  to  the 
performance of the  Director of the TAO,  DG  XX requested that DG XXII approach Agenor with 
a view  to  negotiating the replacement of the  current Director. 
5.5.5.  No  reference  was  made  at  that  stage  either  to  an  intention  of  informing  the 
Commissioners  responsible  and,  through  them,  the  Commission,  or  to  possible  reactions  or 
measures  to be taken in the  light of the findings  of the  audit report,  such  as  possible disciplinary 
action or judicial proceedings. 
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3 November  1998  (no  7358) on meetings  held between representatives of UCLAF and DG XX 
on  1  October  1998  and  13  October  1998,  the  issue  of possible  breaches  of criminal  law  and 
further investigations in  the  framework of the  Leonardo/Agenor TAO  was discussed.  There is, 
however, no evidence that the meetings resulted in  any kind of immediate action by the Directors-
general  or the Commissioners concerned. 
5.5.7.  On 4  November 1998,  a  meeting  took  place  between  the  Director  of UCLAF,  the 
Director-General of DG XXII and the  Deputy Director-General of DG XX.  At that  meeting,  the 
final  audit report  to  be  issued  on  10  November  1998  (see  above  para.  5.5.2)  was  available  in 
manuscript version,  and  it was  agreed  that it would be  submitted to  the  Secretary-General,  Mr 
Trojan, and to  Commissioner Gradin with names and to  the  European Parliament without names. 
It  was  further decided to  establish a file  with documentation to  back up  the most obvious cases 
of fraud  and  to  give  priority  to  five  matters  which  appeared  to  conrfrin most  obvious  and 
easily proved cases of irregularities. 
5.5.8.  It should therefore be noted that the Heads  of both DG XX and UCLAF were well  aware 
not  only of the  numerous  incidences of mismanagement but also of fraudulent  practices which 
justified the involvement of judicial authorities. 
5.5.9.  At this  stage,  DG XXII was  still  involved in  what is known internally as  a contradictory 
procedure.  But it is  also evident that the  audit report as  produced by DG XX  was  available to the 
services  concerned,  including  the  Director-General  of  DG  XXIT,  and  therefore  also  to  the 
Commissioner responsible. 
5.5.10. By letter oft.O November 1998, the thenDirector-General of DG XXll submitted to  Mrs 
Cresson's Chef de cabinet a revised version of DG XX's supposedly final audit report together 
with the remarks of DG XXIT (referred to above in para. 5.4.4.). It followed from the text of the 
audit report, and even more from the  'remarks' added by DG XXII,  that the findings of the report 
had to be deemed to be serious, especially since these remarks did not contest the factual basis 
of the serious allegations made in the report. At one stage, DG XXIT conceded for the first time 
that the matter in question should be investigated by UCLAF. 
5.5.11. On 23 November 1998, the Deputy Financial Controller submitted to  the  Director-
General of  DG XX copies of the final audit report, subsequent to the contradictory procedure 
with DG XXII, which were to be forwarded to Commissioners Gradin, Cresson, Liikanen as well 
as to Mr Trojan and President Santer's Chef de cabinet. It may be assumed that, from then on the 
whole Commission was in a position to know what had been revealed in the reports and what was 
going on in the Leonardo/Agenor TAO. 
5.5.12.  In a  letter,  with  annex,  from  the  then  Director-General of DG  XXIT  to  the  Director-
General  of DG  XX  dated  26  November  1998,  further  observations  were  set  out  regarding 
DG XX's audit report. It is stated that this reply from DG XXII had been 'examined' together with 
Commissioner Cresson's Chef de cabinet, and that it had also been forwarded to the Secretary-
General, Mr Trojan. 
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concerning the Leonardo/Agenor TAO was  'officially'  finalised,  and the  Director-General of 
DG XX sent a copy of the report to the Chair of Parliament's Committee on Budgetary Control. 
DG XX's final remarks were forwarded later on 7 January 1999. 
5.5.14. By mid-December 1998, an official of the Commission, Mr Van Buitenen, had sent a 
comprehensive letter to  the  Chair of the  Green  group in  the  European Parliament revealing, 
among other things, most of the findings of the Leonardo/Agenor TAO audit report. From then 
on, both information and action on the part of the Commission developed rapidly: 
on  19  January  1999,  the  Financial  Controller of the  Commission  and  the  Director-
General of DG XX sent a note to Mrs Cresson with the conclusions of the audit report; 
on 8 February 1999, UCLAF sent a note to Mrs Cresson's Chef de cabinet informing him 
that four cases involving the Leonardo/Agenor TAO would be brought before the Public 
Prosecutor in Brussels, as subsequently occurred on 11  February 1999. 
5.5.15.  On  29  January  1999,  the  Commission  decided  to  give  Agenor  an  extension  of the 
Leonardo TAO contract for another two weeks from 31  January 1999 until 15 February 1999 in 
order to gain time for further negotiations on the improvement of the internal management of the 
TAO and for the removal of the Director who was held responsible for a large number of alleged 
breaches of the rules. Since Agenor did not respond to this extension, the Commission terminated 
the contract with Agenor with effect as from 31  January 1999 by letter of 11  February 1999. 
5.6. Parliament in i&:norance 
5.6.1.  Throughout the summer of 1998, the European Parliament worked on its report on the 
proposal from the Commission concerning the Leonardo II programme, the successor to Leonardo 
I currently under consideration. According to Parliament's schedule, the report of the <iim1ittee 
on  Social  Affairs  and  Employment  on  Leonardo  II  drawn  up  by  its  rapporteur,  Mrs  Sue 
Waddington, was to be discussed and adopted at Parliament's part-session of 4-5 November 1998. 
The European Parliament's Committee on Social Affairs adopted its draft report for the plenary 
on 27 October 1998. 
5.6.2.  There can be no doubt that all matters regarding the financial, managerial and substantive 
implementation of Leonardo I would have been of imminent importance for Parliament's attitude 
and for the decision-making process relating to Leonardo II.  It is elementary 'common sense' that 
the Commission should have supported the Parliament's decision-making process in providing 
it  with  all  kinds  of information  on  substantial  and  even  seemingly  less  important  matters 
concerning Leonardo I.  Any information on past experience could have served as a background 
on how to structure the successor programme. 
5.6.3.  On 26  October  1998,  a  few  days  before the  debate  and  adoption  at first  reading  of 
Parliament's resolution on the Leonardo II programme on 5 November 1998, MEPs received an 
anonymous 'Open letter to Members of the European Parliament' dated 26 October 1998 which 
closed with the demand:  'Do not vote for the proposed Leonardo Da Vinci II programme at your 
November  part-session'.  Subsequently,  a  number  of allegations  were  made  regarding  the 
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and dissemination practices,  as  well  as  very bad management.  Even though it had  to  be classified 
as  one  of the  many papers  trying  to  influence  political  decision-making,  a  fact  of life  in  the 
European  Parliament,  the  paper  was  such  as  to  suggest  at  least  some  familiarity  with  the 
programme's implementation. 
5.6.4.  Until  26  Octoberl998, the  day  when  the  anonymous  letter arrived,  the  rapporteur for 
Parliament's  Committee  on  Social  Affairs  and  Employment,  Mrs  Sue  Waddington,  had  no 
information whatsoever about the numerous irregularities that had occurred in the  implementation 
of the Leonardo I programme. In order to  secure complete assurance that the insinuations of the 
anonymous letter were false,  she wrote to  the  President of the  Commission on 5 November 1998: 
'Of course,  I  am  not  inclined  to  give  any  credibility  to  anonymously  sent 
material,  and I  intend to  take  my report through  the  Parliament as planned. 
I  would however like  your assurance  that  the  allegations  are  unfounded and that  the 
audit of Leonardo I  has  been  satisfactory and that the  Commission  have  taken  account 
of the  Parliament's decisions  on  the  White  Paper. 
5.6.5.  Four days  later,  on  9 November 1998,  President Santer answered Mrs Wadding'tanr 
alia  with the following  words: 
'I share your view as  to  the  attitude  to  be  taken  towards  anonymous material. 
I can  confirm  that the  Commissions Financial  Controller is  currently finalising 
an  internal  audit  report  which  raises  questions  about  certain  aspects  of the 
management of the  current Leonardo programme  by  the  technical assistance 
office concerned.  During the period of the  audit the  contract with  the  technical 
assistance  office  has  been  renewed  on  a  temporary  basis  to  ensure  that,  if 
necessary,  corrective action  is  taken. 
The  Commission  will  monitor  closely  the  performance  of  the  technical 
assistance office and the position will be critically reviewed before the  end of the 
year. 
5.6.6.  The above-mentioned response from  President Santer may be interpreted on  two  levels; 
a  formal  one,  and  one  which  takes  into  account  the  substance  of the  question  raised  by  Mrs 
Waddington as  to  the  nature of the  accusations  made  in  the  anonymous  letter. 
5.6.7.  On  the  formal  level  President  Santer  answered  correctly  in  stating  that  the  Financial 
Controller  was  currently  finalising  an  internal  audit  report  and  that  certain  aspects  of the 
management  of  the  Leonardo  programme  by  the  Technical  Assistance  Office  were  being 
questioned. He was also right in noting that the position of the Technical Assistance Office would 
be critically reviewed before  the  end of the  year. 
5.6.8.  As for  the substance of Mrs  Waddington's letter,  however,  the  answer was  evasive to  an 
extent which can only be qualified as  misleading, in that it failed  to  mention all  those allegations 
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XX  and UCLAF by that date. 
No  mention was  made of the initial internal audit from  June  1996 to May  1997  (see para.  5.3.4. 
above)  and of its  very critical findings,  no  mention  was  made of the report on the  audit visit to 
the Leonardo/Agenor TAO (see para.  5.4.1.), which had already disclosed internally many serious 
allegations of mismanagement and fraudulent  practices  and,  finally,  no  mention was  made of the 
internal  draft  audit  report  by  DG  XX,  nor  of the  subsequent  consultation  between  DG  XX, 
DG  XXII  and  UCLAF (see  paras.  5.5.1.-13.  above)  which  gave  a  global picture  of disastrous 
management of the Leonardo/Agenor TAO,  and which was  available on 20 July 1998. 
5.6.9.  Even  if the  President  of the  Commission,  had  no  idea  of what  was  going  on  in  the 
Leonardo/Agenor TAO  when  he  signed  the  letter  on  9  November  1998,  it  should  have  been 
imperative  to  write  a  rectifying  letter  to  Mrs  Waddington  on  23  November  1998  when  the 
seriousness of the situation was  'formally' disclosed to Mr Trojan and President Santer's Chef 
de cabinet, Mr Cloos (see para. 5.5.11. above). 
5.6.10. With a view to securing more complete information about the 'internal audit report which 
raises questions about certain aspects of the management of the current Leonardo programme' 
referred to  in President Santer's first reply to Mrs Waddington, she wrote another letter to the 
President  pm  30  November  1998  'concerning  allegations  of  fraud  and  failures  in  the 
administration of the Leonardo programme.' She closed her letter by saying: 
'I  wodd therefore  be  grateful if you  could provide me,  as  the  Parliament's 
rapporteur on the programme, with a copy of  the internal audit report and also 
keep me fully informed of  any action which may be taken vis a  vis the technical 
assistance office. 
I look forward to  receiving your reply.' 
No  formal reply to  this  letter was  ever given,  although the fact  that Mrs Cresson appeared before 
the  European  Parliament's  Committee  on  Social  Affairs  on  5  January  1999  to  some  extent 
obviated the  need for such a reply. 
5.7. Professor Reiffers' mission 
5.7.1.  Professor Reiffers' mission 
The White Paper on  Education and Training,  approved by the  Commission in November 
1995  on a proposal from  DG XXII and Commissioner Cresson, sought to  promote new 
approaches  in  the  field  of education  (Towards  the  Learning  Society)  by boosting  the 
LEONARDO and SOCRATES  programmes.  Professor Reiffers,  from  the University of 
Aix-Marseilles,  made  significant contributions  to  the drawing  up  of this  document (cf. 
note  from  Mrs  Cresson  to  the  Committee  of Independent  Experts  dated  17  February 
1999). 
The White Paper proposed five  objectives,  the  first  of which concerned the promotion 
of \he acquisition of new knowledge'.  In July 1995, with a view to  the  attainment of these 
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Commissioners Bangemann and  Flynn,  the  Commission  appointed  a  reflection group 
consisting  of  25  members,  chaired  by  Mr  Reiffers  (amount  paid  to  Mr  Reiffers: 
ECU 10 000, the other members of the Bureau also being remunerated). 
Mr  Reiffers' curriculum  vitae,  which  the  Committee  has  noted,  shows  that  he  is  an 
eminent person with a well established reputation.  After holding several university posts, 
in  199111992  he  was  appointed  education  and  training  adviser to  the  Prime Minister, 
Mrs Cresson. 
On 29 December 1995,  Mr Reiffers  secured a  contract  to  provide assistance  (ECU  30 
000) for  an  individual mission connected with the  implementation of the  White Paper. 
That contract was  awarded without any pre-selection procedure. The possibility cannot 
be  excluded  that  it  was  awarded  in  implementation  of Article  59(d)  of the  Financial 
Regulation which authorises  private-treaty contracts under certain circumstances. 
By  letter  of 27  March  1996,  in  agreement  with  the  Director-General  of DG  XXII, 
Mrs  Cresson  appointed  the  heads  of project responsible  for  the  attainment of the  five 
objectives  set  out  in  the  White  Paper.  Mr Reiffers  was  appointed  head  of project for 
Objective No 1,  the  other heads of project being heads of unit at the Commission. In her 
letter, Mrs Cresson said that these heads of project were working under the responsibility 
of the Director-General responsible for  ensuring a balance between the  estimated costs 
and resources.  Finally, it was  indicated that such cooperation should result in compliance 
with decsion-making procedures and institutional rules vis-a-vis the public authorities 
of the Member States. Those appointments were also made without any pre-selection 
procedure. 
The post of head of project was not remunerated. 
A call for tenders was issued on 31  May 1996 for the provision of consultancy services 
to assist in the implementation and monitoring of the experimental European project for 
the  accreditation  of knowledge.  Consultancy  contracts  were  also  concluded  for  the 
attainment of Objectives No 3 and 4 in the White Paper. 
In  response  to  this  call  for  tenders  concerning  Objective  No  1,  66  requests  for 
documentation were registered, and four bids were deemed to comply with the tender 
specifications. The bid submitted by Reiffers Conseil was selected because it was the 
economically most advantageous bid. When this proposal was submitted to  the ACPC, 
that  committee  asked  for  further  information  so  that  the  authorising  officer  might 
consider the  possibility of the  appointment of Mr Reiffers  as  an  expert  under other 
current procedures and might explain and attest to the fact that the person to whom it was 
proposed that the contract be awarded had had no influence on the drawing up of the 
notice of tender and the tender specifications (cf.  the aforementioned meeting of the 
ACPC). 
In his additional report, the Director-General of Directorate-General XX II noted that it 
was neither for the Commission as a body nor for the Commissioner responsible to make 
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by the contractor did  not seem to  require  appointment by the  Commission as  a body. It 
was  a  matter of meeting  the requirements  of the services  which  currently did  not have 
available  the  expertise  required  to  bring  the  project  to  a  successful  conclusion. 
Appointment by senior politicians in the  Commission would divert the  mission from its 
purpose,  which  was  to  assist  the  services  and  not  to  play  a  role  involving  advice  or 
political  direction. 
Having said  that,  the  Director-General approved Mr Reiffers' contract,  taking the view 
that there  was  no  conflict of interests  in  Mr Reiffers' being  appointed  coordinator for 
Objective No  1 since he had not been involved in the drawing up  of the  call for tenders 
or the tender specifications. 
The  Commissioner  responsible  gave  no  information  to  the  ACPC  in  his  letter  dated 
27  March 1996 that he had appointed Mr Reiffers head of project. 
The amount of the  contract  was  estimated  at EUR  80 000 per year  (one-year  contract 
renewable twice)  (meeting No  370 of the  ACPC of 16  October  1996). 
Having  been  consulted  by  DG  XXII,  the  Commission's  Legal  Service  indicated  on 
3  December  1997  that  there  was  a  conflict of interest  between  the  two  posts  held  by 
Mr Reiffers.  He subsequently resigned from  his post of consultant. 
A letter sent to  the  Commissioner's Chef de  cabinet by the  Director-General of DG XXII 
on 24  September 1996 reflects  a desire not to  reveal certain facts  to  the bodies  asked for 
their opinion on certain aspects of the programme.  In  that letter it is stated that some of 
the objectives set out in  the White Paper continued to result in reservations if not outright 
opposition from  certain Member States and that they must not be given any opportunity 
to  increase the  pressure on and cause difficulties  for Mrs  Cresson,  particularly when  the 
Council of Education Ministers met on  21  November. 
This  matter gives  rise to the following  assessment: 
5.7.2.  From the time when Mr Reiffers  was  appointed as  initial project deviser and  as  architect, 
it  was  not irregular for  him  also  to  become the person responsible for implementing one of the 
objectives.  Nothing prohibits  in principle the person selected  as  project deviser from  acting  as 
project manager and, possibly,  from  assisting  in its  implementation. It is  on a case-by-case basis, 
depending  on  the  circumstances  of each  contract,  that  the  authorising  officer  may  select  the 
appropriate solution. 
5.7.3.  In the  light of the documents  available to  it,  the Committee of Experts  has  not been able 
to  establish whether Mr Reiffers had been awarded  a consultancy contract for  the  attainment of 
Objective No  1 in  respect  of which he  was  also head of project or  whether that call for  tenders 
concerned his  appointment as  head of project. 
It  may  well  be  that  this  involved  a  procedure  used  inappropriately  with  a  view  to  actually 
remunerating  a  head  of project  which  would  explain  why  no  reference  was  made  before  the 
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appointments  and/or contracts  resulting  in  a  conflict of interests  by making  one  and  the  same 
person of head of project and consultant. 
5.7.4.  The Committee would like trecall in  this  connection an  opinion which  it expressed on 
another occasion,  namely that the fact of complying with legal and  statutory provisions does  not 
mean  that  such  conduct  was  justified.  Furthermore,  with  the  tacit  approval  or  not  of  the 
Commissioner responsible,  Mr Reiffers put her in  an  embarrassing situation. 
5.8.  Conclusions 
5.8.1.  The Leonardo Da Vinci file  raises  significant questions with respect to  the  functioning 
of the services of the Commission,  up  to  the  highest levels of command, the Directors-general, 
as  well  as  of the  individual  Commissioners  and  the  Commission  as  a  whole.  The  allegations 
raised against the Leonardo/Agenor TAO at an early stage of operation,  and even before (see para. 
5.2.8.  above),  were  so  serious  and  illustrative  of a  dysfunctional  organisational  climate  and 
structure that they should have been seen by those who  were in charge. They are a demonstration 
of the weaknesses of the information channels  and control mechanisms  within  the  Commission, 
up  to the highest level.  Individual Directors-general and  Commissioners were indeed aware at the 
latest by  July  1998  of the  serious  problems facing  Leonardo/Agenor TAO,  and critical reports 
were  known  to  the  Directors-general  concerned  long  before  that  date  but,  pending  lengthy 
discussions between the Commission services  involved,  no  action was  taken.  The main failings 
are  identified in the following  paragraphs. 
5.8.2.  As  may be seen from several of the files  discussed in this  report,  the  concept of having 
European public programmes implemented by private contractors needs to  be carefully considered 
and managed.  The European Parliament and the  Council have imposed on the  Commission more 
and  more  tasks,  while  at  the  same time  applying  rigorous  budgetary restrictions.  However,  the 
multiplication  of the  operational  funds  in  many  of the  Commission's  areas  of activity  or the 
introduction of new multimillion ecu  programmes,  without providing  the  necessary staff and/or 
adapting the relevant regulations,  will obviously cause problems. 
5.8.3.  The  implementation  of Community  programmes  by  private  contractors  can  only  be 
accepted on the basis of a guarantee that the  essence of the public function  is  notlGlinOO  and 
transferred  into  the  hands  of private  contractors.  Moreover,  those  private  contractors  must be 
subject to  contractual  provisions  imposing  strict  obligations  in  the  general  interest,  and  the 
public authorities  must effectively supervise this  action.  It is  clear that such supervision has  not 
been exercised with sufficient care in the present case vis-a-vis the Leonardo/Agenor TAO. It 
would seem that excessive confidence has been placed in the TAO, and thus excess reliance on 
outside consultants (see above para. 5.4.2.). 
5.8.4.  DG XXIT,  which is  responsible for  the  programme, had already found  indications of 
irregularities  as  early as  1994  when it conducted an  internal audit of the  implementation by 
Agenor of a predecessor programme (see above, para. 5.2.9.). It should have acted accordingly, 
if not in  the  selection of Agenor as  TAO for Leonardo,  then at  least in  the supervision of its 
activities, once selected. 
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detected in  1997. Given the findings  and recommendations, it is not conceivable that the Director-
General of DG XXIT  did  not inform the Commissioner responsible, Mrs Cresson, or that the latter 
was  not informed through other sources. 
5.8.6.  After unnecessarily lengthy discussion between DG  XXIT,  DG XX and UCLAF,  it was 
finally  decided  in  February  1998  that  DG  XX  and  UCLAF  would  undertake  further 
investigations, a fact  which must have been communicated to the Commissioner responsible for 
those services,  Mrs Gradin.  In  DG XX's  internal draft audit report of 20 July  1998,  allegations 
of numerous  frauds  and  irregularities were  confirmed. It revealed important deficiencies  in the 
control  of the  Leonardo/Agenor TAO  by  DG  XXIT  and  came  to  the  conclusion that  it  was  not 
always  clear  who  controlled  whom,  DG  XXII or the  TAO  (para.  5.4.3.).  It  was  not  until  the 
beginning of November  1998  that action was  taken on the final  audit report,  that it  was  officially 
submitted to  DG  XXII and  thereafter to  the  other Commissioners  (paras  5.5.7.  et seq.).  On  10 
December 1998,  the final  audit report was  sent to  Parliament (para 5.5.13.).  It would seem to  the 
Committee  that,  during  these  lengthy  proceedings  which  took  place  from  February  until 
December  1998,  DG XX,  its  Director-General and  the  Commissioner responsible should have 
acted  more  swiftly  and  taken  control  of the  situation,  given  the  seriousness  of the  allegations 
involved. 
5.8.7.  When Parliament was  finally  informed  about this  matter in  December  1998,  when  the 
audit  report  was  submitted  to  its  Committee  on  Budgetary Control,  it had  already  adopted  its 
position on the successor programme,  Leonardo  II.  Taking into  account the  importance of the 
decision to  be taken and  the  role of Parliament in the  decision-making process,  it is  unacceptable 
that the  Commissioner responsible failed  to  inform the  President and  through  him  Parliament, of 
the  allegations  which  surrounded the Leonardo/Agenor TAO. 
90 6.THE SECURITY OFFICE 
92 6. THE SECURITY OFICE 
6.1. Introduction 
The  Security Office 
6.1.1.  The  Commission  Security  Service provides  for  the  internal  and  external  security of the 
Commission's premises as  well  as  of the persons working within it and/or having official access 
to  it.  The Service also provides  accompanying  security services to  Commissioners and,  in special 
cases, other staff of the Commission when they are  on official missions and/or on their way to  and 
from  Commission premises. 
6.1.2.  The Service acts  under the  direct responilby of the  President of the Commission and is 
headed by a Director who reports directly to  the  President's  Chef de  cabinet. 
6.1.3.  The Security Service,  since it  also  deals  with matters  of public order at tJnnn(iEBion's 
places  of work  in Brussels,  has  been  outsourced  by the  Commission  to  security companies  in 
possession of a  licence  to  operate  in  Belgium.  In  the  case  under examination,  the  contract for 
Security  Services  in  the  years  1992  to  1997  had  a  value  of ECU 79 554  861  in  commitment 
appropriations. 
6.2. The sequence of events 
The  press discovers  the  Group  4 story 
6.2.1.  On  18  August  1997,  the  Belgian  newspap®e  Morgen' published  an  article  which 
contained severe criticism of the  security contract (surveillance of Commission buildings, etc.) 
with  the  company  IMS  Group  4/Securitas  in  Belgium  for  the  period  1  November  1992  to  1 
November  1997. The newspaper made the following  allegations: 
* 
* 
* 
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that  Group  4 's  tender  application  for  the  1992  security  contract  had  been 
manipulated  after  the  deadline  for  the  submission  of tenders  and  prior  to  the 
formal tender-opening procedure in order to  give the company an unfair advantage 
in the selection process; 
that an  annex  with an incorrect price index  and other provisions  had  subsequently 
been  inserted,  but  not  submitted  to  the  ACPC  , in  order  to  compensate  the 
company for  the reduction in the bid price; 
that Security Office personnel had arranged thecruitment of a number of 'ghost' 
employees, paid for under the contract and bypassing normal procedures. 
Advisory Committee on Procurement and Contracts 
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inquiries in the matter. 
The  Commission's  reaction  to  the press allegations 
6.2.3.  Two  days  after  the  press  allegations  appeared,  on  20  August  1997,  the  Commission 
departments responsible for financial control (DO XX) and staff (DO IX),  the  Security Office and 
UCLAF  concluded  that  UCLAF  should  undertake  an  investigation  into  the  allegations.  As  a 
starting point,  UCLAF took receipt of a copy of an  audit report on the  Security Office security 
contract by DO XX which  had been finalised  on 23  April  1993  and issued on 7 July 1993.  The 
Security Office endorsed the  audit report on  14 July 1993. 
The  DG XX audit of 1993 
6.2.4.  The above-mentioned audit report by DO  XX on  the  Security Office of the Commission 
dated  from  7  July  1993,  i.e.  nine  months  after the  Security Services  contract with  IMS  Group 
4/Securitas was  concluded. The findings  in  this  audit report contained,  inter alia,  the following 
observations with  regard  to  the  allegations  that would be made public four years  later: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
no formal  internal system of budgetary control,  and  therefore no satisfactory level 
of internal control,  existed in the  Security Office; 
the  control systems were considered inadequate; 
the combination of duties performed by the Assistaht  was likely to  reduce further 
the level of internal control; 
the Assistant, responsible for financial administration, was also responsible for the 
operational unit  'Brussels  Protection',  and the  technical work of this  section,  such 
as  evaluating and proposing actions. 
Referring directly to  the security contract,  the  audit report further stated: 
'1. 
2. 
3. 
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With  regard  to  the  implementation  of the  Commission  Protection  contract and 
subsequent modifications (as  detailed in  Section  Ill.B.2),  the financial  conditions 
of the  contract have  undergone substantial changes,  which  were  not approved by 
the ACPC. 
If the  offer terms  of the  contract are  to  be  respected,  the  price charged by IMS 
should be the  offer price in  ecus and only adjusted for any official increases in  the 
index taking place after October 1992. 
In  the  circumstances where  the  amendments  to  the  contract are considered to  be 
accepted,  then; 
the  offer terms  and conditions have  not been  respected. 
the prices quoted in  the  offer by IMS are misleading and the  comparison 
with  the prices of the  other competitors  used in  the  selection procedure of 
the  tender offers were meaningless." 
In this chapter, the term 'Assistant', refers to the assistant to the Director of the Security Office, a post 
occupied by an official graded at head of unit'level. 
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control  and  also  noted  that  the  contract  had  undergone  substantial  changes  which  were  not 
approved by the ACPC, this  being a serious  infringement of the Financial Regulation. In spite of 
the  very  precise  indications  of infringements  of the  rules,  the  report  made  only  very  general 
recommendations  and  did  not draw  any  specific  conclusions  as  to  the  handling of the  security 
contract.  The problems identified were not regarded at  the time  as  evidence of fraud  or criminal 
offences. 
6.2.6.  The follow-up  to  the  audit - by DG  XX,  the  Security Office or other services - remains an 
open question,  and no  documents were submitted to  the Committee in this  connection. According 
to  the  UCLAF report,  the  invoicing  arrangements  were  changed  in  order  to  improve  control 
within the Security Office. 
Further Commission  reaction 
6.2.7.  During  the  weeks  following  the  allegations  in  the  press  in  August  1997  a  number  of 
meetings  took  place  between  UCLAF,  DG  XX,  the  Security  Office  and  the  Legal  Service  at 
which  the  investigation  strategy,  the  collection  of documents  and  the  legal  framework  of the 
investigation  were discussed  as  well  as  the  invoicing procedures  of Group  4  and  the  Security 
Office.  During these meetings, the Director of the Security Office denied all  the allegations made 
in the press article and the existence of any irregularities in the  Security Office. 
UCI.AF inquiries 
6.2.8.  In  its note No 4961  dated  28  August  1997, UCLAF informed the  Secretary-General about 
the  initial inquiries into Group 4/Securitas and  suggested that a thorough investigation should be 
conducted  by  UCLAF  in  collaboration  with  DG  XX.  This  suggestion  was  confirmed  the 
following day by the Secretary-General, and he  asked that such investigation should be conducted 
'without further delay'. 
6.2.9. On 19 December 1997, UCLAF submitted the provisional investigation report to  the office 
of Mrs Gradin, to  the Secretary-General and to DG XX. 
6.2.1 0.  The report states that the investigations indicated the existence of irregularities in respect 
of the  rules  governing  recruitment  and  the  Financial  Regulation  relating  to  the  hiring  of a 
considerable number of staff through the Security Office, or through 'intermediaries'. This implied 
an unspecified number of 'ghost personnel'. Since there was no establishment plan for the Security 
Office, and since it was difficult to assess the number of staff actually working at any given time, 
the Security Office used the security contract to cover its staff shortages; about 65 persons were 
at the disposal of the Security Office for periods ranging from one month to one year, about 20 
persons were employed on the basis of 'various recommendations', and a limited number worked 
at the 'disposal' of the Assistant in the Security Office. In general, Group 4 recruited personnel 
and determined remuneration on the basis of telephone calls with the Assistant. 
6.2.11.  As  to  the  allegations  concerning  the  manipulation  of the  contract,  the  fact  that  the 
company in question had hitherto refused access to documentation and information had prevented 
UCLAF from drawing any conclusions on these points as yet. 
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4/Securitas,  UCLAF and DG XX,  the  final report No 1859, dated 12 March 1998, on UCLAF's 
investigation was submitted, and it concluded, inter alia, the following : 
that  there  was  strong  circumstantial  evidence  that  manipulation  effectively 
occurred in favour of Group 4 and that such manipulation had taken place before 
the opening of the bids; 
that the annex  to  the contract adding major changes to the financial  terms and 
conditions in favour of Group 4 had not been submitted to the ACPC and to the 
Financial Controller before being signed, a serious violation of internal rules; 
6.2.13. Concerning 'ghost personnel', it was concluded that 
•  the  Security  Office  had  used  the  security  contract  to  solve  internal  staffing 
problems, under circumstances which would have to be investigated further; 
•  other services in the Commission (DG XII, ECHO) employed staff through the 
Security Office for purposes other than security; two persons with administrative 
tasks were working in the European Parliament under the Commission's security 
contract; 
•  31  persons were placed at the disposal of the Security Office or its 'intermediaries' 
(DG XII, ECHO, EP) for periods of up to one year for tasks other than security but 
were still paid by Group 4 under the contract; 
•  a  large  number of persons  were  recruited  on the  recommendation  of various 
persons in authority, and some of them had close relations with the Assistant to 
the Director of the Security Office. 
Consequences of the  UCLAF  report and DG XX action 
6.2.14.  On  13  March  1998,  Commissioner  Gradin  sent  a  note  to  Commissioner  Liikanen 
informing him that  the  UCLAF report  on  Group  4/Securitas  had  been finalised  and  that  its 
conclusion pointed to both disciplinary and judicial proceedings. She added that in her opinion 
the  behaviour of the  Director of the  Security Office  appeared  to  be highly  questionable,  in 
particular since the post carried particular responsibilities and required absolute integrity. She 
therefore asked that, in the light of UCLAF's conclusions, disciplinary proceedings should be 
initiated against the Director of the Security Office and that the Commission should suspend him 
from his duties pending the final outcome of the inquiry. She finally noted that, because a number 
of other staff had been operationally involved in the alleged fraud, firm and rapid action would 
be required. 
6.2.15.  In  a note dated  17  March  1998  from  Commissioner Anita Gradin's  Chef de cabinet, 
reference was made to the established procedures regarding UCLAF' s investigation, and it was 
indicated that the preliminary investigation of the Commission's contracts had been completed. 
He further noted that the conclusions of the report should be brought to the immediate attention 
of  Mr Liikanen, the Commissioner responsible for staff matters, Mr Trojan Secretary-General, 
and President Santer's Chef de cabinet. 
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6.2.16.  Following the submission of the UCLAF report,  on  21  April  1998  the Secretary-General 
of the  Commission  instructed  the  Director-General  of DG  XIV  to  conduct  an  administrative 
inquiry,  the report on  which was  submitted on  14  July  1998. 
6.2.17.  By letter  of 23  April  1998,  the  Secretary-General  submitted  the  UCLAF report  to  the 
Public Prosecutor in Brussels and requested a police investigation pursuant to  Article 209a of the 
Treaty on European Union. 
Provision  of information  to  the  European  Parliament 
6.2.18. In a letter dated 12 May 1998, from the Chair of Parliament's Committee on Budgetary 
Control, Mrs Diemut R. Theato, to the Director of UCLAF, the Commission was asked, amongst 
other matters, whether it intended to initiate judicial proceedings against officialnvolved in the 
Group 4 case and what measures it intended to  take if the Belgian judicial authorities did not 
pursue the matter. She further asked that the reports on the Group 4 contract drawn up by UCLAF 
and DG XX (Financial Control), finalised on 12 March 1998, be made available. 
6.2.19.  In  his reply to  Mrs Theato,  the  Director of UCLAF confirmed that the  whole file  on 
Group 4/Securitas had been forwarded  to  the Public Prosecutor in Brussels by the Secretary-
General of the  Commission  on  23  April  1998.  She  was  further  informed that  the  Secretary-
General of the Commission had appointed a Director-General to open an administrative inquiry 
regarding the role of Commission officials in relation to the contract in question. He regretted, 
however, that he was unable to forward the above-mentioned file to Parliament, since it contained 
documents handed over to the judicial authorities in Brussels and concerned ongoing disciplinary 
procedures which were confidential. 
IMS/Group 4 's  own  inquiry 
6.2.20. On 18 September 1998 IMS/Group 4 Securitas submitted its own inquiry report prepared 
by a consultancy called Farleigh Projects International Ltd. This company is part-owned by Group 
4 Securitas, and the investigation was carried out by two former Scotland Yard police officers. 
The investigation focused on the allegations made in the press on 18 August 1997. 
6.2.21. Even though the report concedes that the  contractual details  were  'finalised'  between 
Group 4 and the Security Office on 5 October 1992, this  was  one month after the ACPC had 
recommended that the contract be awarded to Group 4. Even though it notes thal:ze  tender by 
Group 4 IMS (as  revised)  was  not the  lowest bid.  Evidently the  Security  Office had decided that 
Group 4 IMS should be awarded the  contract on  the  basis of considerations other than J}irire: 
general conclusion of FPIS Ltd.  wast1zat the allegations made in  'De Morgen' in August 1997, 
together with their imputation of  corrupt business practices on the part of  a former managing 
director of  Group 4 IMS,  are unfounded.' 
6.2.22.  This  conclusion  was  partially  contradicted  during  a  meeting  between  the  Director  of 
Group  4  and  representatives  of UCLAF prior to  the  publication  of the  report  on  2  September 
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International  would reveal that manipulation of the  Group 4  proposal had probably taken place 
between  1 and 2 September  1992  (i.e. just before the  tender-opening procedure). 
Further action 
6.2.23.  On  11  September  1998  representatives  of UCLAF officially informed the  heads of Group 
4/Securitas of the conclusions of the  UCLAF inquiry and of the  fact  that they had obtained clear 
evidence that the proposal submitted by Group 4/Securitas had been manipulated.  The Secretary-
General,  Mr Trojan,  and Commissioner Gradin  were informed by way of a note  from  UCLAF. 
6.2.24.  On 6 November 1998,  seven months  after the UCLAF report on Group 4/Securitas had 
been submitted to  the  Public Prosecutor in Brussels, the latter asked the Commission to waive 
the immunity of eight officials,  including the  Director of the  Security Office. 
Disciplinary action 
6.2.25. By decision of 29  July  1998,  the 10mission initiated disciplinary proceedings against 
the  Director of the Security Office in connection with the security contract concluded in October 
1992  with Group 4.  In  the  context of the  disciplinary proceedings,  the Director-General of the 
Commission's Translation Service was  appointed to  hear the Director,  as  stipulated in  Article 87 
of the Staff Regulations  of Officials. 
6.2.26.  On 6 January  1999,  the  Director-General presented her report on the hearings  conducted 
with the  Director of the Security Office,  together with those of three other officials from the same 
service  against whom disciplinary proceedings had  been initiated.  The above-mentioned report 
of 6  January  1999  concluded  that  the  professional  behaviour of the  Director revealed  failings 
which  should be sanctioned by disciplinary action.  No further decision has  yet  been announced. 
6.3. Observations on the environment within the Security Office 
(The  information  below is  essentially based on  internal Commission  documents) 
6.3.1.  The Director of the  Commission's Security Office took up  his  post in  1986,  replacing his 
predecessor who had retired.  He was nominated at the behest of President Delor's Chef de cabinet. 
Doubts over the  suitability and competence of staff 
6.3.2.  On  a  recommendation  from  the  Director  of Security  in  Belgium,  the  Director  of the 
Security Office recruited  into  the  Commission Security Office  an  ex-colonel from  the  Belgian 
police.  This  recruitment  was  undertaken,  according  to  an  internal  note  from  UCLAF  dated  5 
December 1997,in an effort to strengthen and to improve relations between the Commission's 
and the Belgian Security Services. 
6.3.3. These circumstances were made public when, in the course of a parliamentary inquiry, a 
Member of the European Parliament, Mrs Dury,  expressed her surprise that a member of an 
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Security Services. 
6.3.4. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the above-mentioned ex-colonel was called into question 
when, in  1991  (the year of the Gulf War), five days after the implementation of what is known 
as 'phase ll' (enhanced protection of the Commission's buildings and staff), no particular measures 
had been taken to that effect. The person concerned was subsequently transferred to another post 
in the Commission. 
6.3.5.  In  1991,  the ex-colonel was replced by Mr Y.  This measure was  seemingly generally 
welcomed, to the extent that the Director of the Security Office appointed him as  his assistant 
with the agreement of the President's Private Office (internal UCLAF note dated 5 December 
1997).  In this capacity, Mr Y was head of the 'Brussels protection' unit and of the financial unit 
of the Security Office, which entailed the following responsibilities: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
preparation of the budget, ACPC files and financial operations; 
internal control of the financial systems of the Security Office; 
liaison with DGs XIX and XX in connection with the approval of expenditure 
commitment  proposals  and  payment  orders  and  the  relevant  accounting 
procedures; 
preparation and administration of the contracts. 
6.3.6. When he visited the Seville World Exhibition in  1992, the President of the Commission 
himself noted the presence of 10 Commission security officials, even though security on the spot 
was provided by Spanish Security Services. Moreover, their behaviour (feet on the table, heavy 
drinking, etc.) was considered intolerable. 
6.3.7. When the Director of the Security Office was informed about these incidents he  'covered' 
for his staff. 
6.3.8. On 8 October 1992 Mr N,  then a member of the President's Private Office, was visited by 
a member of the Staff Committee who reported dubious incidents at the Security Office, such as 
the disappearance of office equipment and furniture. 
6.3.9. When these events were reported,  Mr DM of  DG XX was asked to undertake an internal 
audit of the Security Office. 
Attitude of the  President's  Private  Office 
6.3.10.  Mr N  in  the  President's  Private  Office  was  completely  unaware  of the  contract for 
Security  Services  concluded  between  Group  4/Securitas  and  the  Commission.  He  had  no 
knowledge of either the call for tenders or the signing of the contract. 
6.3.11. The only information he received was a note from Mr Y dated September 1992 stating that 
IMS Group 4/Securitas had been chosen. 
6.3.12. On 15  October 1992 Mr N was succeeded by Mr Min the President's Private Office. 
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its Director. He never had confidence in  Mr Y,  even though he had no indications of any violation 
of the rules on recruitment.  As  to  the internal  audit by DG XX,  he said that no  special attention 
had  been paid to  it by the  President's Private Office and  that it only confirmed that the Security 
Office  was  organised  in  a  'shambolic' way.  As  a  general  rule,  he himself,  as  a  member of the 
President's  Private  Office,  did  not pay special  attention  to  what  was  going  on  in  the  Security 
Office. 
6.3.14.  There  was  a  peculiar  complicity  within  the  security  system  and  between  the  Security 
Office and other circles in the Commission that created a kind of 'regulation-free-zone', where 
existing laws and regulations were regarded as cumbersome barriers to various forms of arbitrary 
action  rather than  as  limitations  to  be respected.  The security  system  appears  to  have  been 
undermined by a sub-culture which was characterised by personal relationships, a system of 'give-
and-take' and a withdrawal from the overall system of control and surveillance.  The question 
must be asked as to how such a sub-culture could develop, exist and prevail in a section of the 
European  civil  service  without  being  detected  from  within,  brought  to  light  only  when  a 
newspaper published the allegations. 
6.3.15.  Confidential Commission notes disclosed particular features of this sub-culture such as: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
the power to offer 'small favours' to colleagues in the Commission, such as  cancelling 
police fines for parking offences or drink-driving. He allegedly performed these favours 
for directors-general and members of Commissioners' private offices. 
the services of drivers and gardeners; 
the Security Office was a private club for former police officers from Brussels or the 
vicinity, for whom special recruitment 'competitions' were arranged. 
surveillance of UCLAF staff by guards who informed him who was visiting UCLAF' s 
offices during its inquiry into the Security Office. 
6.4. Allegations regarding the tender procedure for the new Security Services contract 
(1997) 
6.4.1. Overlapping with the above-mentioned proceedings connected with the revelations in the 
press concerning the contract awarded to IMS Group 4/ Securitas, another tender procedure for 
the provision of Security Services as from 1 November 1997 was opened on 6 June 1997. Two 
companies submitted bids, the Belgian company 'Securis', which already in 1992 had taken part 
in  the  procedure,  and  the  German company,  'SIDA',  which  planned  to  open  a  subsidiary in 
Belgium. 
The  bidding process and the  evaluation of tenders 
6.4.2.  At  a  meeting  with  the  German bidder on  19  June  1997,  Commission  officials  gave 
assurances that the fact that SIDA had not yet established a formal presence in Belgium (requiring 
licensing by the Belgian authorities) would not be taken into account as  a selection criterion, but 
that such a presence (and licence) would be required for the contract to become effective. 
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the Security Services contract, that from  'Securis'. The SIBA bid, even though supposedly ECU 
1.5 million less expensive per year than the 'Securis' offer, was not submitted to the ACPC, since 
it was said be a  'conditional' offer (i.e. the company would only apply for a licence in Belgium 
'on condition' that it was awarded the contract). 
6.4.4. SIBA contested the notion of a 'conitional' offer and pointed out that the criterion that a 
licence had to be submitted together with the bid had not been included in the original call for 
tenders. However, the call for tenders did stipulate that a specific licence should be obtained from 
the Belgian authorities.  'Conditional' offers,  i.e.  bids which include a  declaration that certain 
requirements of a tender will be fulfilled 'on condition' that the contract is awarded, are normally 
not accepted by the Commission, to protect it against non-compliance with such declarations once 
the contract has been signed. 
6.4.5. On the same day, SIBA sent a message to the Commission that it would seek to acquire a 
licence for Belgium well before the start of the EC contract on 1 November 1997 and irrespective 
of the outcome of the call for tenders. On 22 July 1997, SIBA sent a letter to the Director-General 
of DG XV4  asking him to inquire urgently into this procurement procedure. One of the arguments 
put forward was that the facts had been wrongly presented. 
6.4.6. The contract was finally signed with 'Securis' by the Director of the Security Office by the 
end  of July  1997.  Neither  the  Secretary-General  nor  the  President's  Chef de  cabinet  were 
informed. By letter of 2 October 1997, the Commission Security Office informed SIBA that its 
bid had been rejected. 
Reactions from  outside the  Commission 
6.4.7. The proceedings surrounding this call for tenders give rise to another set of questions, with 
particular  regard to the comparison of prices and compliance with conditions laid down in the 
call for tenders. It must be noted that the German company claimed that its bid was ECU 1.5 
million less than the one from the Belgian company 'Securis' and that no answer was given as 
to why, at the beginning of the procedure, the condition of having a licence for Belgium had not 
constituted a problem, whereas it later emerged as the decisive factor in SIBA's exclusion. 
6.4.8. In a letter dated 28  October 1998, the then President of the European Court of Auditors, 
Mr Friedmann, informed SIBA that he had asked UCLAF to investigate the matter. The same 
question  was  raised  in  a  letter from  the  Chair of the  European  Parliament's  Committee  on 
Budgetary Control, Mrs Theato, dated 12 May 1998, to the Director of UCLAF. 
6.4.9. In his letter of reply to Mrs Theato dated 17 July 1998, the Director of UCLAF noted that 
neither the relevant Commission departments nor UCLAF had received any indications as  to 
possible irregularities regarding the award of a Security Services contract to the Belgian company 
'Securis'. 
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XV to  the  President's Chef de  cabinet, the reasons  why DG  XV did  not  react to  the  complaints 
from SffiA are explained:  'It  would appear that we did not reply to the complainant as  the contract 
had  already  been  approved  by  the  ACPC  on  16  July  1997  and  we  were  informed  that  the 
complainant had already been  in  contact with  the  service responsible,  in this  case  the  Security 
Office. This omission may also result from  the fact  that this  case is  not  subject to  the  Directives 
on  Procurement.' 
6.5. Conclusions 
Rapidity of reaction 
6.5.1.  Following  the  first  allegations  of  violations  of  rules  and  of  criminal  laws  in  the 
Commission's Security Office in  the  Belgian press  in August  1997,  the  Commission acted both 
comparatively rapidly  and  according  to  established rules  with  regard  to  the  verification of the 
allegations,  the opening of an  internal  administrative inquiry,  the  opening of procedures leading 
to  possible disciplinary measures and  the forwarding  of relevant material to  the Public Prosecutor 
in  Brussels. 
6.5.2.  The first  action was  taken  within 48  hours,  the  administrative inquiry was  launched five 
weeks after the  UCLAF report became available, and judicial proceedings were initiated two days 
later.  After another three months,  in July  1998,  disciplinary proceedings  were initiated. 
6.5.3.  Given  the  existing  rules,  the  procedures  to  be  followed  and  the  investigations  to  be 
conducted,  the  time-frame described above can be considered acceptable for a public institution 
like the  Commission. 
Follow-up of audit results 
6.5.4.  The  internal  audit  of  the  Security  Office  carried  out  in  1993  revealed  a  number  of 
weaknesses in the  area of financial management and control, and it stated that substantial changes 
not approved by the ACPC  had been made  to  the  contract.  However, the  audit was  confined to 
the formal  procedure and did  not go  to  the  heart of the  matter. It did  not reveal anything about the 
'ghost' personnel system.  To  the  Committee's knowledge  there  was  no  procedure to  follow  up the 
findings  of the  audit.  According to  the UCLAF report,  however,  measures  were taken  to  improve 
control arrangements.  Although it  was  precise and  correct in its  findings,  the  audit procedure as 
a whole seemed  to  be  very  lax  in  character,  which  illustrates  the  weak institutional position of 
internal  audits in  the  Commission. 
6.5.5.  It is  the Committee's view that disciplinary proceedings should have been launched as 
early as  1993 on the basis of the internal audit report. 
The  second contract 
6.5.6. Regarding the second Security Services contract awarded to the Belgian company 'Securis', 
no allegations have been confirmed. The German firm SffiA has lodged complaints against the 
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At  this  stage,  it  should  merely  be  noted  that  the  Commission,  after  its  experience  with  the 
previous contract for IMS/Group 4,  should conduct any tender procedure for Security Service 
contracts  with the  utmost caution. 
Responsibilities 
6.5.7.  In the Security Office case,  the Commissioner responsible,  Mr Santer,  acted swiftly after 
the  allegations of fraud  appeared in the press.  This said,  audit results  as  early as  1993,  if followed 
up,  could have made it possible to  identify the  nature of the problems in  the Security Office much 
sooner.  The  prime  responsibility  of Mr Santer  in  this  case  is  that  neither  he,  as  the  official 
nominally responsible for the  Security Office,  nor his  private office took any meaningful interest 
in its functioning.  As  a result no  supervision was exercised and a 'state within a state' was allowed 
to  develop,  with the consequences described in this report. 
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INTRODUCTION 
7.1. Regulatory and budgetary framework 
7.1.1.  The Commission, since the  Council resolution of 22 July  1975  defining the role it ought 
to  play  in  nuclear  safety  issues,  has  had  the  task  of acting  as  a  catalyst  for  Member  State 
initiatives,  seeking  a  common  position  within  international  organisations  and  promoting 
harmonisation of safety requirements  and  criteria in  order to submit optimum draft Community 
provisions in this  area to  the Council. 
7 .1.2.  Following  the  accident  in  Unit  4  at  Chernobyl  in  1986,  the  international  community 
began to  size up  the risks  to  the planet posed by  the  stock of  Soviet-designed nuclear reactors, 
which  focused  on  meeting  nuclear  production  requirements,  while  neglecting  safety  and 
environment  questions.  From  1990  to  1997,  accordingly,  the  European  Community allocated 
ECU 848.5  m  for  nuclear safety programmes,  including  ECU 786.1  m  under the  PHARE and 
TACIS  programmes. Those appropriations  are  intended to  support and speed  up  domestic safety 
upgrading programmes, but not to  shoulder recipient countries' own responsibilities.  Community 
aid represents roughly  1%  of the spending which would have to  be effected to upgrade 65  stations 
concerned. 
7.1.3.  Most Community aid  for  nuclear safety has  been provided under the PHARE and TACIS 
programmes  and  represents,  respectively,  2%  and  20%  of  the  commitments  for  those 
programmes. The commitments break down as  follows: 
operational safety and on-site assistance:  38% 
generic studies, design safety:  21% 
fuel,  waste and decommissioning:  14% 
assistance for safety authorities:  10% 
subsidy to  the  Russian and Ukrainian institutes  (ISTC  and USTC):  10% 
planning,  management and evaluation:  5% 
miscellaneous:  2%. 
7.1.4.  The TACIS  and PHARE rules  constitute the legal framework for  these measures. TACIS 
is  covered  by  the  Council  Decisions  of  15  July  1991,  19  July  1993  and  4  July  1996  on 
Community support to  assist economic transition,  firstly in the  Soviet Union,  subsequently (to 
take  account of political developments) in Russia and the  other New Independent States (NIS), 
as  well  as  in Mongolia. 
7.1.5.  With regard to  PHARE,  the Council Decision of 18  DecemTh009  on economic aid to 
Hungary and Poland, successively amended to  extend aid to  the  countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe,  constitutes the applicable rules. 
7.1.6.  Each year,  lastly,  the Commission adopts  a nuclear safety programme relating to  TACIS 
and  PHARE. 
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Commission's internal budget implementation rules constitute the  other provisions. It should be 
pointed out that the conclusion and award of Community-financed contracts benefiting recipients 
of external aid  are governed by Articles  113  to  119  of the Financial Regulation,  notwithstanding 
Title N  of the Financial Regulation,  with only service contracts awarded in  the interests of the 
Commission  being  governed  by Articles  56 to  64a of Title N, Section  I,  i.e.  by the  ordinary 
provisions. 
Article  118 stipulates inter alia that: 
(1)  contracts for  services and cooperation shall be awarded after restricted invitations 
to tender; 
(2)  some contracts  may be awarded  by private  treaty,  particularly in  the  following 
cases: 
short or small projects 
projects being carried out by non-profit-making institutions or associations 
extension to  projects already under way 
where  the  invitation to  tender has been unsuccessful. 
7.1.8.  Under the PHARE and TACIS programmes, contracts may be concluded by private treaty 
up  to  a value of ECU 200 000 (originally ECU 300 000). 
7.2. Organisational structure 
7 .2.1.  The  Canmission  is  the  authorising  authority  for  nuclear  safety  expenditure  for  the 
Central  and  Eastern European  countries  (CEEC)  and  the  NIS.  It was  decided  to  authorise  the 
Commissioner  responsible  for  external  relations.  From  1990  to  1997,  the  Commissioners 
responsible were: 
from  1989  to  January 1993:  Mr Andriessen 
from January  1993  to  January 1995:  Sir Leon Brittan 
from January  1995  to  January 2000:  Mr van den Broek. 
7 .2.2.  The  managing  authority is  DG  I  A,  which  has  a  total  complement  in Brussels  of 560 
officials  and other staff (204 category A officials  and 29 detached national experts),  specifically 
Unit  1AC5,  which  is  responsible  for  nuclear safety  and  the  coordination  of energy measures. 
Several other directorates-general deal  with nuclear-related questions,  such as  the RELEX joint 
service created in  1998  and  made up,  in  part,  of officials  from  DG  1 A. 
7 .2.3.  A  PHAREff  ACIS  committee,  comprising  representatives  of the  Member  States  and 
chaired  by the  Commission  representative,  is  consulted  on  proposals  submitted  to  it  by  the 
Commission. Should the committee be unable to  take  a decision or should it deliver a  negative 
opinion, the Commission may submit its  proposal to  the Council. 
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7.3. The report of the Court of Auditors 
7.3.1.  In its Special Report No  25/98  (OJ EC C3511  of 9 February 1999) concerning operations 
undertaken by the  European  Union  in the  field  of nuclear  safety in central  and  eastern Europe 
(CEEC) and in the new  independent States (1990 to  1997  period),  the  Court of Auditors  criticises 
the  approach taken by the  Commission,  its  management of the  operations,  and  the  mobilisation 
of appropriations  and points  to  the  poor results. 
7 .3.2.  The following,  in  particular,  are  called into question: 
(1)  the  excessive transfer of Commission responsibilities to third parties  (cf.  6.3.) 
(2)  the  fact  that  there  were  no  tendering  procedures  for  contracts  with  on-site 
assistants and few  contracts with  supply agencies (cf.  6.9.),  plus uncertainty in the 
share-out of work between contractors and  subcontractors  (cf.  6.8.) 
(3)  inadequate implementation monitoring and  project follow-up  (cf.  4.12.  to 4.18). 
The  Commission has responded to  these  criticisms  (document attached to  the  Court of Auditors' 
report)  and  has  forwarded  additional information to  the  Committee of Independent Experts. 
7.4. Delegations of responsibilities 
7 .4.1.  The DG I A  unit  in  charge of the programmes did  not have the  necessary manpower at 
its  disposal, in  terms of numbers  and expertise, to  draw  up  the nuclear safety programmes, follow 
them  up  and  monitor implementation.  For this  reason,  the  Commission  delegated  some  of its 
responsibilities  to  the Twinning Programme Engineering Group  (TPEG) and to supply agencies 
to  such  an  extent  that  the  Court  of Auditors  termed  these  delegations  excessive  and  likely  to 
clearly jeopardise the  institution's  independence. 
TPEG 
7.4.2.  TPEG was  established on 24  July  1992 in response to the  Commission's desire to  rely on 
a  single  structure  constituted  by  European  Community  electricity  generators  responsible  for 
pressurised-water  nuclear  reactors.  TPEG  is  a  consortium  made  up  of  EDF  (France), 
TRACTEBEL (Belgium),  MAGNOX (United Kingdom),  DTN (Spain),  VGB  (representing the 
German electricity generators  RWE,  KKE  and  GKN GmbH),  ENEL (Italy),  GKN (Netherlands) 
and IVO/TVO (Finland). 
7.4.3.  TPEG played an  important role in drawing up  the  programmes.  In  its  Special Report,  the 
Court  of Auditors  considered  that  the  Commission  had  delegated  too  many  of its  planning 
responsibilities,  thus undermining its  authority and independence (cf.  point 2.7.). 
7  .4.4.  In  its  reply to the Court of Auditors and to  the Committee of Experts, DG I A pointed out 
that  TPEG  had  not  handled  the  planning  on  its  own  and  that  it  itself had  set  the  strategy. 
Furthermore,  its  services  and Member States' experts had reviewed the  TPEG proposals before 
the  programmes  had  been  adopted  by  the  Commission,  following  consultation  of  the 
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enhanced the independence of the expert assistance provided, since all the Member States' nuclear 
power stations operators,  and  not just one or some of them,  were represented within  it.  Some 
areas  were excluded from its  field  of activity,  however, such as  nuclear safeguards, nuclear waste 
reprocessing,  security authorities and, to  some extent, on-site assistance. 
7 .4.5.  TPEG was involved in drafting virtually all  the  terms of reference for the design safety 
projects  in  the  1991  and  subsequent  TACIS  programmes  and  the  PHARE  programmes  as  of 
1992-1993. Because of its  involvement, project uniformity was  ensured. 
7.4.6.  As of 1996, TACIS  rules prohibited firms  which had taken part in the process of defining 
projects from implementing them.  For that reason,  starting with the  1996 programmes for TACIS 
and the  1998 programmes for  PHARE, the  terms of reference for  the design safety projects, were 
established by the Joint Research Centre. The involvement of the JRC is  longer-established, since 
it also carried out all  the projects concerning nuclear safeguards since 1994 and took part in the 
1991  TACIS evaluations, but the rules by which it used to  be governed did not authorise it to  take 
a more active role with regard to  nuclear safety. 
7.4.7.  On account of its  independence, the JRC affords considerable advantages;  but it is not 
in a position to cover all  expertise requirements needed for implementation of the programmes. 
For that reason,  the Commission must continue to  rely,  in part,  on the nuclear power industry of 
the European Union's Member States. 
7.4.8.  TPEG was dissolved in January  1999. 
Tlze  supply  agencies 
7.4.9.  The Commission often resorts to  supply agencies for  the implementation of complex and 
large-scale projects. In  the opinion of the Court of Auditors,  interposing these agencies between 
the  Commission  and  the  European  nuclear  power  station  operators  responsible  for  on-site 
assistance  complicated programme implementation, contributed to  delays  and  allowed excessive 
advances to be paid, thus  artificially improving the rate of mobilisation of appropriations.  In  fact, 
the  use of supply agencies  was  inevitable.  Commission services  were not in a  position to  take 
charge of project management (issuing of invitations to  tender, follow-up to evaluations, contract 
negotiations, payments,  etc.),  since they did  not have the necessary expertise. The alternative to 
making  use  of agencies  would  have  been  to  entrust  these  tasks  to  the  electricity  generators 
responsible for on-site assistance; in 1993-1994, however, DG XX (Financial Control) judged this 
solution  to  be  unacceptable,  since  it  would  have  given  too  many  powers  to  firms  intimately 
involved  in  the  programme  (TPEG).  DO  I  A  therefore  decided  to  bring  in  agencies  as  a 
counterweight to  assist it in  administering supply contracts,  while requiring them to  comply with 
precise supply rules. 
7 .4.1 0.  For  service  contracts,  the  Financial  Regulation  stipulates  the  procedure  involving 
restricted  invitations  to  tender.  However,  contracts  with  supply  agencies  have  often  been 
concluded by private treaty  in  order  to  maintain  service continuity.  In  general,  such  contracts 
represented  amounts below  the  threshold  authorised  for  the  award  of private-treaty  contracts 
under the PHARE and TACIS  programmes. 
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fees.  Subsequently,  services were financial  on  the basis  of a fixed  percentage of the  value of the 
equipment  concerned.  Payments  were  made  in  instalments,  as  supply  projects  proceeded. 
Agencies' fees  are  also  dependent on the  degree  of complexity of the  specific services requested. 
7.4.12.  The responsibilities of the agencies were set out in  their respective contracts,  in particular 
with regard to  the preparation of invitation to  tender documentation. The agencies  are responsible 
for  ensuring that  specifications  are  neutral  and  have  the  task,  under Commission oversight,  of 
opening tenders  and  submit to  it the final  evaluation report and the contractual documents for  the 
purchase  of equipment.  They  also  work  with  the  operators  on-site,  who  define  the  technical 
specifications and make  arrangements for  evaluating tenders. 
7.4.13.  In 1996, the procedures applied to  purchases made via agencies set out in  more detail and 
standardised the description of the role of the players concerned (Commission,  on-site consultant, 
agency and recipients). 
7.4.14.  The agencies discharge the  following  responsibilities: 
verifying the neutrality of technical specifications 
organising invitations to  tender and  registering tenders  received 
verifying  technical and  then financial  evaluation reports 
drawing  up  contracts  with the  supplier appointed by the Commission 
payment of invoices in  line  with the  contract. 
7.4.15.  A major criticism levelled by the  Court of Auditors concerned the  fact  that the  amounts 
paid to  agencies  inflated budget implementation with regard to  the  volume of contracts and did 
not reflect actual  contracts.  Of the  ECU  167  m paid out,  the contracts concluded by agencies in 
1997  represented ECU 44.06 m.  Furthermore,  most of the  contracts concerned were apparently 
concluded at the  end of the  year,  which  would have continued to  improve the  rate of utilisation 
of appropriations  at  year  end.  Lastly,  large  amounts  of bank interest  accrued  which  had  been 
neither entered in  the  accounts  nor audited by Commission services. 
7 .4.16.  The  Commissioner  responsible  replied  to  the  Committee  of Experts  that,  within  the 
Commission,  the  full  details  of delegated  operations  are  not  recorded  in  real  time.  They  are 
examined by DG  I A  services  and,  subsequently, by JRC services in regular reports.  Interest is 
recorded in  those reports;  it  is  then  paid back to  the  Commission upon expiry of contracts with 
supply agencies. 
7.5. The contracts 
Contracts  by  private  treaty 
7.5.1.  From the  outset  of the  programmes,  the  Commission has  concluded  service contracts 
involving large sums without competitive tendering,  with ECU  192 m  out of a total of ECU 610 
m,  or 31%  of the value of the  contracts, pursuant to  Article  118(2)  of the  Financial Regulation, 
having been committed by private treaty. 
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the  area of action.  Private treaty was  used for  on-site assistance in particular,  sinamfOOsion 
services  wished  to  call in  the  Union's  power station  operators  for  contracts  concerning a  large 
number of nuclear sites. 
7.5.3.  During his hearing before the Committee of Experts,  the  Commissioner pointed out that, 
as  a rule,  private-treaty contracts related  only to  services  (safety authority assistance projects and 
contracts with the  Union's electricity generators for  on-site assistance)  and that,  in  agreement with 
the Financial Controller, cost controls had been carried out by applying the hourly rates laid down 
on the basis of the outcome of the  twenty or so  invitations to  tender issued  for  the  design safety 
projects under the  1991  programme,  which were evaluated in February/March  1993. 
7.5.4.  In  spite  of requests  from  nuclear  power  station  operators,  the  rates  have  remained 
unchanged from  the outset.  Since it has  not been demonstrated that the  costs  were too  high,  the 
Commission services consider that they have protected the  Community purse. 
7.5.5.  As  the  volume of activities  was  the variable factor,  it was  described in detail  in the  terms 
of reference,  which  were  discussed  on  a  case-by-case  basis.  Estimates  were  analysed  and 
discussed  before  contracts  were  concluded,  but  the  resources  available  for  legal  checking  of 
contracts  are  not specific to  the  nuclear programmes,  since they are identical for  all  T  ACIS  and 
PHARE contracts. 
The  derogatory framework accepted by DG XX - Financial  Control 
7.5.6.  On  12  July  1994 the Financial Controller accepted a derogatory framework  proposed by 
DG  I  A  which  was  based  on  a  list  of the  types  of nuclear  safety  contracts  as  grounds  for 
authorising  derogations  without  the  prior  agreement  of  Financial  Control.  The  contracts 
concerned were: 
•  Engineering contracts 
7.5.7.  These  contracts  make  it  possible  to  improve  the  nuclear  facility  stock in  the  East  by 
introducing European know-how.  Although most such contracts  can be concluded following  a 
restricted invitation to  tender, private treaty proved necessary in  about 20% of cases for  following 
up  operations  under previous projects or for  technical reasons leading the  institution to  approach 
a particular contractor because of his  expertise in  a specific technology. 
•  Equipment contracts 
7.5.8.  Derogations are required for  this  category of contract,  which  is  the second largest,  either 
because of the  limited number of suppliers,  which makes it necessary to  make use  of restricted 
rather than open invitations  to  tender,  or for  reasons  concerning technical  characteristics or on 
grounds  of urgency,  necessitating private treaty.  Equipment contracts  were  concluded by private 
treaty mainly for  spare parts  in  respect of which  it was  not possible to  change supplier. 
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7.5.9.  For such  service  contracts,  competitive  tendering  would  have  been  inappropriate:  the 
Union's  safety and regulatory authorities  are non-profit-making or public-law organisations,  each 
representing a particular technical  system.  If an  invitation to  tender were to  lead to  the  selection 
of a  single  European  partner,  the  system  transferred  to  the  East  would  constitute  the  first 
instalment of a contract which would subsequently be captive. To avoid such problems, the five 
annual  contracts  representing  some  ECU  8  to  10  m  were  concluded  by private  treaty  with  a 
consortium of national authorities which had decided to  pool  their knowledge,  allowing them to 
provide coherent and balanced assistance. 
e  On-site assistance contracts 
7.5.10.  In  view  of the  limited number of nuclear operators  in the European Union and the little 
interest  shown by Western  operators  for  this  type  of activity,  the  contracts  initially concluded 
were by private treaty and  were extended on the  same basis.  In  1994 there  were  nine  contracts, 
with an  annual volume of ECU 15  to  18  m. 
e  Consultancy or research contracts 
7.5.11. This  type  of activity involves  about ECU 6  m,  with  100 contracts per year to  provide the 
Commission  with  technical  assistance  services  so  as  to  help  it  to  prepare  the  nuclear  safety 
programme,  make  the  best  operational  choices  and  follow  up  and  evaluate  projects.  These 
contracts were  concluded by private treaty with TPEG - a multinational consortium of nuclear 
operators established at the Commission's  initiative. 
e  Joint ventures 
7.5.12.  By their nature these contracts, based on the  notion of partnership, can only be concluded 
by private treaty. 
7.5.13.  Derogations from customary competitive tendering procedures are justified: 
where there  is  an  oligopolistic situation:  in this  instance,  a restricted  invitation to 
tender may  be  preferred  to  a  general  invitation  to  tender,  provided  that  all  the 
companies which might be able  to  perform the contract are included on the list of 
companies consulted, 
on grounds  of urgency, 
for  technical  reasons,  where a firm  can perform the contract. 
Contracts  based  on  invitations  to  tender 
7.5.14.  As  regards  two thirds  of the  remainder of the contracts,  the Court of Auditors considered 
that  some  invitations  to  tender  tended  to  create  the  impression  that  there  was  satisfactory 
competition  whereas,  in  fact,  the  Commission  was  in  a  quasi-monopolistic  or  oligopolistic 
position which encouraged private treaty.  In those cases,  alternative procedures should have been 
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framework contracts)  (cf.  5.12.). 
7.5.15.  In  his  replies  to  the  Committee of Independent Experts,  the  Commissioner responsible 
acknowledged  that  that  had  been  the  situation,  but  that  it  had  been  a  special  case  where  the 
beneficiary wished to  make improvements  to  a radioactive-waste incineration plant.  Contracts -
concluded outside the TACIS  framework - had existed between the power station  and a company 
since the  start of the  1990s.  The Commission's  choice  was  between requesting  a derogation to 
award a contract by private treaty with the firm  or seeking to  widen the potential choice through 
competitive tendering.  So  as  not to  seek derogations  at a time  when it was possible to  organise 
an  invitation  to  tender,  it opted  for  the  second  solution.  A  single  tender was  received,  and  the 
contract was concluded with the original bidder. The Commissioner stresses that this  was  a works 
contract,  whereas the TACIS  programme makes  provision only for  service or supply contracts. 
The  alternative for  DG  I A  would have been to  abandon  the project. 
Subcontracting  involving  Eastern  organisations 
7.5.16.  In  its  report,  the  Court  of Auditors  pointed  out  that,  in  many  instances,  design  safety 
research contracts go  to  Russian design  institutes via subcontractors and that the  specifications 
in  the  subcontracts  are  often  identical  to  those  in  the  main  contract,  thus  making  it  extremely 
difficult to  evaluate the  respective workloads of European Union contractors and  their Russian 
subcontractors  (cf.  5.19.).  The  way  in  which  work  is  divided  between  contractors  and 
subcontractors is  vital,  however,  since Western experts' fees  are  far higher than fees  for Eastern 
European  experts  with  equivalent  expertise.  The  Court  of  Auditors  concluded  that  the 
subcontracting arrangements  were likely to  enable European Union contractors  to  make sizeable 
profits which cannot be verified (cf.  2.12.) 
7.5.17. Appearing before the  Committee of Experts,  the  Commissioner responsible replied that 
the  approach  chosen,  in  particular  for  study  contracts  under  the  1991  TACIS  programme, 
consisted in requiring bidders, for subcontracts, to  accept a flat rate laid down by the  Commission 
on the basis of a technical  opinion by European Union experts.  In  all  instances bar one,  that rate 
had been accepted by the  Russian subcontractors. 
7.5.18. Subcontracts were negotiated by the main contractors  selected under invitations  to tender 
on the basis of a budget imposed by the  Commission.  During negotiations,  almost all  the  firms 
adopted the same approach,  i.e.  they included general terms in the  subcontract which were similar 
to  those  in  the  main  contract  plus  payment  arrangements  based  on  the  staged  submission  of 
reports  or information by the  Russian  side.  The Commission subsequently instructed TPEG to 
define in greater detail,  when  the  terms  of reference were being drawn up,  the respective tasks of 
the  main  contractor  and  the  subcontractor.  In  1993,  the  terms  and  conditions  documents 
systematically laid down a precise breakdown:  the  maximum amount allocated for  the  Russian 
subcontractors' tasks  was  consistently  defined  in  terms  of workload  or subcontracted  budgets 
when  the terms  and conditions were  accepted by the beneficiary. 
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Project  implementation 
7.6.1.  With regard to  project implementatiom,ccording  to  the  Court of Auditors,  14  of the  52 
projects relating to on-site assistance for  the  1992  to  1994 programmes had been carried out,  and 
11  cancelled, at the  end of the  financial  year  1997. 
7.6.2.  The Commissioner responsible  explained  to  the  Committee of Experts  that  the  need  to 
commit global  amounts  each year,  after consulting the  Management Committee, had often led to 
the  adoption of budgets by site before project content had  been fleshed  out.  Consequently,  the 
feasibility  of equipment projects  was  all  the  more  uncertain because,  in  general, equipment was 
requested which was unsuitable  and  difficult to  introduce in  the local context.  For recipients, the 
heavy plant aspect often  takes  precedence over organisational considerations  and  consideration 
of  raising  awareness  of  safety  questions,  which,  in  their  view,  the  European  side  took 
exaggerated account of. 
7.6.3.  The major disparity between budgets for  on-site assistance and  budgets  for  actual projects 
relating  to  such  assistance  (cf.  5.11.)  is  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that,  with  regard  to  general 
assistance  for  operations,  spending  is  always  immediate  (pooling  of operational  experience 
through  training  seminars,  training  periods  in  Europe  and  virtually  permanent  presence  of 
Western experts on sites).  Equipment is  supplied after protracted discussions  between electricity 
generators  at  the  sites  and  the  Russian  and  Ukrainian partners.  Payments  are  made  even later, 
following  submission  of invoices,  and  come  up  against  difficulties  relating  to  differences  in 
technical specifications and  administrative formalities  such as  customs. 
7.6.4.  The  Court  of Auditors  also  pointed  to  the  delay  in  turning  budgetary  decisions  into 
contracts  (63%  of allocations)  and  payments  (37%).  The figures  are  even lower in  the  case of 
Chernobyl (20%  and  8%  respectively)  (cf.  5.2.2.). 
7.6.5.  The  Commissioner  responsible  replied  to  the  Committee  of Experts  that,  m  order  to 
improve the situation,  DG  I A had introduced the  following  changes: 
better preparation of terms  of reference before action programmes were adopted; 
cancellation of projects  whose launch is  unduly delayed; 
increase  in  the  average  volume  of projects  and  a  reduction  in  the  number  of 
projects. 
7 .6.6.  At the  start of the  1990s,  under pressure from  the  European  Parliament and  the  Council, 
priority had been given to  the immediate organisation of operations  on the basis of applications 
from  recipient  countries.  Those  applications  were  piecemeal  and  involved  small-scale  action. 
Only on the  basis  of this  experience was  the  Commission able,  some years  later,  to  respond to 
needs by cancelling certain projects. 
7.6.7.  With regard  to  Chemobyl,  the project could not commence until  there  had been sufficient 
progress  in  the  negotiations  with Ukraine on shutting down the power station. 
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7.6.8.  Project  follow-up  was  carried  out  be  means  of missions  by  Commission  officials  and 
contracted experts.  For each project, furthermore,  checks were arranged throughout the process 
by Commission services acting to: 
prepare the project statement submitted to  the  experts group and subsequently to 
the Management Committee; 
verify the  terms of conditions; 
prepare the  list of companies to  be consulted and the  technical  documentation for 
the invitation to  tender; 
check the evaluation of tenders  and  negotiations for the contract; 
verify  the  contractor's  progress  reports,  involving  JRC  expertise  or  other 
Commission services on request; 
negotiate and prepare possible addenda to  the contract; 
authorise payments or approve invoices. 
7.6.9.  Supply  agency  projects  are  also  monitored  by  the  task  manager  on  the  spot  in  the 
beneficiary countries. 
7 .6.10.  At central  level,  the programme follow-up  tools  are as  follows: 
the  Desiree database  - a  financial  management and analytical  accounting tool 
permitting follow-up by programme (country and theme), operation, project and 
contract; 
a master control schedule permitting forward financial management with the same 
degree of detail as the Desiree database; 
a  central  database  for  project  follow-up,  providing  summary  qualitative 
information by country and programme. 
7.6.11. The Desiree records faithfully reflect all actual TACIS contracts signed with contractors. 
Only supply contracts awarded by supply agencies are not recorded in Desiree, but each invitation 
to  tender  and  each  contract  prepared  and  awarded  by  supply  agencies  is  verified  by the 
Commission as part of the payment procedure. 
7.6.12.  The  1992  TACIS  programme  earmarked  a  budget  of ECU  1  million  for  project 
management  and  coordination  by a  Joint  Management  Unit  (JMU)  based  in  Moscow.  The 
purpose of that unit, made up of staff from the Ministry for Atomic Energy (MINATOM), the 
safety authority (GAN),  nuclear power station operators  (REA),  other Russian organisations 
involved  and  Western  experts,  was  to  make  sure  that  TACIS  operations  were  properly 
implemented and facilitate relations with Western institutions. The need for such a structure was 
restated in the  1993 TACIS  programme. In  October 1997,  the representatives of the Russian 
Ministry for Atomic Energy expressed their disappointment at the lack of progress made in setting 
up  the  JMU.  Contracts  were  concluded  in  November  1997  in  order to  finance  it  until  30 
September 1999; those contracts were charged to the 1994 and 1996 programmes. The Court of 
118 Auditors considered that the  lack of a JMU in  Moscow had prevented any continuous monitoring 
of programmes in Russia until the end of 1997. 
7.6.13.  In its  reply to  the Court,  the Commission pointed out that the JMU had been established 
to  help the Russian authorities  to  coordinate their participation in  the  nuclear safety programme, 
particularly at  the  programme  definition  stage,  and  to  act  as  a  clearing  house  for  information. 
Appearing before  the Committee of Experts,  the  Commissioner responsible  explained that the 
setting  up  of the  JMU had  come up  against  difficultitneause  MINATOM  was  unwilling  to 
make  premises  and  staff available,  except in  return  for  financial  compensation  under TACIS, 
despite  the fact  that the JMU is  described as  a joint unit,  and because the Russian coordinator -
the  official  partner for  the  entire TACIS  programme - was  hostile  to  the  creation of a  specific 
nuclear structure on the  fringes  of the coordination unit. 
CONCLUSIONS 
7.7. Conclusions 
Preliminary  remark 
7.7.1.  Two main questions  are raised: 
the question of human resources in terms of both allocation and management, 
the  question of competitive tendering and the  award of contracts by private treaty 
in  an oligopolistic or virtually monopolistic  sector. 
Staff problems 
7. 7  .2.  The  Commission  does  not  have  sufficient  human  resources  at  is  disposal,  in  terms  of 
numbers  and expertise,  to  manage programmes of such complexity.  Staff assigned  to  the  nuclear 
safety  programmes  are  on  fixed-term  contracts,  with  a  maximum  of three  years  for  detached 
national  experts and one to  three  years for  auxiliaries.  Because of this  permanent turnover,  staff 
must  be  trained  when  they  take  up  their  duties;  and  when  they  leave  the  institution,  their 
knowledge disappears  with  them.  This loss  of knowledge is  not offset - again because of a lack 
of staff - by sufficient arrangements  to  keep and archive files. 
7.7.3. Furthermore, the services responsible for  nuclear safety programme implementation are not 
grouped together,  which necessitates major coordination efforts with no guarantee of success. For 
that reason,  an  inter-departmental group was  set up  in  1998, bringing together officials from  DG 
I  A,  DG  IT  (Economic  and  Financial Affairs),  DG  XI (Environment,  Nuclear Safety and  Civil 
Protection),  DG  XII  (Science,  Research  and  Development),  DG  XVII  (Energy)  and  the  Joint 
Research Centre. 
7.7.4.  The Commission considers that programme implementation ought to  be improved because 
of the  setting  up  of the  inter-departmental  group  and  the  RELEX joint service,  the  use  of the 
resources  available  at  the  JRC  and  the  setting  up  of the  JMU  in  Moscow.  However,  the 
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to  put a question mark against the  effectiveness of the  solutions adopted by the  Commission. 
Award of contracts 
7.7.5.  In  spite of the replies  given by the Commission, the problem of the award of contracts to 
European Union industrial firms  remains,  given an  oligopolistic and indeed even monopolistic 
market because of the need to  apportion contracts among the Member States, with extremely high 
risks of concerted practices.  Regardless of whether contracts are  concluded by invitation to tender 
or  private  treaty,  there  are  question  marks  against  the  Commission's  ability  to  carry  out 
appropriate cost analyses by specialised technical  services  and to  make provision,  in contracts, 
for  the legal means for  cost control on an a posteriori basis. 
7.7.6.  The Commission's reply concerning the  setting of hourly rates  on  the  basis of the twenty 
or so invitations to  tender issued in  1991  did not answer this  question sufficiently pertinently. 
7.8.  Commissioners' responsibilities 
7.8.1.  From the examination undertaken by the tmnittee of Independent Experts,  exclusively 
on  the  basis  of the  Court of Auditors' recent report,  of the  Commission's replies  and from  the 
discussion  with  the  Commissioner  responsible,  it  emerges  that  there  are  no  grounds  for 
contending,  as  matters  stand at present,  that the  implementation of nuclear safety programmes in 
Eastern countries gave rise  to  fraud  or serious  irregularities. 
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The  Committee of Experts  has  considered the  situation of all the  Commissioners  against whom 
allegations have  been  made,  particularly in  the press,  in  order to  ascertain,  in  accordance with 
its  tenns of reference,  whether these  allegations were  well{ounded and whether faitillm  had 
occurred or whether the  Commissioners  had been  libelled. 
js.l. Mrs Cresson 
Numerous  allegations have  been  made against Mrs  Cresson,  both  by the press and by Members 
of Parliament.  The  Committee  has  concentrated on  the  issue  involving Mr Berthelot. 
FACTS 
Links  between  Mrs  Cresson  and Mr Berthelot 
8.1.1.  Mrs  Cresson  wished  to  make  use  of Mr Berthelot's  skills  at  the  Commission.  She has 
admitted  several  times  that,  at  the  time  of the  facts  considered here,  Mr Berthelot was  a long-
standing friend of hers. 
8.1.2.  For  example,  when  she  appeared  before  the  European  Parliament's  Committee  on 
Budgetary Control on 28  October 1998,  Mrs Cresson continued that she had known Mr Berthelot 
for  many  years.  She  had  wished  to  draw  on  his  advice  in  her  capacity  as  a  Member  of the 
European Commission in  connection with the preparation of the 5th Framework Programme of 
Research  and  Development.  When  she  had  explained  to  her  staff that  she  wished  to  have  an 
independent  adviser  to  help  her  prepare  the  programme,  that  such  an  adviser  should  have  a 
scientific  background  combined  with  practical  experience  and,  above  all,  should  enjoy  her 
confidence,  and  that  his  role  would  be  to  state  his  views  on  the  refonns  undertaken,  they  had 
informed her that the  appropriate status  would be  that of 'visiting scientist'.  Accordingly, it had 
seemed  to  her  perfectly  legitimate,  as  a  political  decision-maker,  to  use  external  advisers, 
including some whom she knew well. 
The  contract  with  DG  XII:  1  September  19995  •  28  February  1997 
8.1.3.  Before being appointed by the Commission, Mr Berthelot signed two  contracts in  1995 
alone:  one with ANV  AR (see below),  the  other with Parkington Enterprismift:ed,  which has 
registered offices  in  Ireland  and  would  appear to  be linked to  the  Perry Lux  group. 
8.1.4.  The legal  provisions  applicable  to  the  contract with  DG  XII  - administrative  directives 
applicable to  visiting scientists in the context of research programmes run by DG  XWthe Joint 
Research Centre - stipulate  that the  following  may be accepted as  visiting scientists: 
(a)  university professors  or teaching  staff from  scientific higher education establishments 
(b)  scientific staff of high  standing from  other research organisations. 
123 8.1.5.  It is  not apparent from  Mr Berthelot's curriculum vitae,  which was  forwarded  to  DG Xll, 
that he  falls  into either of the  above  categories.  In  the  CV which  Mr Berthelot submitted at the 
time of his  appointment, he stated under the heading  'current posts' that he was  a special  adviser 
to  ANV  AR (National Research Exploitation Agency), which is based in Paris. In fact,  it transpires 
that he  had  simply had a contract with  that  agency from  6 March  to  30 June  1995  as  an  expert, 
the  purpose  of which  was  to  define  more  clearly  the  Commission's  approach  to  ANV  AR,  its 
image and  user requirements. 
More specifically, Articles  1 and 2 of this  contract define its  purpose as  being a study to ascertain 
how ANVAR can become a natural partner of the  Commission of the  European Union and,  with 
due regard for  the subsidiarity principle,  how  it can participate effectively in the  implementation 
of Community programmes. 
8.1.6.  The letter of appointment which  DG XII sent to  Mr Berthelot on 26  July  1995  quotes  as 
its  subject 'your unsolicited application'. The appointment was  initially for 6 months, and the letter 
was  signed by the  Deputy Director-General of DG  XII.  No  specific duties  are  set out in the letter, 
contrary  to  the  requirements  of  the  directives;  Article  1(3)  of  the  above-mentioned  legal 
instrument  stipulates  that  the  subject  on  which  the  visitor  is  to  work  shall  be  determined  in 
advance  by the appropriate Director. 
8.1.7.  The Commission's Financial Control (DG XX) approved the  appointment offer on 20 July 
1995. 
8.1.8.  The  contract  was  extended  for  the  first  time  until  31  August  1996,  retaining  the  same 
financial  and  administrative  provisions.  A  second  extension,  subject  to  the  same  conditions, 
continued  the  contract  until  28  February  1997.  These  two  letters  were  likewise  signed  by  the 
above-mentioned Deputy Director-General. 
8.1.9.  Article 7(7)  of the  above-mentioned legal instrument stipulates that the  visitor shall submit 
to  the Director-General, within  one  month  of the  end  of the  visit,  a report on the  work for  the 
purpose of which the  visit was  made.  The documentation submitted to  the  Committee of Experts 
on this  subject contains numerous notes,  which are  very diverse  and  in  some cases  technical and 
in others very vague and  political,  all  addressed to  Mrs  Cresson,  some written during the contract 
period and some after it had  expired.  But this  documentation does  not include any formal  report 
in  the sense of the  above  article concerning the work for the purpose of which the visit was  made. 
Moreover,  these notes,  of which there are  ten,  do  not bear any entry stamp or registration number. 
These notes  are  as  follows,  starting with  the  most recent: 
1.  Scientific programme of IA  VI  (Rockefeller AIDS  Initiative)  (18.3.97); 
2.  Participation  by  Member  States  in  life  sciences  programmes  under  the  3rd  and  4th 
Framework Programmes of Research and Technological Development (17.12.96); 
3.  Comparison of the  scientific performances  of the  EU,  USA  and  Japan in life  sciences  and 
technologies (15.10.96); 
4.  Why  should  life  sciences  and  technologies  be  assigned  an  important  position  in  the  5th 
Framework Programme of R&TD?  (16.7.96); 
5.  Research,  innovation and  economic development - Poitou-Charentes,  a case  study (8.7.96); 
6.  Signs of worrying  trends  in European investment in  pharmaceutical R&D  (11.6.96); 
124 7.  Beyond the myth of venture capital (19.3.96); 
8.  Structural differences in  the development of biotechnology in the  USA and Europe (30.1.96); 
9.  AIDS  in Thailand (18.12.95); 
10.  Attenuated live vaccines  (30.10.95). 
All  these notes,  taken together and representing a year  and  a halfs work,  total  barely 24  pages. 
Annex  1  to  thmote of 8 July 1996 contains a list of 13  journeys to  Chatellerault' (a town in 
Poitou-Charentes), stating the dates and places of the visits (between January and the end of May 
1996). Annex 2 to the same note lists Community financing of research in Poitou-Charentes in 
1996. 
8.1.10.  Altogether, during the period of this  contract,  Mr Berthelot apparently undertook 17 
missions, including 13  to  Chfttellerault, one to Issoudun (in Poitou-Charentes) and the last one 
in Marseilles, it seems that two of them ultimately did not take place. In the box marked 'purpose' 
on the application forms for the mission orders, Mr Berthelot always entered exactly the same 
phrase: 'Performance of specific duties at the direct request of the Commissioner'. Altogether, Mr 
Berthelot spent at  least 41  days  on  mission to  Chatellerault,  paid for out of the  Community 
budget. 
8.1.11.  It was not until 2 October 1997 that, following an internal audit in DG XII, the Deputy 
Financial Controller took an interest in the candidacy, work performed and final  report of the 
visitor in question and sent a letter to DG XII. 
The latter did not reply, despite several reminders, until 27 April 1998: it then merely stated that 
the final report requested was not in the file and claimed that the person concerned had serious 
health problems; the Deputy Financial Controller recalled in a note dated 30 June 1998 that he 
would also like to receive the other information which he had requested concerning this case, 
particularly details of the places and nature of the missionsndertaken by the person concerned, 
including those in respect of which payments were made on the following dates; DG XII replied 
on 30 July 1998. 
The  co11tract  with  the  ]oint Research  Centre:  1  March  1997  - 31  December  1997 
8.1.12.  This contract was  concluded for  one year but terminated prematurely on grounds of 
illness.  Unlike in  the  case of the  previous contract,  the  provisions  applicable  to  this  second 
contract - Administrative Directives applicable to visiting scientists to the Joint Research Centre -
include a third paragraph which reads: 
(c) any other person of high scientific standing whose knowledge can be used to good advantage 
by the JRC in the scientific work the performance of which has been entrusted to it. 
8.1.13.  The Commission Administration confirmed in its letter of 24 March  1998, in reply to 
comments by the Financial Controller, that 'Mr Berthelot has  been awarded visiting scientist 
status in accordance with Article 1(1)(c)  .. .'. 
8.1.14.  Another difference from the previous contract was that, in the draft contract proposed by 
the Director-General to the Head of the Human Resources Unit of the JRC, it was proposed that 
in view of the level of competence and experience of Mr Berthelot, his remuneration should be 
125 increased by 25%. This corresponds to Article 2(3) of the above Administrative Directives, which 
lays  down that on  a proposal from  the  Director of the  receiving institute,  the  Director-General of 
the  JRC may,  exceptionally, permit the  remuneration to  be increased by 25%  for reasons based 
on  the competence and  experience of the  visitor. 
8.1.15.  Again unlike in the  case of the previous  contract, tlri1e  the Administration specified 
a  short  description  of the  planned  work:  participating,  in  close  contact  with  Mrs  E.  Cresson's 
private office and  the Commissioner, in  the  preparation of the  5th Framework Programme and 
of specific programmes  in  the  field  of the life sciences.  Liaising with  certain national research 
circles,  particularly  in  France  ...  Work  within  the  programme:  exchanges  of views  with  the 
Commissioner.  Attending  meetings  at  the  Commission  and  elsewhere  ... ;  this  Administration 
document  also  specifies  that  Mr Berthelot has  been selected,  in  accordance  with  the  approval 
procedure  presently  in  force,  for  a  visiting  period ... ';  these  terms,  and  the  above-mentioned 
increase  in  remuneration,  were  confirmed  in  the  letter  of  appointment  sent  to  the  person 
concerned on 29  January  1997  and  approved by Financial Control (DG XX). 
8 .1.16.  On  11  December 1997,  Mr Berthelot forwarded  to  the acting Director-General  'a  brief 
summary of my fields  of work' and  informed him of the state of his  health (heart attack in April 
1997)  with  a  view  to  terminating  the contract.  The summary consists  of three  very  vague and 
miscellaneous paragraphs which mention AIDS,  the  Second-Chance School and electric vehicles. 
On the same date, the recipient of this letter thanked Mr Berthelot for all the information provided 
and  for  all his  efforts  to  promote European research. 
Tlze  intervention  of the  Deputy  Financial  Controller 
8.1.17.  On  14  September  1998,  the  Deputy  Financial  Controller  informed  the  Financial 
Controller of the steps he had taken vis-a-vis DG XII and the JRC, taking the view that it was 
difficult not to conclude that Mr Berthelot's visiting scientist duties in  1996 and 1997 had been -
primarily at least- a way of remunerating Mrs Cresson's adviser in connection with Mrs Cresson's 
work as  mayor of Chatellerault.  Subject to  proof to  the contrary, this was  an  abuse of public 
funds, as appropriations from the Community budget may not be used to finance the remuneration 
or other expenses of an adviser to a mayor in a Member State of the Community. 
8.1.18.  By  letter  of 9  November  1998,  the  above-mentioned  Deputy  Financial  Controller 
submitted to the Financial Controller the draft of a letter to the Directors-General of DG XII and 
the JRC seeking their comments on a number of points and asking them 'to consider whether a 
recovery order should be prepared for all or part of the payments shown in Annex III and Annex 
IV (amounts paid on the DG XII contracts and amounts paid on the JRC contracts)'. The Director-
General for  Financial Control does  not  seem to  have  sent this  draft letter to  the  appropriate 
Directors-General. 
8.1.19.  It was only on 7 December 1998 that the Director-General of the JRC asked Mr Berthelot 
to send as soon as possible a copy of any information, opinion, report or background paper he had 
submitted either to Mrs Cresson or to her private office. A virtually identical letter containing the 
same request was sent to Mrs Cresson's Chef de cabinet. 
126 8.1.20.  This  belated  request  for  information  was  the  outcome  only  of  an  exchange  of 
correspondence  which  began  with  a  letter  of  1  December  1997  from  the  Deputy  Financial 
Controller asking the  above-mentioned Director-General for information about the case.  This first 
letter  was  supplemented  by  another,  dated  20  February  1998,  in  which  the  Deputy  Financial 
Controller in particular asked  for a statement of 'the  particular qualifications  and  experience of 
the  person concerned which fulfil  the conditions of a scientific visitor  ...  and whether his  letter of 
11.12.97  should be considered  as  the report...'.  He  added,  'Could I also  ask you  to  explain why 
a  12  months contract was  proposed by the  JRC after the person concerned had already spent  18 
months as  a scientific visitor at DG XII since ...  the  Directive  limits  the  duration of the visit to 
a maximum of 24 months'. 
8.1.21.  On  10  January  1999,  Mr Berthelot's  wife  replied  to  the  Director-General  of the  JRC, 
informing  him  that  because  of the  lengthy  period  which  her husband  would  have  to  spend  in 
hospital,  she  could not comply with  his  requests.  Her husband  would  be able  to  reply himself 
once his  health improved. 
EVALUATION 
Summary  and discussion  of grounds  for  complaint 
8.1.22.  The objective grounds for complaint about Mr Berthelot's recruitment by the  Commission 
are  as  follows: 
Appointment 
8.1.23.  In  the  case of his  first  contract with  DG XII,  his  appointment was  manifestly irregular, 
being  contrary  to  the  rules  in  force,  in  spite  of the  Commissioner's  needs  (apparently  at  the 
interface between science and administration). Moreover, it may be deduectontrario that there 
was  no  basis  for  the  contract  with  DG  XII,  since  the  contract  at  the  JRC  was  based  on 
subparagraph  (c)  of the internal directives  and this subparagraph did  not exist in the case of the 
first  contract.  In  addition,  his  four-month  contract  with  ANV  AR  could  not  under  any 
circumstances  justify  his  appointment  by  DG  XII,  as  the  statement  of  facts  makes  clear. 
Furthermore,  the nature of his  duties  is  not stated in  the  first  contract. 
8.1.24.  Nor can  the contract with  ANV  AR alter the  unjustified nature of his  employment by the 
JRC,  as  it does  not qualify him as  'any other person of high  scientific standing'.  An examination 
of Mr Berthelot's  professional  career  (between  1958  and  1992)  does  not  reveal  any  trace  of 
scientific work.  Moreover1  a comparison  with  the  CVs  of other  'visiting  scientists' leads  to  the 
conclusion that  their cases  are  hardly comparable to  that of Mr Berthelot. 
In  sum,  the  two  contracts  are  irregular because  they  lack  a  legal  basis,  so  that  Mr Berthelot's 
applications ought to  have been declared inadmissible. 
The  duration  of the  appointments 
127 8.1.25.  The duration of the appointments  at the  Commission was  excessive,  since his contract 
with the JRC took the  total  length of his  contracts with the Commission to  30 months (18  months 
at DG Xll and  12  at the JRC),  whereas  Article  1(4) or (5)  of the provisions applicable (Directives 
for  DG XII and  the JRC)  restrict total  contract periods to  a maximum of 24  months. 
Missions 
8.1.26.  Virtually all his missions were to Chfitellerault. On this essential point in the case, we 
consider  it  highly  unlikely  that  these  missions  could  be  justified  in  the  interests  of the 
Commission. That strongly suggests (despite the above-mentioned note of 8 July 1996) that the 
missions must have been mainly undertaken in the personal interest of Mrs Cresson when mayor 
of that town. Such a situation gives rise to a confusion of interests between Mrs Cresson's dual 
status as a Commissioner and as  Mayor. 
Failure  to  produce work 
8.1.27.  Finally, there is the failure to produce even a minimum quantity of work of interest to the 
Commission and, particularly, a final report. A comparison with the reports normally submitted 
by visiting scientists makes this very clear. 
8.1.28.  This failure to produce a minimum quantity of work raises the question of a possible 
recovery of the payments made on grounds of non-performance by Mr Berthelot at the required 
level. At all events, the payments made to him during his illness and in respect of absences seem 
to  have been completely unjustified,  as  he was  supposed to  be covered by his  social security 
scheme  and  his  pension.  The  penultimate  paragraph  of the  JRC's  aforementioned  letter of 
appointment of 29  January  1997 stated,  'concerning social cover,  a document certifying your 
membership to a sickness insurance scheme is required throughout your visit. Insurance against 
the risk of accidents which may occur is also required during the same period', which corresponds 
to Article 6 of the administrative directives applicable. 
Altogether,  some  BEF  5.5  million  was  paid  directly  to  Mr Berthelot  by  the  Commission 
(contracts with DG XII and the JRC), the recovery of which should be considered. 
Inadequate  compliance  with  administrative  procedure 
8.1.29.  When appearing before the Committee on Budgetary Control on 28 October 1998, Mrs 
Cresson said that Mr Berthelot's appointment as a visiting scientist was approved by the Financial 
Controller. If  they were qualified and the procedures were complied with, there is no reason why 
these recommendations should not be acted upon, on condition that the generally applicable rules 
were strictly respected, as regards both administrative procedure and qualifications. 
8.1.30.  It emerges from the file that the administrative procedure (letter of recruitment, offer of 
appointment,  approval  by  the  Financial  Controller,  etc.)  proceeded  unhindered  within  the 
Commission and that the decisions - for example concerning his appointment - giving rise to the 
case were taken, at least formally, directly by those responsible in DG XII and the JRC without 
any intervention by the Commissioner, which is  apparent from the documents in the file.  The 
violation of certain essential aspects of the internal administrative directives was raised only at 
the end of 1997 by Financial Control when performing its retrospective audits. 
128 8.1.31.  Under the  circumstances, when  the  various administrative authorities  fell  into  line,  it is 
necessary to  ascertain the  share of responsibility attributable to  the  Commission Administration 
(DG  XII,  JRC and DG  XX  - Financial Control)  and  the  share attributable  to  Mrs  Cresson.  Is  it 
reasonable to  suppose that  the  administrative procedure could have been completed if the person 
concerned had  not been a member of Mrs Cresson's  personal entourage? 
8.1.32.  In  view  of  the  numerous  shortcomings  of  the  administrative  file  which  has  been 
examined, it seems unlikely that the  answer could be  yes. 
An aspect difficult to justify: tile missions to  Clzatellerault 
8.1.33.  The missions to Chfttellerault (virtually all the missions undertaken) are hard to justify 
purely from the Community's point of view, without considering the significance of that town and 
of its links with the Commissioner, who was its mayor until the end of 1997. 
8.1.34.  This is all the more pertinent in view of the fact that, as  described in the section headed 
'Facts', the purpose of the mission orders was simply 'Performance of specific duties at the request 
of the  Commissioner'. It is  hard to  understand  why Chatellerault and  the  surrounding region 
should be almost the sole centre of interest of a visiting scientist whose remit in theory covered 
very wide fields,  as the above-mentioned notes sent to  the Commissioner, at least, attest. 
The above-mentioned note of 8 July  1996 (without entry stamp or any registration number)  , 
which  in theory constitutes  the  culmination of the  work which he did during  his  missions  to 
Chatellerault, comprises only seven pages (not counting the  annexes), and they are extremely 
vague and schematic and contain no hard information. Its added value is not particularly obvious, 
therefore. In sum, it can hardly be regarded as the outcome of more than 40 days spent on mission 
in the region. 
These missions may, therefore, be regarded as evidence of the fictitious nature of the 'scientific 
advice' which Mr Berthelot was in principle deemed to be giving, and demonstrate his failure to 
submit any work of interest to the Community in this capacity. 
A  case  of favouritism 
8.1.35.  In conclusion,  what we  have here is  a clear-cut case of favouritism.  A person whose 
qualifications did not correspond to the various posts to which he was recruited was nonetheless 
employed.  The  work  performed  was  manifestly  deficient  in  terms  of quantity,  quality  and 
relevance. The Community did not get value for money. 
8.1.36.  Moreover,  the  person  recruited  worked  mainly  as  a  personal  staff member  of the 
Commissioner, and there are very strong grounds for believing that he was often used in a manner 
which had little to do with the Commissioner's work on behalf of Europe. 
8.1.37.  The competent administrative authorities signed the contracts,  and Financial Control 
approved  them  beforehand.  Despite  the  lack  of a  legal  basis,  it  seems  that  there  were  no 
hesitations on their part. 
129 8.1.38.  Compliance  with  formal  requirements  does  not  exonerate  the  beneficiaries  of their 
responsibility,  whether it be  the  employer (Mrs  Cresson) or the  employee  (Mr Berthelot).  Quite 
the opposite:  as  he was a friend  of hers,  Mrs Cresson, as  a Commissioner,  ought to  have exercised 
heightened vigilance throughout this  affair. 
I  8.2. Mr Liikanen 
Two  co11tracts  sig11ed  by  Mrs  Liika11e11 
8.2.1.  Two contracts  concluded between Mrs  Liikanen  and  the  Commission  (DG  V)  have been 
criticised  in  the  press  and  have  led  Members  of the  European  Parliament to  table  a  number of 
written questions. 
8.2.2.  Mrs Liikanen,  whose  career began  in  1973,  has  been  an  official of STAKES,  the Finnish 
National Research  and  Development Centre  for  health  and  social  affairs,  since  1994.  She has 
worked  as  a head  of project,  first  in  Finland  and  then,  as  from  1 September 1996,  at STAKES' 
European Union liaison office in  Brussels. 
8.2.3.  Mrs Liikanen signed or jointly signed two  contracts  with  the  Commission: 
1st contract: 
8.2.4.  In  1994,  the  Commission granted  a subsidy of ECU 6000 under the  equal  opportunities 
programme,  on  the basis  of the  estimated cost of the  project,  to  the Finnish  association Women 
96 Network,  chaired by Mrs  Liikanen.  This  subsidy was  for  a programme to  promote the  equal 
opportunities  dimension  in  thqmblic  debate  about  Europe  in  Finland.  The  project  lasted  13 
months,  from  September  1995  to  October  1996;  in  view  of the  actual  cost  of the  project,  the 
Commission, despite having agreed to  contribute ECU 6000, in the event paid ECU 4970 towards 
it. 
8.2.5.  Mrs Liikanen did  not receive  any remuneration in  connection with  this project. 
2nd contract: 
8.2.6.  The second contract was  concluded on  the  basis  of a call for  tenders  issued in  1994,  at  a 
time  when  the  current Commission had not yet  taken office.  The project was  selected by DG V 
in  1995, but for reasons relating to  the availability of budget funds,  the  contract was  not signed 
until  1996,  covering  the  period  1 Februar!-996  to  1 November  1997.  Mrs  Liikanen,  in  her 
capacity as  head of project,  signed it jointly with  the  Director-General of STAKES.  The subject 
of the  contract was  the  situation of elderly women  (SEW),  and  a subsidy of ECU 243  100  was 
awarded for  it.  The project was  developed  in partnership with  Greece,  Ireland and  Portugal and 
coordinated by Mrs Liikanen as  a representative of the  Brussels Liaison Office. 
8.2.7.  In  view  of the  total  cost  of the  project,  the  Commission  actually  paid  ECU  207  779 
towards  it.  The project was  terminated and  its  results published. 
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at  a meeting of experts,  namely one payment of BEF 2600,  representing a train journey to  attend 
a two-day meeting organised by DG  XII,  and  a payment of BEF 6000 made by DG IX  in  1998 
for her attendance at a conference organised by DG X in January 1998. 
8.2.9.  STAKES  concluded  several contracts  with the  Commission which did  not  involve Mrs 
Liikanen. 
8.2.10.  The Committee of Experts concluded that Mrs Liikanen's professional life  was  genuinely 
independent of that of her husband and  that the  allegations concerning both Mr and Mrs Liikanen 
were unfounded. 
I  8.3. Mr Marin I 
The appointment of  Mr Marin's wife at the Commission 
8.3.1.  The criticisms levelled at Mr Marfn  concern his  wife's appointment at a high grade in 
category B. 
8.3.2.  Mrs Ortiz Bru, Mr Marfn's wife, is a Commission official in grade B2. 
8.3.3.  When the Community was enlarged to include Spain and Portugal, the Council adopted, 
on  12  December 1985, Regulation No 3517/85 laying down special and  temporary measures 
applicable  to  the  recruitment of Spanish  and  Portuguese  officials.  Article  1(2)  provided  for 
appointments  to  intermediate  and  higher  grade  posts  in  each  category to  be  decided  after  a 
competition on the basis of qualifications. The Commission made use of this  procedure to fill 
intermediate-grade posts in a number of categories and held competition COM/B/612 to establish 
a reserve list for recruitment of assistants of Spanish nationality leading to career bracket B3/B2. 
8.3.4.  The Committee of Experts has studied the notice of competition, the selection board's 
report and the reserve list. Its findings were as follows: 
377  applications were registered,  99  people were called for  interview,  and the  Selection 
Board placed 48 successful candidates on the reserve list. 29 were placed on list 1 (general 
administration),  divided  into  two  groups  according  to  merit,  the  first  comprising  seven 
candidates, the second 22. Mrs Ortiz Bru was in the second merit group. All the candidates 
in the first group were recruited. Mrs Ortiz Bru was appointed on 1 October 1988. 
8.3.5.  Having examined the qualifications of Mrs Ortiz Bru, the Committee of Experts found that 
they complied with the conditions required by the notice of competition. Consequently, it took 
the view that the recruitment of this official to grade B3  did not involve any irregularity. 
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Mrs  Pinheiro 
8.4.1.  On  13  February  1993,  the  Permanent Representation of Portugal submitted to  DG  IX  -
Personnel  and  Administration - an  application from  Mrs  Pinheiro,  a professor at  the University 
of Minho.  In  view of her qualifications and  her scientific and technical research work,  published 
in  numerous  scientific journals,  Mrs  Pinheiro  was  seconded  to  the  Commission  as  a  national 
expert  from  5  May  1993  to  4  May  1994.  Her secondment  was  twice  extended  for  a  year  and 
terminated on 4 May  1996  in  accordance with the internal rules  applicable. 
8.4.2.  Her secondment did  not entail any expense for  the  Commission.  Mrs  Pinheiro was  paid 
by  her  Portuguese  employer.  The  Community  did  not  pay  her  any  daily  allowance,  nor  did  it 
reimburse  her  travelling  expenses  although  national  experts  on  secondment  are  entitled  to 
reimbursement provided  that  they demonstrate  that  they have  incurred expenses  which justify 
such reimbursement. 
8.4.3.  The Committee of Experts concluded that the  allegations  about Mrs  Pinheiro'stjox»B at 
the  Commission were  unfounded. 
Mr  Pinheiro's  brotlzer-in-law 
8.4.4.  Mr Pinheiro  spoke  about  the  case  of his  brother-in-law,  Mr Vieira  Paisana,  before  the 
Committee of Experts. 
8.4.5.  Most of Mr Vieira  Paisana  's  professional  experience  was  as  a  member  or head  of the 
private office of various Portuguese Junior Ministers, then,  between  1986  and  1996,  as  an  adviser 
to  the Permanent Representation of Portugal to  the  European Union.  Since April  1996,  Mr Vieira 
Paisana  has  been  a  member  of the  private  office  of Commissioner  Pinheiro  responsible  for 
external relations  with the African,  Caribbean and Pacific States and  with South Africa. 
8.4.6.  Before  the  Committee  of Experts,  the  Commissioner  said  that  Mr  Vieira  Paisana's 
remuneration at the Portuguese Representation was  slightly higher than the one which he received 
at the  Commission. 
8.4.7.  The Committee of Experts decided that,  given Mr Vieira Paisana's professional experience 
as  Chef de  cabinet  and  then  over  a  period  of ten  years  at  the  Portuguese  Representation,  he 
possessed the requisite qualifications to  hold  one of the  six posts  allocated to  the  Commissioner's 
private office. 
8.4.8.  The Committee concluded that the  recruitment of Mr Vieira Paisana did  not involve any 
irregularity.  However,  it felt  that it would have  been more prudent on  the  part of Mr Pinheiro if 
he had not appointed his  own brother-in-law. 
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La Gbu5rale des Metaux Precieux and Off-Shore Ecologies Ltd 
8.5.1.  Allegations  have  been  made  about  Mr  Santer  in  the  press,  particularly  in  an  article 
asserting that a preliminary inquiry had been instituted by the  Luxembourg Public  Prosecutor's 
Office  concerning  him.  This  inquiry  concerned  the  regularity  under  Luxembourg  law  of the 
commercial operations of a company (Ia Generale des Metaux Precieux (GMP)) whose founders 
and  shareholders  were  also  said  to  have  set  up  an  off-shore  company in Ireland,  Off-Shore 
Ecologies Ltd. The latter allegedly wished to  secure a favourable position with a view to  the 
major projects to dismantle North Sea oil platforms, which would receive Community funding. 
The names of President Santer and his son are said to have appeared in a preparatory document 
relating to Off-Shore Ecologies Ltd identifying them as potential Honorary Chairman and legal 
adviser respectively. 
8.5.2.  Upon  inquiry,  the  Public  Prosecutor's  Office  at  the  Luxembourg  District  Court 
categorically denied these claims, which it described as pure fantasy. It also stated that no inquiry 
concerning Mr Santer or any member of his  family  was  in progress  and  that  there  were no 
grounds for such a measure. 
8.5.3.  Mr Santer forwarded to  the Cmmittee a letter from the Public Prosecutor's Office at the 
Luxembourg District Court and  the  official records  of the  inquiry into GMP and fOShore 
Ecologies. A study of these documents shows that the claims reported in the press are without 
foundation. 
8.5.4.  Lastly, according  to  a  journalist,  the  Luxembourg  judicial  authorities  have  been 
investigating the real estate interests of Mr Santer's wife, who, 'in one way or another', was said 
to  have a holding in companies managing buildings used by the European Community. The 
Luxembourg Minister of Justice denied these claims in a communication dated 8 January 1999. 
8.5.5.  The Committee considers the allegations about Mr Santer to be unfounded. 
js.6. Mrs Wulf-Mathies 
The  appointment  of Mr  Vogel 
8.6.1.  Mr Vogel was appointed by DG XVI as a legal expert to work in the private office of Mrs 
Wulf-Mathies , who readily acknowledged that she had long been acquainted with Mrs Vogel. 
He signed a one-year contract as an auxiliary staff member assigned to DG XVI; the contract was 
signed by the Director-General of DG IX - Personnel and Administration. 
133 8.6.2.  Mr Vogel  is  a jurist.  He  first  served  as  a judge on  a  labour tribunal;  since  1994,  he has 
taught  labour  law,  environmental  law  and  food  law  with  a  view  to  its  integration  with 
environmental policy. 
8.6.3.  At the Commission, Mr Vogel dealt with legal issues relating to  the Structural Funds,  with 
particular regard  to  environmental policy and  the  imposition of penalties for offences. 
8.6.4.  Before the Committee of Independent Experts, Mrs Wulf-Mathies explained that Mr Vogel 
had been appointed by DG  XVI as  her legal  adviser because she needed and independent member 
of staff in  order to  explore  new  avenues  in  relations  with  the  Member  States,  with  a  view  to 
strengthening the  Commission's role by making greater use of penalties. The Committee accepted 
this  explanation but considered that, if Mrs Wulf-Mathies wished to recruit Mr Vogel,  she should 
have  appointed him to  one of the posts in her private office.  Mr Vogel's recruitment by DG  XVI 
for  Mrs  Wulf-Mathies'  private  office,  though  admissible  on  its  merits,  could  be  regarded  as 
bordering on  an  inappropriate procedure. 
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9.1. The Committee's mandate and the scope of its inquiries 
9.1.1.  The primary  task  of the  Committee  of Independent  Experts,  as  defined  in  its  terms  of 
reference,  is  to'seek to  establish  to  what extent the  Commission,  as  a body,  or Commissioners 
individually,  bear specific  responsibility for the  recent  examples of  fraud,  mismanagement or 
nepotism  raised in  Parliamentary discussiom(see  para.  1.1.4.). 
9.1.2.  In  order to  fulfill  this  mandate,  the Committee has  examined in detail a number of specific 
cases,  all  of which, to  a greater or lesser extent,  are  in  the  public arena and have  been raised in 
parliamentary discussions.  During the brief lifetime of the Committee, a number of other cases 
which merit further examination have been brought to  its  attention,  some very recently.  It has not 
been possible within the  time at  the  disposal of the Committee to  investigate such cases  for  the 
purposes of this report.  The following conclusions are therefore based exclusively on the  material 
contained  within  the  body  of the  report  and  do  not  refer  to  any  extraneous  information.  If 
possible under the  terms  laid down by  Parliament for  the second phase of the Committee's work, 
it  will  take the opportunity to  look more closely at  additional material in its  second report. 
9.1.3. In this  report, the Committee has,  for reasons of confidentiality,  generally avoided naming 
individuals:  only legal entities or Commissioners currently in office,  whom the Committee has 
interviewed,  are identified by name. 
9.2. Responsibility of the Commission and of individual Commissioners 
General  observations 
9.2.1.  Throughout its  series of hearings, and during  its examination of the files,  the Committee 
has  observed  that  Commissioners  sometimes  argued  that  they  were  not  aware  of what  was 
happening in  their services.  Undoubted  instances  of fraud  and  corruption  in  the  Commission 
have thus passed 'unnoticed' at the level of the  Commissioners  themselves. 
9.2.2.  While  such  affirmations,  if sincere,  would  clearly  absolve  Commissioners  of personal, 
direct responsibility for  the  individual instances of fraud  and  corruption,  they represent a serious 
admission of failure  in  another respect.  Protestations of ignorance on the part of Commissioners 
concerning problems that were often common knowledge  in their services, even up to the highest 
official levels, are tantamount to  an  admission of a loss  of control by the  political authorities over 
the  Administration that they are  supposedly running.  This  loss of control implies at the outset a 
heavy responsibility for both the Commissioners individually and  the Commission as  a whole. 
9.2.3. The Committee did not encounter cases  where a Commissioner was directly and personally 
involved  in  fraudulent  activities.  It found,  however,  instances  where  Commissioners  or the 
Commission  as  a  whole  bear  responsibility  for  instances  of  fraud,  irregularities  or 
mismanagement in their services or areas  of special respomily.  Furthermore,  the Committee 
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mismanagement. 
The  individual  cases  examined  by  the  Committee 
9.2.4.  In  theTOURISM  case,  the  Committee  found  that  the  Commission  and  the  successive 
Commissioners responsible bear joint responsibility for formulating and attempting to  implement 
a  policy for  which resources  were not available  and over which it was  exceedingly difficult to 
exert effective control. They must also bear responsibility for failing to  react over a lengthy period 
to clear warning signals that serious problems had arisen in  the Tourism Unit.  The Commissioner 
responsible  for  personnel  in  the  previous  Commission must take  responsibility  for  failure  to 
ensure  appropriate  disciplinary  sanctions  in  respect  of  one  of  the  two  officials  primarily 
concerned.  Finally, the Commission as  a whole is responsible  for delaying a positive response 
to  requests  for the  waiver of official immunity in  respect of three  senior officials for over two 
years,  for an excessively lenient attitude towards  the management failings  and poor judgment of 
the Director-General of DG  XXID  and for consistentl)ilfng to  inform the European Parliament 
as  to  the  true state of affairs  over many years. 
9.2.5. In theMED  case, the Committee found that Mr MARIN, the Commissioner responsible, 
acted swiftly and correctly in response to the discovery of irregulities, conflicts of interest and 
a lack of control.  The main criticism addressed to Mr MARIN is  that he allowed too long a 
period to elapse between the detection of problems by the Court of Auditors and the launching 
of an administrative inquiry (20 months).  The Commissioner who preceded Mr Marfn  must bear 
greater responsibility in that he presided over the creation of the management structures which 
subsequently gave rise to the situation described above.  His fault is one of omission: failing 
adequately to monitor the implementation of the MED programme in circumstances of high risk. 
The Commission as  a  whole  deserves  serious  criticism  (as  in other caswnder review)  for 
launching a  new,  politically important and highly expensive programme without having the 
resources - especially staff - to do so. 
9.2.6. In theECHO  cast; the main responsibility at the level of the Commissioners concerns the 
issue of staffing.  Mr MARIN was informed of the presence in ECHO of staff not employed in 
accordance with the Staff Regulations of Officials and,  notwithstanding the fact  that he gave 
written instructions to the contrary,  was nevertheless persuaded to  tolerate this  situation over 
several  years,  mainly as  a  result of the  absence of any response  to  his  repeated requests for 
additional staff.  This exposed ECHO to the fraud and irregularities which occurred.  There is, 
however, no suggestion that Mr MARIN was aware of any fraud.  During the investigations which 
followed, Mr MARIN and Mrs BONINO stated that they were not aware of the subject of the 
UCLAF inquiry.  However  that may be,  this  resulted  in a  prolonged  delay  before  the  facts 
emerged and remedial measures were taken. Here, too, the Commission as a whole must be held 
accountable for the fact that a major policy initiative was launched without the service concerned, 
ECHO, being given the means to implement the policy. 
9.2.7. In theLEONARDO  case,  Commissioner CRESSON failed to act in response to known 
serious and continuing irregularities over several years, starting with the audit of the predecessor 
programme  by DG XXII in  1994 and followed by further reports by DG XXII and DG XX.  In 
the case of the DG XX audit of 1998, she shares responsibility with the Financial Controller for 
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More  generally,  the  Commissioner responsible  must  assume  wider  responsibility  for  the  lax 
control  exercised  by  DG  XXII  over  the  Technical  Assistance  Office  and  for  the  poor 
communication  and  internal  control  mechanisms  within  the  Commission services  concerned. 
Mrs  CRESSON further bears  serious responsibility for  having failed,  though in full  possession 
of  the  facts,  to  inform  the  President  of the  Commission,  and  through  him,  the  European 
Parliament,  of the  problems  in  implementing Leonardo  I when the  latter had to  take a decision 
whether  or not  to  approve  Leonardo  II.  Finally,  the  Commission  as  a  whole  is  again  open  to 
criticism for  the  underresourcing phenomenon which is  at the root of the need to  delegate public-
sector responsibilities  to  outside consultants. 
9.2.8.  In  theSECURITY  OFFICE  case,  the  Commissioner responsible,  Mr SANTER,  acted 
swiftly after the  allegations  of fraud  appeared  in  the  press.  This  said,  audit  results  as  early as 
1993,  if followed  up by the  then President, might have enabled the nature of the problems in the 
Security Office to  be  identified much earlier.  The prime responsibility of Mr SANTER in  this 
case is  that neither he,  who  is  nominally responsible for the  Security Office, nor his private office, 
took any meaningful interest in  the way it operated.  As a result,  no  supervision was  exercised, 
and  a  'state  within a state' was  allowed to  develop,  with the consequences set out in  this  report. 
9.2.9.  In  theNUCLEAR  SAFETY case,  the principal accusation made by the  Committee,  one 
which  applied  to  the  Commission  generally  and  to  successive  Commissioners,  is  the  failing 
common to  several of the  cases examined,  namely undertaking  a  commitment in  a  new policy 
area without the  Commission possessing all  the resources  to  carry out its  task. 
Allegations  of favouritisllfxamined  by  the  Committee 
9.2.10.  As  regards  thCASES  OF FAVOURITISM  by individual Commissioners  it  examined, 
the Committee found  the following: 
in  the case  of Mrs  CRESSON,  the  Committee  found  that  the  Commissioner  bears 
responsibility for  one instance of favouritism. 
She should have  taken suitable steps  to  ensure  that  the  recruitment of a member of her 
staff who would be working closely with her was  carried out in compliance with all  the 
relevant legal criteria.  Subsequently,  she should  have employed  that person  to  perform 
work solely in the Community interest. 
In  the  case  of  Mrs  WULF-MATHIES,  the  Committee  found  that  she  used  an 
inappropriate procedure to recruit a person to join her personal staff and  carry out work 
of Community interest. 
In  the  case  of Mr PINHEIRO,  the  Committee  found  that  the  procedure  by  which  his 
brother-in-law was recruited was  correct and  that the  work that  the  latter carried out was 
of Community interest. Nevertheless, the Committee believes that a Commissioner should 
under no  circumstances recruit a close relation to  work in  his  or her Private  Office.  · 
In  the other case;.<; the  Committee found  no justification for  the  allegations  of favouritism 
levelled at Commissioners LTIKANEN, MARiN and SANTER. 
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9.3.1. The Commission, and Commissioners,  must  act in complete independence,  in  the  general 
interest  of the  Community,  and  with  integrity  and  discretion  on  the  basis  of certain  rules  of 
conduct.  These,  as the Committee pointed out at  the  outset of its report (para  1.5.4.),  are  part of 
a core of 'minimum standards in public life' accepted in the legal  orders  of the  Community and 
the  Member States.  The Committee found instances where no  irregularity,  let alone fraud,  could 
be  discovered,  in  the  sense  that  no  law  and/or  regulation  had  been  infringed,  but  where 
Commissioners allowed,  or even encouraged, conduct which,  although not illeJ!al' se, was  not 
acceptable. 
9.3.2.  This  is  the  case,  clearly,  were  favouritism  is  found.  Very often,  the  appointment of an 
individual  numbered among  the close friends,  or the  'entourage',  of a  Commissioner to  a  well-
remunerated  position  in  the  Commission,  or  the  granting  of  an  equally  well-remunerated 
consultancy contract, contravenes existing rules.  This  occurred where the person concerned was 
recruited into  a staff category for  which  he  lacked  the  qualifications  required.  However,  even 
where no  such irregularity occurs and  no rules  are  infringed,  Commissioners  should abstain from 
appointing spouses, close family relations or friends,  even those with appropriate qualifications, 
to  positions for which an open competition/tender procedure has not been held.  In  such instances, 
there should at  all  events be  at least an  obligation of disclosure in the course of the  appointment. 
9.3.3. The principles of openness,  transparency and  accounWiy (see above,  para.  1.5.4.), are 
at  the heart of democracy and are  the very instruments allowing it to function  properly.  Openness 
and  transparency  imply  that  the  decision-making  process,  at  all  levels,  is  as  accessible  and 
accountable as  possible to  the  general public.  It means  that the  reasons for  decisions taken, or not 
taken,  are known and that those taking decisions  assume responsibility for  them and are ready to 
accept  the  personal  consequences  when  such  decisions  are  subsequently shown  to  have  been 
wrong.  For instance,  calls  for  tender  should  be  much  more  open  and  transparent:  any  bidder 
should be in a position to  know  why his  bid was  not chosen and  why another one found favour. 
9.3.4.  The Committee found  that the relationship  between tilmissioners  and directors-general 
did  not  always  meet  this  standard.  The  separation  between  the  political  responsibility  of 
Commissioners (for policy decisions)  and  the  administrative responsibility of the  director-general 
and  the  services  (for the  implementation  of policy)  should  not be  stretched  too  far.  As  stated 
above,  it is  the  opinion  of the  Committee  that  Commissioners  must  continuously  seek  to  be 
informed  about  the  acts  and  omissions  of  the  directorates-general  for  which  they  bear 
responsibility and  that directors-general must keep  their Commissioners  informed of all  major 
decisions  they take  or become  aware  of.  This requirement  of mutual  information  implies  that 
Commissioners must be held to  know what is  going on in their services,  at least at  the level of the 
Director-General,  and should bear responsibility for it. 
9.3.5.  In  the  same  spirit,  the  Committee would stress  that it is imperative for all  those  working 
in  the Community Institutions  to  understand that no  strategy of cover-up may ever be considered 
acceptable.  No information may be  withheld from  other institutions,  such as  Parliament,  or other 
officials  - Commissioners especially - when  they are  called upon to  play a role in  the  decision-
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to  what  are  often  lengthy  contradictory  procedures  (as  in  the  case  of audit  reports).  Such 
information must be shared at  an early stage,  of course under cover of confidentiality, with the 
officials,  services, directorates or Commissioners who need to  have full  knowledge of the facts 
in the  light of the decisions to  be made or to be prepared. 
9.4. Reforms to be considered 
9.4.1.  Starting  from  the  early  1990s,  the  Commission  has  seen  its  direct  management 
responsibilities increase substantially. It has  been transformed from  an titution which devises 
and proposes policy into one which implements policy.  At the same time, its administrative and 
financial culture, the sense of individual responsibility among its  staff and awareness  of the need 
to comply with the rules of sound financial  management have not developed at the  same speed. 
The  senior  hierarchy  in  particular  remains  more  concerned  with  the  political  aspects  of the 
Commission's work than with management. Although the Santer Commission has taken a number 
of steps  to  speed up  the change of thinking required,  the  shortcomings which remain were clearly 
revealed  to  the  Committee  by  its  consideration  of  the  specific  issues  relating  to  direct 
management by the  Commission. 
9.4.2.  Most of the  Commissioners  heard  by  the  Committee  invoked  the  shortage  of human 
resources  as  the  main  reason  for  the  use  of mini-budgets,  TAOs  and  other forms  of external 
assistance  and  the  recruitment of auxiliary  staff.  However,  the  Commission  can  put  forward 
whatever proposals it sees fit  with regard to its Establishment Plan when it submits its preliminary 
draft budget to  the budgetary authority.  This is  why the Committee felt  that the excuses referring 
to  the  shortage of human resources  were  at  odds  with  the  decisions  taken by the  Commission 
itself to  continue the policy of austerity budgets since  1995. 
9.4.3.  No  one  disputes  that,  in  recent  years,  the  Commission  has  had  to  deal  with  many new 
challenges,  such  as  the  preparations  for  successive enlargements,  humanitarian  crises  and  the 
problem of refugees,  the  crisis  involving mad-cow disease, etc. 
In  the light of its  new management tasks,  the Commission had a duty to set priorities,  something 
which it failed  to  do,  preferring to  use Community funds  (sometimes illegally)  to  ensure a match 
between  the  objectives  to  be  achieved  and  the  resources  to  be  employed.  The  use  of outside 
assistance (TAOs and others)  demonstrates the fact  that the Commission has failed  to  tailor its 
human resources  to  its  needs  (redeployment, filling of vacant posts). 
9.4.4.  The Committee takes  the  view that the Commissioners had a  collective responsibility to 
adopt a joint stance on the human resources problems noted by individual Commissioners in order 
to avoid undermining the integrity of the European public service, a process which has gone hand 
in  hand  with  the  moral  and  economic  damage  denounced  by the  Commission's  internal  audit 
services, the supervising institutions  (Court of Auditors  and Parliament) and,  finally,  the press. 
A  mismatch  with  serious  consequences 
9.4.5. The problems encountered in  connection with each of these cases can be traced back to the 
mismatch between the  objectives assigned to  the  Commission,  in the context of the new policy 
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which the Commission has  been able, or has chosen,  to  employ in  the  service of that new policy. 
9.4.6.  The  redeployment  of existing  staff  proved  impossible  for  a  number  of reasons:  the 
compartmentalisation of the  directorates-general,  the  existence of as  many fiefdoms  as  there are 
Commissioners  and  the  commonly-held  feeling  that  a  change  of posting  at  the  behest  of the 
appointing  authority  without  the  consent  of the  official  concerned  could  be  equated  with  a 
punishment.  An  increase,  in  the  Commission's  operating  budget,  in  the  appropriations  for 
auxiliary staff might have offered a partial  solution. 
9.4.7.  The Committee of Experts found  no  evidence of any attempt by the Commission to  assess 
in  advance  the  volume  of resources  required  when  a  new  policy  was  discussed  among  the 
Community Institutions. 
9.4.8. The Committee has not had time to  consider staff management or any changes which might 
be  made  to  the  Staff Regulations.  However,  it  notes  that  a  number of Commissioners  have, 
unprompted, expressed their conviction that no  genuine improvement in the way the  Commission 
works  will  be possible  without in-depth consideration of these points. 
9.4.9.  As  regards  organisational  methods,  the  same  picture  of  an  inability  to  anticipate 
requirements emerges:  the Commission did  not  try to  lay down  in advance how each new policy 
would have to  be implemented and  to  make  the  necessary arrangements accordingly.  It reacted 
as  each individual  problem emerged,  without a guiding philosophy and  with no  overall  view of 
the  situation,  on the  one  hand,  by  recruiting  temporary  or agency  staff,  and,  on  the  other,  by 
subcontracting tasks out to the TAOs. 
9.4.10.  The  contracts  for  the  provision  of services  were  often  awarded  under  questionable 
circumstances,  a  situation  encouraged  by the  vagueness  and  the  scattered  nature  of the  texts 
governing the  award of contracts and  the  weakness of the ACPC. 
Control  mechanisms 
9.4.11.  This  brings  us  to  the  central  issue:  why  were  the  control  and  audit  mechanisms  not 
adequate to  rectify these  problems  in good time? 
9.4.12.  In connection with  most of the cases  under consideration,  the  external  auditor (the Court 
of Auditors) produced reports  which were clear and  to  the point (for example in  1992  and  1996 
on tourism policy and  in  1996 on MED and ECHO).  However, only one of the  two arms of the 
budgetary authority (Parliament)  gave  them proper consideration. 
9.4.13.  Within  the  Commission,  the  internal  audit  and  control  mechanisms  failed  to  work 
effectively.  The  Committee  regards  this  as  a  central  issue.  In  order  to  analyse  it,  a  clear 
distinction must be drawn  between auditing and  a priori control. 
9.4.14.  A priori control  is  embodied in the approval procedure,  for  which DG XX is  responsible; 
this  procedure, as  currently employed within  the Commission, is  very ineffective.  Most of the 
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gave  its  approval. 
9.4.15.  Internal  auditing  is  carried  out by  a small  unit  within  DG XX.  As  the  Committee has 
noted,  its  work is  generally satisfactory.  However,  not all  the  cases  which warrant consideration 
are dealt with in good time.  It is not capable of masterminding the operations designed to remedy 
the situation.  It  is  more and  more  common for UCLAF,  which is  not part of DG  XX,  to be asked 
to carry out purely internal Commission inquiries  in competition with the internal auditing unit, 
undermining the  latter's  authority. 
9.4.16.  A  priori  control  and  internal  auditing  are  activities  which  employ completely different 
techniques  and  address  completely different concerns. The arrangement whereby they have been 
kept  together within  the  same directorate-general  should be  reviewed.  Internal  auditing  must 
play an  effective supporting role in the service of the Commission so that the  latter can exercise 
its  responsibilities.  With  that  aim  in  view,  the  human  resources  allocated  to  internal  auditing 
should be greatly increased.  In  addition,  internal auditing must take  place independently. 
9.4.17.  In  general,  the contradictory procedures which are  part and parcel of internal  auditing take 
too  long  and  allow  scope for  any conclusions  to  be  watered  down.  They should  therefore  be 
governed by strict rules:  once a binding time-limit,  of between one and  two  months,  has passed, 
a department which has  been audited and which  has  not responded to  a preliminary audit report 
should be given  to  understand that the  audit report will be published without its reply. 
UCLAF 
9.4.18. UCLAF's position within the Commission, as  one of the bodies responsible for combating 
fraud  and irregularities,  is  less  than clear.  UCLAF must not act as  an internal auditing  service: 
the majority of its staff do not have the requisite professional skills.  At present,  there seems to 
be competition between the two internal auditing services.  Parallel to,  but distinct from,  internal 
auditing,  UCLAF must carry out its  own specific task.  That consists of considering,  inside and 
outside the  Commission,  on  the  basis  of audit reports  (starting  at  the pre-report stage)  or other 
available  sources  of information,  all  situations  in  which  the  protection  of the  Communities' 
financial  interests is  at  stake,  preparing the files  to  be forwarded  to the judicial authorities  of the 
Member States and  then monitoring  the  entire proceedings. 
9.4.19.  As  the  Committee's consideration of the cases in  question has  shown, UCLAF does not 
operate  exactly  in  this  way.  Its  intervention  sometimes  slows  the  procedures  down,  without 
necessarily improving the end result. 
Administrative  and disciplinary  inquiries 
9.4.20.  Administrative inquiries are informal procedures which the tilmission often employs, 
particularly if senior officials  are  involved,  in order to  bring irregularities and  cases of fraud  to 
light.  Such inquiries  are  generally entrusted to  a serving director-general,  sometimes to  a group 
of three such officials.  Although it recognises  the value of gathering in  this  way a solid body of 
evidence possibly with a  view  to  disciplinary proceedings,  the  Committee  warns  against over-
frequent recourse to  such procedures  and urges  caution in  the  way they are  used,  particularly as 
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of results.  They may sometimes even act  as  a deterrent to  the opening of disciplinary proceedings. 
9.4.21.  Disciplinary  proceedings  are  rare,  although  the  Committee  has  noted  that  they  have 
recently been increasing in  number.  It encountered cases were  they should have been initiated, 
but were not.  This concerns,  in particular,  very senior officials to  whom Article 50 of the Staff 
Regulations  (retirement in  the  interests of the service) has  been applied,  generously and  without 
hesitation,  enabling them to  depart with their reputation intact and  a comfortable pension. 
9.4.22.  Secondly,  disciplinary proeedings  often  come  too  late  in  the  day and  are  slow.  This 
remark chimes in with those  made above concerning the  weaknesses of financial  control,  internal 
auditing,  UCLAF,  administrative  inquiries  and  the  confusion  between  these  activities.  It is 
difficult to  identify individual responsibilities  within the Commission and  its  departments. 
9.4.23.  Finally,  disciplinary  boards  propose  penalties  which  are  too  lenient  and  which  the 
appointing  authority is  reluctant to  increase,  as  it is  entitled to  do.  The Committee considers that 
the  circumstances  preventing  the  Administration  from  putting  its  case  to  disciplinary  boards 
should be  reviewed,  along  with  the  very complex  scale  of penalties  provided  for  by  the  Staff 
Regulations. 
Responsibility 
9.4.24.  The Commission does  not have  a simple,  rapid and  practical internal financial  procedure 
to  establish individual responsibility for the  irregularities,  and  the  instances of fraud  which may 
result,  perpetrated by its  own officials.  The Committee  noted  this  shortcoming in  most of the 
cases  it  considered.  It would  therefore  be  desirable  if the  audit  reports  were  to  focus  more 
systematically,  in their conclusions,  on the  assessment of individuals' performance.  Should that 
assessment go against the  official concerned, an independent administrative committee, including 
a  representative of the  internal  auditing  unit,  could  propose  suitable  action  to  the  appointing 
authority. 
9.4.25.  The responsibility of individual Commissioners, or of the:rfimission  as  a body,  cannot 
be a vague idea,  a concept which in practice proves unrealistic. It must go  hand in  hand with an 
ongoing process designed to  increase awareness of that  respomi~. Each individual  must feel 
accountable for the measures  he or she manages.  The studies carried out by the Committee have 
too often revealed a growing reluctance among the members of the hierarchy to  acknowledge their 
responsibility.  It is  becoming  difficult  to  find  anyone  who  has  even  the  slightest  sense  of 
responsibility.  However,  that sense of responsibility is  essential. It must be  demonstrated,  first 
and foremost,  by the  Commissioners individually and  the  Commission  as  a body.  The temptation 
to  deprive the  concept of responsibility of all  substance is  a dangerous one.  That concept is  the 
ultimate manifestation of democracy. 
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Specific cases examined: Commissioners and Services Responsible 
CASE  COMMISSIONER  SERVICE 
Tourism  Mr CARDOSO E  DG  XXID Enterprise Policy, Distributive 
CUNHA (until  1992)  Trades, Tourism and Cooperatives 
Mr VANNI 
D'ARCHIRAFI (until 
1994) 
Mr PAPOUTSIS 
(from  1995) 
MED  Mr MATUTES (until  DGffi  External Relations:  Southern 
1992)  Mediterranean, Middle East, Latin 
Mr MARIN (from  America,  South and  South-East Asi, 
1993)  and North-South Cooperation 
ECHO  Mr MARIN  (until  ECHO  European Community Humanitarian 
1994)  Office  (Directorate) 
Mrs  BONINO (from 
1995) 
LEONARDO  Mrs  CRESSON  DG  XXll  Education,  Training and  Youth 
Security Office  Mr SANTER (reports  Security Office - Directorate 
direct to  President) 
Nuclear Safety  Mr Van  Den  BROEK  DG  lA  External Relations:  Europe and the 
New Independent States,  Common 
Foreign and  Security Policy and 
External Missions 
Other relevant Commissioners and Services in the context of the cases examined 
All  cases  Mr Van MIERT (unti  DG  IX  Personnel  and  Administration 
(except nuclear  1994) 
safety)  Mr LllKANEN (from  . 
1995) 
All  cases  Mrs  GRADIN  DG  XX  Financial Control 
(except nuclear  UCLAF  Task force  set up  to  coordinate the 
safety)  fight  against fraud  (Directorate of th 
Secretariat- General) 
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